Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I think part of the answer is that we are not bodies as well as souls. Our biological functions and ends are meant to support our higher ends, and we should, if rational, respect the proper ends of our biology. A limb or organ that is going to kill us has ceased to perform its function and end, so it is permissible to remove it, but one that is still functioning well should not be a remove, as this frustrates it end.

Here's where I'm losing you. What's wrong with this?

1. The body's proper end is the ordering of the soul.
2. As such, the body's own functions are subsumed by the general end of the soul.
3. That which is subsumed in a higher end can be terminated in the interests of that end.
4. A psychological condition is a severe risk, perhaps even a definite reduction of the capacity of the soul.
5. An organ may be removed as a treatment of a psychological disorder.

This isn't in formalized logic, but I'm sure you get the point. Do you perhaps disagree with 4? Or did I misunderstand 2?

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

I think your analysis is perhaps too dualist for the Aristotelian natural law tradition. Our bodies are part of us. Whilst the ends of our bodies ultimately serve our highest ends, it is not permissible to actively subvert or pervert our ends, even biological ones. In his latest essay collection, Dr. Feser defends the perverted argument along these lines. An organ that has ceased to function and will kill us may be removed because it is not serving its end, for the sake of the whole. But a healthy organ is different.

 
Although you will grant that a functional, yet ill organ may be removed.

On what grounds are you making the distinction between an ill, yet functioning organ as opposed to an entirely healthy organ which will benefit the whole incidentally in it's removal?

As I see it, you're making a distinction based on health, not functionability. On what basis do you count the organ's health in as a factor? It seems rather arbitrary to me.

Last edited by Etzelnik (7/02/2015 8:21 pm)

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Actually, I'm not sure where the line is drawn or quite how natural law treats diseased organ, although it must be said that a diseased organ is not identical to the case of a pyschological condition where the limb is entirely healthy. There does seem a distinction - one is still functioning perfectly and one may not be functionly well. The question is whether and when the non-perfect functioning means it is acceptable to remove the organ.

 
Alright, then I see where you're coming from (although I still maintain my earlier account).