- truthseeker
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Re: Aquinas' Definition of Being
First of all, I want to clarify that I used the word 'predicable' to mean what would be called 'property' by many contemporary philosophers. I wanted to avoid 'property' because that term has a different meaning in Scholastic philosophy. Perhaps I should've used the word 'accident?'
Anyway, I agree that not every predicate expresses a property (i.e. a predicable). If we assume certain predicates express properties we get a contradiction (e.g. 'is believed by the Greeks to be identical to Hesperus'–– tell me if I need to explain that). But why should we assume that 'exists' doesen't express the property of existence? Furthermore, if there's no property of existence, then what is existence?
John West wrote:
...I should expand by saying that properties are grounded in a substance and can be actualized (are actual or potencies) in virtue of a specific essence or form tied up with the matter of the substance.
When you say 'essence or form' is the 'or' the 'or' of synonymy or the 'or' of disjunction? That is, is essence the same as form? I was assuming a form was a property, which would imply that a substance could have many forms. But you seem to speak rather of a substance having a single form with different aspects.
- Scott
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Re: Aquinas' Definition of Being
On my way out of the house, but I wanted to give a quick reply to a couple of terminological questions:
I wanted to avoid 'property' because that term has a different meaning in Scholastic philosophy. Perhaps I should've used the word 'accident?'
Yes, if you want to follow Scholastic usage, the proper term is "accident" (rather, in fact, than either "property" or "attribute"). Substances exist in and of themselves, and accidents exist only in substances.
Even here we have to be careful, though. Aquinas distinguishes five "predicables," namely genus, difference, species, property, and accident, where "accident" has a narrower meaning and "property" is in a sense intermediate between substance and accident. A property isn't an accident in this narrower sense, although it's sometimes called a "proper accident." Basically, a property is a characteristic that in some way "flows from" or "follows from" an essence.
I was assuming a form was a property, which would imply that a substance could have many forms. But you seem to speak rather of a substance having a single form with different aspects.
A substance does have a single substantial form, but it can have lots and lots of accidental forms. Also, a form can be predicated of a substance, but in general it isn't a property (again in the Scholastic sense).
EDIT: I've just posted this, and the first item on the list may be helpful.
Last edited by Scott (7/22/2015 12:29 pm)
- John West
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Re: Aquinas' Definition of Being
But why should we assume that 'exists' doesen't express the property of existence? Furthermore, if there's no property of existence, then what is existence?
Thomists argue for a real distinction between essence and existence (ie. see Scholastic Metaphysics, p. 241 - 256). So if properties flow from essences, existence can't be a property.
But I'll be frank, the real distinction is one of the trickiest, most difficult parts of Thomistic metaphysics to argue for. The ghost of Scotus haunts me.
Last edited by John West (7/22/2015 10:58 am)
- Ste11aeres
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Re: Aquinas' Definition of Being
I'm reading through Feser's Aquinas and I'm really stuck on what 'being' is supposed to mean; I've had to stop reading altogether as I've gotten to the Five Ways because I can't understand them without this more fundamental concept.
What I've gathered so far: 'Being' can't mean the same thing as 'existence' since almost everything can have being without having existence (except God). It also apparently has a hierarchy, as God has more being than any other (though he has it in a difference sense than we do). But does that mean 'being' something is like an essence or a description of a thing? I'm uncertain.
I've greatly appreciated the book so far, but I'm reading it on my own and am feeling about portions of it as the Etheopian eunich. If if someone could give me a clear, concise definition of 'being' as Aquinas/Feser use the term, I'd be really grateful.
I haven't read through all the responses, so pardon me if someone already said this, but you might like Etienne Gilson's book: Being and Some Philosophers.
Also, Aquinas's work: De Ente et Essentia.