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I tried to bring this up in the abortion thread, but no one really took it up.
My issue is metaphysical not ethical but the problem does follow from the metaphysics that underlies prolife arguments:
1. All embryos are human beings (for unspecified reasons).
2. Some embryos become embedded in their mother or in a twin such that their gestation is extremely stunted and they are medically considered tumors. The embryo lives off its host indefinately, sometimes even having recognizable organs, but is dramatically deformed.
3. This tumor is still a human being. (from 1)
4. But this seems absurd because of the extreme deformity of the case.
:. 1 is false? (or there is a missing demarcation criterion by which something stops being an embryo).
The question is really: 'does something living ever stop to being an instantiation of its form on the basis of organic deformity?'
The reasoning surrounding evolutionary theory, speciation, and classical metaphysics would probably be relevant here: after all, provided that one thinks, for instance, that human beings have a distinct form from their evolutionary ancestors, there would have had to of been a point in the past where an organic process led to the material instantiation of a form entirely distinct from prior ones. How is this accounted for metaphysically?
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iwpoe wrote:
The question is really: 'does something living ever stop to being an instantiation of its form on the basis of organic deformity?'
I think the answer is no. In application, though, there might be room for vagueness.
For instance, if I donate my kidney to someone, then it is taken up into his life. It's from me but part of him. If I die, then it's in one sense "something living," but it's still a part of him, not a part of me.
It might be possible that some fetus in the case you described dies but some of its matter is taken up into the life of the mother. I doubt that one could reliably tell when this is the case versus when the fetus continues to live in a very deformed state. I don't think any of the hard cases usually stressed in the literature, as well as typical pregnancies, are cases of this form.
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iwpoe wrote:
The question is really: 'does something living ever stop to being an instantiation of its form on the basis of organic deformity?'
I think Greg's right that the answer is no. An otter, no matter how deformed, never stops being an otter until it's dead, at which point its form is just gone.
iwpoe wrote:
The reasoning surrounding evolutionary theory, speciation, and classical metaphysics would probably be relevant here: after all, provided that one thinks, for instance, that human beings have a distinct form from their evolutionary ancestors, there would have had to [have] been a point in the past where an organic process led to the material instantiation of a form entirely distinct from prior ones. How is this accounted for metaphysically?
There's nothing especially strange about a form's conferring the ability to produce other, different forms. That's how St. Augustine dealt with that question (if memory serves; I don't have a source at hand).
But a species's giving rise to another species by substances' giving birth to substances with different forms from their parents' is one thing. That scenario differs fundamentally from a single substance's suffering a change of its own form.
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Greg wrote:
It might be possible that some fetus in the case you described dies but some of its matter is taken up into the life of the mother. I doubt that one could reliably tell when this is the case versus when the fetus continues to live in a very deformed state. I don't think any of the hard cases usually stressed in the literature, as well as typical pregnancies, are cases of this form.
No, of course not. My problem was more that it seems to me that one has to say at some point a deformation disqualifies something from being a member of its original teleologically proper class: a mutation occurs and now it grows scales, gills, and can only swim- seems to me to be a fish.
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iwpoe wrote:
My problem was more that it seems to me that one has to say at some point a deformation disqualifies something from being a member of its original teleologically proper class: a mutation occurs and now it grows scales, gills, and can only swim- seems to me to be a fish.
Sure, but again, if you're talking about a change from one generation to the next, there's nothing especially problematic or controversial about it. Indeed, if there's a mutation involved, it's not even obvious any longer that the fish is receiving its form solely from its biological parents.
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iwpoe wrote:
My problem was more that it seems to me that one has to say at some point a deformation disqualifies something from being a member of its original teleologically proper class: a mutation occurs and now it grows scales, gills, and can only swim- seems to me to be a fish.
Well, at some point, the thing might be in a different teleologically proper class. That is, I think, what happens in the organ transplant scenario and might occur with a fetus and mother in the case I suggested.
Once a thing is no longer a member of its original teleologically proper class, though, it is of a different class altogether.
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Scott, you made a reference to Aquinas on generation. He obviously didn't adress directly evolutionary process. So I was wondering what the context of the reference was.
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iwpoe,
However obviously problematic extreme deformity is for any number of practical questions or considerations, I think you might benefit by considering the fact that you are admitting the deformed living thing is a living thing. Are you saying then that this living being is not human and just a tumor, albeit a tumor having organs?
Regardless, the fact that human life is sacrosanct is admitted even in this case (for even if one calls the deformed embryo a tumor it is just to say that it is not human and admit the fundamental point of the pro-life argument; namely, that human life is to be respected always and under no circumstances can any human being justify killing an innocent human: certainly not and never qua innocent)...
What I mean to say, iwpoe, is that you are right now in the aweful position of having to pronounce judgment on whether or not this living being is really a human being: a human life (a matter that is obviously open to some debate). Is it not generally considered to be the case that in such aweful situations we ought to err on the side of caution?
Last edited by Timocrates (2/22/2016 1:36 pm)
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iwpoe wrote:
Scott, you made a reference to Aquinas on generation. He obviously didn't adress directly evolutionary process. So I was wondering what the context of the reference was.
Evolution is still an instance of generation and anything true of generation as such will apply to evolution; else, we have to reduce distinct biological species to being, effectively, merely accidentally different with the consequence, ultimately, that we are essentially no different (or better than) a toad, say.
Last edited by Timocrates (2/22/2016 2:05 pm)
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Timocrates wrote:
iwpoe,
However obviously problematic extreme deformity is for any number of practical questions or considerations, I think you might benefit by considering the fact that you are admitting the deformed living thing is a living thing. Are you saying then that this living being is not human and just a tumor, albeit a tumor having organs?
I'm willing to admit it's living- the statement that it's a tumor medically is merely emphasis not meant to have direct classificatory import: I simply picked a case where the fetal structure is utterly deformed -but its structure is so unhuman that I'm skeptical that it still even qualifies, as mulch is no longer a tree trunk. The question is mainly because the process of the organism deforms itself, and I don't know how that cashes out in terms of how we think about tele.
Timocrates wrote:
Regardless, the fact that human life is sacrosanct is admitted even in this case
I'm not sure in these cases it ever comes up. The tumor often shows up in the twin many years later because it's a medical problem, in which double effect would always come into play.
Timocrates wrote:
(for even if one calls the deformed embryo a tumor it is just to say that it is not human and admit the fundamental point of the pro-life argument; namely, that human life is to be respected always and under no circumstances can any human being justify killing an innocent human: certainly not and never qua innocent)...
I'm actually almost entirely uninterested in the ethical argument. My core problem is that the fetus is so deformed that its prime similarity to human life (with the exception of the errant whole tooth, bone, or fingernail) is at the cellular level only, but because of circumstance it does, indeed, grow itself into that situation. The question is about living instantiation of form and whether an organic process can actualize itself away from its own form to the point that you would need to call it something else. We can talk about non-human instances- trees sometimes grow very differently under odd cirucumstances. Botanically you sometimes classify these differently, sometimes not.
Timocrates wrote:
What I mean to say, iwpoe, is that you are right now in the aweful position of having to pronounce judgment on whether or not this living being is really a human being: a human life (a matter that is obviously open to some debate). Is it not generally considered to be the case that in such aweful situations we ought to err on the side of caution?
We can make a distinction between the practical/ethical problem and the metaphysical problem. If the metaphysical question is even cogent, there is a fact of the matter about it. Answering it in the ethical circumstance and drawing practical consequences might indeed entail too much risk, but there is no such thing as metaphysical risk.