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- Dennis
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Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
My problems with the Thomistic invention of Essence and Existence begins from its very introduction.
"A distinction is commonly drawn in Scholastic metaphysics between the essence of a thing (that is to say, what the thing is) and the existence of the thing (that it is). Considered by itself, a contingent thing's essence is taken to be a kind of potency, and its existence a kind of actuality. For there is nothing in the essence of a tree, for example, that entails that it exists, which is why trees come into being and pass away. By itself the essence of a tree specifies a merely potential kind of being. The same is true of the essence of a Velociraptor and the essence of a unicorn (if unicorns have essences). That it exists is what makes it the case that a tree is also an actual kind of being, whereas velociraptors and unicorns are merely potential because the first no longer exists and the second never did." (Scholastic Metaphysics, p. 241)
How can the Thomist know of an uncreated or an un-instantiated objects essence? Or rather, how can the object of knowledge be uninstantiated, and yet can be had? Is it simply the notion that, ‘What is?’ and ‘Is it?’ are two different questions, even if the postulated essence fails to capture any reality of what it means to be a Unicorn?
My main contention here concerns the inference from the notion of a Unicorn(or anything as such) is non-contradictory, it thus follows that it is not only logically possible, but metaphysically possible. Where does this metaphysical possibility come from? Whenever we speak of potency, we seek to assign it as a function or a principle of an object. Is it proper to then move on from the notion of potency, which is a function of things that are in act, to the idea of metaphysical possibility?
From what I’ve learnt, it seems that the people who make such a move (as I would), by introducing a distinction between something being logically possible and metaphysically possible would seem to threaten the notion of contingency altogether. Is this correct? However, I’m hesitant to accept such a plethora of uncreated possibles into my ontology without arguments that strengthen this via the demonstration of the existence of a Purely Actual Being. Another thing to add would be that this makes me question the notion of contingency altogether as well insofar as created objects go. I think there’s a lot to say here, but I have no idea as to where to begin in terms of speaking of contingency.
What do we mean by contingency? I can ask a few questions here.
- The notion that something could exist at a specific time, and then fail to exist at another time?
This is perhaps the first notion of contingency that I was aware of, and while it is good pointer to what it would actually mean for something to be contingent, it is a purely rough and ready version of what it means to be contingent, although still valid, it’s pretty weak since it doesn’t tell me whether the object of instantiation and failure to exist is always in potency to existence or actual at times. For if it is in potency to be actual, it has some sort of existence. For potency inheres in act.
- The notion that for something to exist, it is dependent on something other than itself to exist?
This is a better and a stronger notion of contingency as far as I’m concerned, if and only if it clarifies under investigation that it is dependent upon something other than itself for its existence. However, it is still insufficient for me, since it fails to tell me that it being in potency couldn’t be part of an already existing existent.
- For uninstantiated, and uncreated objects to be in potency to existence, and thus have some sort of existence either as a principle of some act, or as Divine Ideas for uncreated objects respectively?
This is the final notion of contingency. For the objections of instantiation and thus dependence, to totally depend on God for their being, in this, uncreated and uninstantiated objects exist in the mind of God as Divine Ideas or possibles. To me, this is what it means for something to be contingent. We never see Unicorns(whatever the essence of the Unicorn may be), but God could, in fact, produce Unicorns, even if he never in fact wills to create one. This is the only definition that purely captures what it means for something to be contingent, or exist contingently.
I think there is a problem with the last notion of contingency. If we do admit that the third one captures in full what it means to be a contingent entity, then in what sense do we say that uncreated objects that God knows are really possible? However, I do think that this is right, since it preserves the notion of true contingency. If I’m wrong, and it somehow doesn’t, please feel free to correct my mistakes.
Aquinas's arguments for the real distinction of essence and existence are seemingly in one way or the other, dependent upon demonstrating the existence of a Being that is Purely Actual.
The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Aquinas's metaphysics in talking of Essence and Existence by Gaven Kerr ends with the following,
"Notice that here Thomas correlates essence and existence as potency and act only after he has concluded to the existence of a being whose essence is its existence (God). One wonders then whether or not essence and existence can be related as potency and act only on the presupposition of the existence of God. Regardless of his preferred method in the De Ente Chapter 4, Thomas could very well have focussed on the efficiently caused character of existence in finite entities (as he does in the opening lines of the argument for the existence of God), and argued that insofar as existence is efficiently caused (whether or not this is from God), existence stands to that in which it inheres as act to potency, in which case the essence that possesses existence stands in potency to that act of existence. Therefore, Thomas need not presuppose the existence of God in order to hold that essence and existence are related as potency and act; all he need presuppose is (i) that essence and existence are distinct and (ii) that existence is efficiently caused in the essence/existence composite."
Now here's the problem I have with this sort of analysis. Assuming that the polygenic view of causation is correct, I fail to see how the essence of an object is really distinct from its existence. Consider the example of a matchstick that is struck constantly in a vacuum, but never ignites due to the lack of oxygen. The matchstick has an inherent tendency or potency to ignite, but in fact may never be able to. Suppose next that oxygen is introduced into the vacuum and thus causes concurrently the match to ignite. What has happened here is that it is the identity condition of the matchstick that which has caused for such a disposition to take place given the introduction of oxygen and the striking. In other words, the ignition of the match is inherent and part and parcel of what it means to be a match. How then could the essence be really distinct, since the match is always in potency to ignition? I do want to maintain that potencies exist, and that they exist as a function of that which is actual. Only that they have a different kind of existence from actual existence.
I think I've asked a lot of questions here. I may not have been clear enough in expressing myself, I may have been sloppy in my formulations. I've asked these questions because I'm having a hard time with this bedrock Thomistic notion and I'm slowly leaning towards Scotus. The horror in doing that is that such a move in regards to essence & existence, may potentially lead to justifying the distinctions we see to the effect that all that exists is one thing, i.e. Monism. Amidst all other questions, is this a valid fear? If it is, it is one of my greatest fears.
Last edited by Dennis (1/12/2016 12:34 pm)
- Scott
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
Dennis wrote:
How can the Thomist know of an uncreated or an un-instantiated objects essence?
In what way does it seem that the Thomistic account of the real distinction depends on such knowledge? If we're not sure unicorns have essences (a possibility that Ed parenthetically acknowledges), substitute velociraptors, which did exist even if they don't now. What goes wrong with the account?
My main contention here concerns the inference from the notion of a Unicorn(or anything as such) is non-contradictory, it thus follows that it is not only logically possible, but metaphysically possible. Where does this metaphysical possibility come from?
If "metaphysical possibility" means something more than "logical possibility," then I'm not sure this does follow. But as far as I know, when Aquinas says something is metaphysically possible, all he means is that it doesn't involve a contradiction.
- Dennis
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
Hi Scott,
Yes, I'm aware of the fact that Ed acknowledges such a thing. I suppose I'm confused on what the Thomist means when they say that they 'know' the essence of either a Unicorn or a velociraptor. What you say later clarifies a few things for me if you're right.
There is a difference for something to be logically possible and to be in potency to existence in reality, the latter which I call metaphysical possibility. If Aquinas means nothing more than logical possibility, say for instance a Unicorn or a velociraptor, how can the move be made that its essence and existence are distinct without demonstrating the existence of a Purely Actual Being? My problem is, that it is far from clear to me as to what the proof or demonstration concerns.
I don't have a problem the demonstration to the effect of an existence of a Purely Actual Being.
After all, from what it seems(although I may be incredibly wrong), I don't see the difference in Aquinas asking the question about real distinction distinct from asking, "Can 'x' be the sort of thing that exists necessarily?", isn't it just questioning whether what it is at hand contingent or not? I should add, if this is the case, doesn't this just demonstrate that its whole being is contingent, rather than its Essence being contingent on Existence?
Say that velociraptors were in potency to existence(metaphysically possible), and that unicorns were never in potency to existence, but logically possible. The Thomist wants to say that there is a real distinction between the essence and the existence of either entities, however, the velociraptor in some sense does exist. Whereas the unicorn, never does, and thus could only exist in the mind of God as a Divine Idea. Maybe consider matter, which Aquinas considered to be pure potentiality, and thus did not exist unless and until some form actualized it. How can I say the same thing when it concerns a velociraptor which is definitely an existent, however, unactualized? Am I in anyway right to question this, or is it all wrong-headed?
If there is no difference between Aquinas's questions and mine, I do not consider this to be a proper demonstration where the essence of something is actually distinct from its Existence, for there are at least three ways we can look at essences.
i. Logically possible essences, objects which don't involve a contradiction.
ii. Metaphysically possible essences, objects which are in potency to existence.
iii. Uncreated possible essences, objects which exist in the mind of God as a Divine Idea, which God has the power to bring into Being, but never does.
Simply said, I want to maintain that unactualized potencies exist, and the existence of anything that is metaphysically possible, although contingent on many different things, exists. So either or both the velociraptor or the Unicorn exist and that actualization of their existence is simply a matter of contingent factors, whether they were actualized in the past, present, or in the future. The existence of metaphysically possible entities is not a matter of whether their essence is separate from their existence, but rather that which God has chosen to actualize from eternum. Or, in other words, it would be a matter of whatever is in potency to existence, and not just about things that are logically possible. Can this be maintained after accepting the Real Distinction of Thomists? If so, I have no problem in doing this.
This isn't my primary concern, but, does opting away from the Real Distinction really harm the proof that Aquinas gives for God's existence?
Last edited by Dennis (1/13/2016 2:21 am)
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Thread Starter- Scott
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
Say that velociraptors were in potency to existence(metaphysically possible), and that unicorns were never in potency to existence, but logically possible.
I think this may be at the heart of the matter, so I'll focus on it.
If something doesn't exist, it doesn't make much (Thomistic) sense to say that it's "in potency" to existence. Pure potencies don't exist any more than prime matter does.
What we can sensibly say is that if something does exist, then (unless it's God) its existence is the actualization of its essence. If there are velociraptors, it's because God has made/makes there be velociraptors. But He didn't/doesn't do that by starting with the bare potency for a velociraptor and going ZAP! and actualizing it, any more than He makes there be velociraptors by starting with some prime matter and adding some forms. He creates ex nihilo, and in so doing He simply makes there be a composite substance in which there's a real distinction between essence and existence, potency and act. (Indeed, the fact that neither of the "elements" of the composite substance can exist apart from the other, i.e. that neither of them is ontologically primary in the relevant sense, is what tells us that a simple, purely actual Being must be responsible for creating them in the first place.)
As I understand St. Thomas, he doesn't maintain that the idea of a velociraptor in the Divine Intellect is a "potency" for an actual velociraptor; he regards it as an exemplar according to which God creates real essence-plus-existence velociraptors from nothing.
Does that clarify anything?
- iwpoe
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
I know we're talking about first creation, but it reminded me of a seperate question about living kinds. If you take common descent seriously, would you still be able to say that the raptor is immanently a potency of living things generally? That is to say, given that there is still living matter and given proper breeding and conditions and mutations etc (say a jurrasic park scenario or genetic engineering) DNA or whatever could so configure such as to actualize again raptors. Or are raptors only properly that which was previously instantiated?
If we accept that raptor is a potency of living matter, would we have to accept that it's a general potency of (at the very least) the kinds of matter we have on earth (carbon, oxygen, etc)?
Last edited by iwpoe (1/14/2016 9:51 am)
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- Dennis
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
If something doesn't exist, it doesn't make much (Thomistic) sense to say that it's "in potency" to existence. Pure potencies don't exist any more than prime matter does.
What we can sensibly say is that if something does exist, then (unless it's God) its existence is the actualization of its essence. If there are velociraptors, it's because God has made/makes there be velociraptors. But He didn't/doesn't do that by starting with the bare potency for a velociraptor and going ZAP! and actualizing it, any more than He makes there be velociraptors by starting with some prime matter and adding some forms. He creates ex nihilo, and in so doing He simply makes there be a composite substance in which there's a real distinction between essence and existence, potency and act. (Indeed, the fact that neither of the "elements" of the composite substance can exist apart from the other, i.e. that neither of them is ontologically primary in the relevant sense, is what tells us that a simple, purely actual Being must be responsible for creating them in the first place.)
As I understand St. Thomas, he doesn't maintain that the idea of a velociraptor in the Divine Intellect is a "potency" for an actual velociraptor; he regards it as an exemplar according to which God creates real essence-plus-existence velociraptors from nothing.
Does that clarify anything?
Thanks! Yes, that helps, a lot! But I do need more help, thank you for your persistence, and please help clarifying!
Though that has cleared a lot for me, I'm thinking of something on the same lines as iwpoe, but iwpoe, I don't think I'm talking just about first creation. iwpoe, given the polygeny of causes, I think it's a given that we'd have to accept what you've said.
If the raptor is created, and thus existed, isn't it always in potency to existence? Even if it fails to exist today? It only lacks the adequate concurrence of the causes to bring it about, this I think would apply to the question of any substance, this is why I posited the distinctions in the kinds of ways I would like to speak of possibility. It's here where things get hard for me, because I've always looked at potency as a principle or function some form of act(not Pure Act though).
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
I've asked these questions because I'm having a hard time with this bedrock Thomistic notion and I'm slowly leaning towards Scotus. The horror in doing that is that such a move in regards to essence & existence, may potentially lead to justifying the distinctions we see to the effect that all that exists is one thing, i.e. Monism. Amidst all other questions, is this a valid fear?
Well, Duns Scotus didn't think his ontology collapses into a blob. If you mean Duns Scotus, then I don't think it's a valid fear—no. Another scholastic realist who didn't draw a real distinction between essence and existence was Suarez. I don't think his ontology collapses into a blob either.
John Scotus Eriugena's ontology was arguably a blob, and people sometimes confuse him with John Duns Scotus, but I don't think that's who you meant.
- Dennis
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
Well, Duns Scotus didn't think his ontology collapses into a blob. If you mean Duns Scotus, then I don't think it's a valid fear—no. Another scholastic realist who didn't draw a real distinction between essence and existence was Suarez. I don't think his ontology collapses into a blob either.
John Scotus Eriugena's ontology was arguably a blob, and people sometimes confuse him with John Duns Scotus, but I don't think that's who you meant.
Hi John, thanks for letting me know. I was indeed referring to John Duns Scotus and not John Scotus Eriugena. However, my fear extends further more than just the ontology of Scotus. It's something of an irrational fear where I go,
"I've just denied Real Distinctions, should I go forth and inquire if there's any distinction at all? Isn't it all just one thing?"
I'm in a very difficult phase of my personal metaphysical career. I suppose I'm looking for good arguments not just for Real Distinction or Formal Distinctions, but also good arguments against monism if I reject Real Distinctions. Like something to totally help shut the justifications to invoke parsimony among other arguments for monism after accepting Formal distinctions, and reduce everything to one thing, as well as counter-argue. I just hope I don't slip, and rather argue against. But that fear is down the line, right now the matter of debate concerns the former inquiry and I'm willing to wait till I come to a solution after clearing all my queries along with reforming my incoherences along the way.
Last edited by Dennis (1/18/2016 6:14 am)
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Thread Starter- John West
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
For what it's worth, Scotus wouldn't have denied all real distinctions. He just thought he had independent reasons for denying real distinctions between essence and existence.
Like something to totally help shut the justifications to invoke parsimony among other arguments for monism after accepting Formal distinctions, and reduce everything to one thing, as well as counter-argue.
The argument seems based on the old mistake of giving parsimony priority over explanatory power. Suppose I should favor parsimony over explanatory power. Then I should favor theories on which the rest of you don't exist to theories on which you do—perhaps even theories where I don't exist.
The premise that parsimony has priority over explanatory power had better not be based on intuitive plausibility, either. If the argument's other premises are true, it leads to the conclusion that Bill Clinton and I are not really distinct. It is, however, far more intuitively plausible that Bill Clinton and I are really distinct than parsimony having priority over explanation could ever be.
So, you need to give explanatory power priority over parsimony. One way is to adopt a principle of plurality to balance your principle of parsimony. The positive formulation of Ockham's razor is one example of a principle of plurality. Chatton's principle is another[1].
[1]It's worth noting that Chatton considered himself a Scotistic realist.
- Scott
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Re: Essence and Existence, Real distinction vs Formal Distinction
If the raptor is created, and thus existed, isn't it always in potency to existence? Even if it fails to exist today?
Not at all. I suppose you might say (along iwpoe's lines) that something somewhere has a potency to bring about, as a cause in fieri, the existence of a raptor under the right causal conditions, but it strikes me as nonsense to ascribe such potency to the nonexistent raptor that might thereby result. It's only a real, existing raptor that can be intellectually analyzed into act and potency. If there's no raptor, there's just nothing to analyze. (Or our analysis is hypothetical: "If a raptor existed, it would be . . . ")
I think you're still thinking of essence-as-potency as some sort of raw material out of which actual raptors are somehow "made," as though God makes a raptor by starting with an unactualized "raptor essence" and actualizing it into existence at each moment it exists. But as I understand it, God just makes a raptor, full stop. For an existing raptor, its existence is (according to Avicenna and Aquinas) the actualization of its nature or essence, and in that sense we say that God, in creating/sustaining a raptor, is conjoining an essence to an act of existence. But that doesn't mean He starts with an unactualized essence and adds some existence to it. God creates ex nihilo, and as a cause in esse, not in fieri. Just as He's the eternal (primary) cause of the entire temporal (secondary) causal process by which the raptor comes into being, He's also the cause of the entire act/potency composition of the raptor at each moment of its existence.
Again, of course, there's some sense (according to Aquinas) in which God uses ideas in the Divine Intellect as "patterns" or exemplars in creating raptors and other things. But those Divine ideas aren't potencies; there are no potencies in God.
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