"DanielCC" wrote:

What out of interest is your reason for restricting the scope of the term 'exists' to the objects of the natural sciences? Assumably by objects of the natural sciences you mean concrete material particulars?

According to my definition of 'existence', things that exist consist of parts, and have a beginning and an end in time. And that coincides pretty exactly with the objects of natural sciences, or, as you say 'concrete material particulars'.

I think, in traditional philosophy, that the domain of 'concrete material particulars' occupied a particular level, as it were.

I hadn't heard about Russell attempting to define 'existence' in those terms. I have read his discussion of Meinong, but, like him, I found Meinong impossible to fathom.

My initial intuition about this was the Platonist notion that, for instance, real numbers are unlike existing things, because they don't come into and go out of existence. IN fact prime numbers are by their definition, indivisible. If you read this brief passage ]about Augustine's conception of 'intelligible objects', you will see how he argues on this basis for the reality of incorporeals.  It is basically a Platonist argument.

So, I am working on the idea that the 'intelligible objects' do in some sense correspond to the Platonist idea of numbers, forms and universals. In other words, they are not existent in the sense that manifest objects are existent. They subsist within the operations of thought but pertain to a different level than the domain of concrete material particulars. I think this is why Plato distinguishes the knowledge pertaining to them in terms of dianoia and noesis.

Last edited by quotidian (8/06/2015 5:48 am)

The reason I asked about language, is because I suspect that in some other languages, the distinction between 'existing' and 'being' might be easier to articulate, but it is not that important.

quotidian wrote:

Well I would say that God is being itself  - but not existence. That avoids pantheism - but the distinction between 'being' and 'existing'  has to be able to be made. That is what I am on about.

The distinction that you are aiming at can be expressed in terms of degrees of reality. Phenomena and appearances are less real as they come and go. Their existence is less relevant. Immutable immaterial things like universals are more real, precisely because they are immutable.

For example cold and warm are less real, because a place is either warm or cold, but temperature is more real, because anywhere you turn you will find temperature. By the same logic, since God is the absolute, God is the truest existence, the greatest reality, and all lesser things are gradually less real.

quotidian wrote:

Because it matters in common discourse and in philosophy. The ability to distinguish between being and existence underlies the notion of an hierarchy of being which is precisely what has been collapsed in modern thinking.

Bu what does it tell us that is new or conceptualy clarifying? How is it that God exist in a fuller way than an electron? Because God cannot fail to exist? But that is just to say God is necessary whilst the electron is contingent, something we could say without modifying use of the term existent. It might seem I'm coming down very hard on you about this but I honestly think the temptation to use well-known terms in unusual ways has lead to much confusion in terms of understanding ontologies.

quotidian wrote:

 That is why modern philosohy can't even conceive of what the words 'ontology' and 'metaphysics' mean (not to say there aren't modern philosophers who can't but the mainstream anglo-analytic tradition can't as a matter of principle.)

What proofs would you give to justify this assertion? Were we talking about the period when Russell and immediate successors were writing (read as constantly whinging about ∃x) I'd heartily agree, but now I’d say the Analytical tradition can talk about these issues as clearly as it was ever possible in history, what with the advances in modal logic and the revival of Divine Simplicity and the metaphysics which underpin it in recent years. I certainly can think of no other contemporary philosophical school which is doing such work (if you know of Continental philosophers who are please, please point me in their direction).

quotidian wrote:

The other time the distinction strikes me is exactly in translations of old Greek and Latin texts (I don't read either, incidentally) where God is referred to as 'beyond being', which I think is a non-sequiter. Surely what is meant is 'transcendent', i.e. 'unmanifest' or 'unmade', that which neither begins nor ends. So not 'beyond being' but 'beyond existing things' or 'beyond existence'.  It might seem like a quibble but whenever I read translations of old philosophy, I notice this.

I think you're correct in your interpretation there. The Beyond-Being idea probably comes from Plato or at least Platonists carving up reality into the realm of Becoming (the world of particular things), the realm of Being (the world of the Forms) and that which is Beyond-Being (the Form of the Good or the One). I think they're getting at an important truth here (the order of ontological dependence) but I don't think that's depedent on their choice of terms.

quotidian wrote:

I have the idea that traditional theology and philosophy enables the distinctions between 'created temporal things' (which include the body) and created incorporeal beings (which include the soul and the angelic intelligences.) Am I right in saying that? Then, the incorporeal beings (souls and angelic intelligences) whilst not eternal are immortal, and simple, i.e. not composed of parts.

Yes, that is true (though Thomists specifically would say that they're still composite in that their essence is distinct from their existence): they are still contingent though, it is logically possible for them not to be.
 

Last edited by DanielCC (8/06/2015 8:18 pm)

Daniel CC wrote:

How is it that God exist in a fuller way than an electron? Because God cannot fail to exist? But that is just to say God is necessary whilst the electron is contingent, something we could say without modifying use of the term existent. It might seem I'm coming down very hard on you about this but I honestly think the temptation to use well-known terms in unusual ways has lead to much confusion in terms of understanding ontologies.

There was a discussion in a Philosophy Now magazine about Hegel's religious philosophy, which talks about that question (which I might try and dig out).

But the choice of 'an electron' as an example of 'something that exists' is problematical, because there is still a great deal of uncertainty about that . But let's say that the metaphorical chairs/tables/apples exist - no contention there, I hope - but the nature of the existence of inanimate things is different to the nature of the existence of humans; which is why humans are 'beings' and chairs are 'things'. So there is something intrinsic to humans which differentiates them from 'things'.

I don't object at all to the criticism -after all that is why I put up the idea - but I don't yet see a reason to abandong the distinction I'm trying to make.

Daniel CC wrote:

I’d say the Analytical tradition can talk about these issues [i.e. metaphysics and ontology] as clearly as it was ever possible in history, what with the advances in modal logic and the revival of Divine Simplicity and the metaphysics which underpin it in recent years..

Could you recommend any sources on that? (I am actually intending to enrol in Oxford's external studies unit in Metaphysics pending getting my employment situation sorted out.)

Scott wrote:

Souls and angels are temporal.

I understand them to be immortal but not eternal.

Last edited by quotidian (8/06/2015 11:52 pm)