Can you better explain your rejection of WLC on the point? I can "picture" a world where there is only a colony of diseased rabbits much as I can picture a billion sided figure as vaguely circular, but I'm not sure I can construct a "logical picture" of such a world. My knowledge of geometry at least gives me some confidence that I can, with a computer and some work, ensure the consistency and full implications of the notion of a billion-sided figure, but my knowledge of biology gives me no comparable confidence. So I'm asking for more clarification on your rejection of the first objection. I don't know why conceivably exercises should on their own imply anything more than a kind of psychological possibility.

That said, yes I'm highly suspicious of the usual notions of evil that pop up here. Craig is at least more interesting than 'something that makes me cry happens for no good reason' but even there the "evil" is a matter of high anthropological significance.

DanielCC wrote:

Response One: Deny the possibility of such worlds tout court. This is WLC’s answer which I don’t care for as it pushes too far against conceivability – we can clearly construct logical pictures of such worlds which heavily implies they are in fact possible. 
 
 

I would go with this response, but also maintain conceivability is a reasonable indication of possibility. Here is how:
Let's assume that God exists as understood by Christians (all good all powerful etc.) and is the creator of all that exists in every possible world. For instance, in a world like our own but with a different set of animals, God is the creator. In a world very different from our own in which there is no space and time but only angels, God is the creator. 

Further, let's assume that any contingent universe necessarily requires God to create it. So no universe can exist uncaused. 

Now, consider the world with gratituous evil, say in which all that exists is a colony of diseased rabbits. Given my assumptions, it would follow that in such a world it is true to say "God created a world with gratitous evil." But such a thing, on the assumption that God is all-good, is an impossibility. It is like saying "God created a world with pointy circles." or "God causes moral evil." 

What this shows is that whether or not such a world is possible depends on the nature of its creator. But we cannot use the possibility of such a world to determine the nature of the creator because this has the logical order backwards. 

iwpoe wrote:

Can you better explain your rejection of WLC on the point? I can "picture" a world where there is only a colony of diseased rabbits much as I can picture a billion sided figure as vaguely circular, but I'm not sure I can construct a "logical picture" of such a world. My knowledge of geometry at least gives me some confidence that I can, with a computer and some work, ensure the consistency and full implications of the notion of a billion-sided figure, but my knowledge of biology gives me no comparable confidence. So I'm asking for more clarification on your rejection of the first objection. I don't know why conceivably exercises should on their own imply anything more than a kind of psychological possibility.

That said, yes I'm highly suspicious of the usual notions of evil that pop up here. Craig is at least more interesting than 'something that makes me cry happens for no good reason' but even there the "evil" is a matter of high anthropological significance.

Okay, time for some 'fine grain' distinctions. Conceivability need not capture all that's possible and 'Imaginability' need not capture all that's conceivable. In the instance of 'picturing' a billion sided shape as vaguely circular one is either coupling one's image of a circle with the semantic label 'billion sided' shape or being led astray by the limitations of one's visual imagination. In itself the process is vague and when brought to clarity one sees were it fails.
 
I call what can be captured in a logical picture what we can conceive and imagine when the two cohere. It has more modal cash value than 'mere' conceivability, unless that conceivability be fleshed out in other ways e.g. by bringing it closer to our modal experiences and prior knowledge - the 'logical picture' idea is derived from Descartes' 'Clear and Distinct perception' argument with a little fleshing out from the Tractatus. Of course such things only capture a relatively small amount of the conceivable and the possible - we cannot picture to ourselves a being's having a mind though that's in no way to say we cannot conceive it.
 
For some of these scenarios I would indeed claim that they're impossible but not because of their incompatibility with God (this is my gripe with WLC). Let's go with the rabbit example - if Evil is the frustration of a being's flourishing and the flourishing of beings at one another's expense in the actual world is permissible then for the rabbit world to be impermissibly evil then nothing can benefit from the rabbits' decline - no bacteria, micro-organisms, plants et cetera. This leads to an odd point though - if the world consists of no living organism other than rabbits i.e. no plants, no intestinal microbes necessary for digestion - how do they subsist long enough to suffer privation gratuitously? By analysing the ‘logical picture’ in question one might conclude that the only way for such a world to be possible is through miraculous intervention, which, of course, cannot be captured straight in a logical picture.
 
I would deny that a world where all humans are eternally damned or achieve union with God can be captured in a logical picture too so WLC’s own example loses most of its strength. I endorse a kind of Platonic Universalism so would deny the possibility of any entity’s being eternally sundered from God at least against its will.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I don't see what difference the possible world talk makes to this argument. Surely, one could just as easily talk about alleged gratuitious evil in this world.

Well one could change it to talk about the possibility of gratuitious evil in this world - the important point is it being even possible. The other key thing is that there can be nothing else in that world, no competing instances of goodness: it has to be soley the evil scenario.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Anyway, to all versions of the so called problem of evil is there not the response available that, because for the sake of the argument that one is putting forth one is committed to the existence of objective good (after all, what meaning would a problem of evil have if good and evil are just subjective), in classical theism God is absolute goodness itself. The atheist is then in the absurd position of suggesting absolute goodness is not good enough, or of appealing from absolute goodness to what they take to be a higher good.

This is a very good point but I think it will lead us to have to deal with the question of whether God is by internal nature compelled to create the best possible world.
 

Last edited by DanielCC (7/31/2015 6:09 am)

Rivers23 wrote:

I was always kind of confused with the skeptics' obsession with the ''problem'' of evil. I argue that evil is necessary for free will, period. In my mind, that cuts off all the whining about evil.

I don’t' view normal problems of evil as that important either, though I'll stress that in this example one need not refer to beings with free will so that defense is out. The argument is that God's 'presence' in all possible worlds should render evil worlds impossible and they do not, prima facia, appear to be so.

Rivers23 wrote:

As for the omnibenevolence, it may have bee dr. Feser who said well God can't force you into His presence, you can be a great person all your life but if you're an atheist, you're not going to Heaven because you don't want to be with God. And again, God's omnibenevolence can't trump free will bestowed upon us by God. So if you choose to do evil, what can God's omnibenevolence do about that if you have free will to do so? I mean, God is bound by laws which God instituted, this is also why I reject the argument that gratuitous evil is somehow incompatible with God's omnipotence.

Free Will objection duly noted. I'm not sure about that way of explaining the atheist's situation covers all bases - there have been a good number of atheists who would like God to exist only don't think that is the case.

Rivers23 wrote:

We can define evil as something that is contrary to God and God's will. Thus, God did not create evil, God merely gave us a choice, a freedom to do something that is contrary to God's laws. - thus, God did not create evil, unless one supposes that God giving us freedom constitutes the creation of evil. The guy who put together that argument in the original post completely distances evil from this and see it just as something distinct from the other laws of the universe.

Now, if we agree that evil is necessary because it is basically an extension of free will, how can we say that an extension of free will trumps God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence? It simply does not and this is where the argument falls apart for me, because it basically states ''God presence in all worlds renders free will (or a direct result of free will) impossible''. And I think we agree that free will exists, thus the argument just falls apart.

But the argument does not require the existence of beings with free will (the rabbit example for instance) so even if the appeal to free will does work in the case of humans there’s still more work to be done.