Last Rites wrote:

Which is what? "Don't do anything?" You mentioned the benefit of hindsight earlier; it certainly applies to Iraq.

 Even if the worst was true about Saddam and the WMD (which there were reasons to doubt at the time), it was still more sensible not to do anything. Saddam was a tin-pot dictator. He was not the kind of threat, even with WMD, that required direct military intervention and regime change. Anyone with a realist foreign policy (and without the frankly warped obsession with Saddam that Cheney and Rumsfeld had) could have seen this.

As far as an interventionist rebuttal is concerned, I'll state the obvious: despite some shortcomings in U.S. strategy in Iraq, the country wouldn't be in the pit that it currently is if Obama hadn't sold a decade of hard-earned, gradual progress and tentative stability for votes. If a small detachment of U.S. soldiers had remained (as recommended by military leadership) we wouldn't be talking about a "debacle" but rather something less dire, such as whether or not the U.S. financial expenditure and loss of military personnel was worth a fledgling but growing Iraqi democracy.

I agree when it comes to Obama and Iraq, though this still could not have happened without the foolish invasion of 2003. It must be said, though, that interventionists don't seem to have helped much in Syria. In particular, the most Hawkish tend to oppose the most obvious solution - the victory of Assad.

I'm not disputing that Britain put itself in a troubling situation with few good options, but going to war in 1938 versus 1939 is clearly the better choice now if it may not have clearly been then, though there were reasons to think so. You admit yourself that Britain wasn't much better off in 1939- hence their swift defeat on the mainland at the hands of a determined Germany- so again I ask "why not 1938?" Regardless of straight munition and troops counts, the gap between Germany and Britain was larger in 1939 than in 1938. This is the only relevant piece of information when comparing the two countries' military capabilities. Moreover, the Czechs would have fought alongside Britain and France if given the opportunity in 1938, I think you're selling the Royal Navy's impact short for the sake of argument, and it's worth noting that there was still significant opposition to Hitler in the military in 1938 precisely for the reasons I've been suggesting: many generals did not believe Germany was yet ready to fight Hitler's war. If Britain and France had gone to war over Czechoslovakia, the Oster Plot likely would have been carried out against Hitler and the Nazi leadership apparatus. To what effect is pure speculation, obviously, because Chamberlain was too cowardly to back them and it never happened.

 Chamberlain was a good man, as Churchill himself said when he died, so let us stop the silly attacks on him. His stance had little to do with cowardice. 

In 1938, Britain had very few troops or munitions. Though still woefully unprepared for war in 1939/1940, it had managed to ​scrape some troops and supplies together by this time. Britain couldn't have done much at all in 1938. Even if there was smaller relative gap in 1938, in absolute terms Britain simply couldn't have waged war. But it is not true that the gap was bigger in 1939. Germany had been rearming and building up its military by 1938. Britain had not. Although the Germans continued to build up, by April 1939, Britain had begun to rearm. This closed the gap somewhat. By the time Britain actually went into combat with Germany in the Spring of 1940, it was far better armed, and psychologically its people were far more prepared.

No doubt historical lessons are misinterpreted or, worse, misused for political purposes, but that has no bearing on their actual relevance to international relations theory.

True. But the point here is what the Munich lesson is and what it is not. It is a lesson that very bad consequences, that may require intervention, can occur from small beginnings. It is not a lesson that small incidents do usually lead to very bad consequences. So, it isn't a lesson a particular good lesson in favour of interventionism. It is a lesson against non-interventionism in a completely rigid sense, but only to the degree it shows that we must be cautious and circumspect and that there may be time when we should intervene.
 

If Trump is not negatively affected by that debate last night, then he's probably right: he could shoot someone on Fifth Avenue and his supporters would not leave him.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems obvious to me that Trump will govern as a slightly erratic, very pro-big business moderate.

I suspect he would run more or less like Obama. He doesn't care about conservative social issues like religious liberty; he doesn't understand why anyone would care about them. He doesn't know much about the courts.

It's evident, also, that he does not have detailed plans on anything. On healthcare, he said he would promote interstate competition, but asked to elaborate, he repeated the same point several times. Asked how he would get Mexico to pay for a wall when  all of its politicians say that it will not, he said "I will" (to thunderous applause). He is all bluster with no plans. So he would maintain the status quo.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Is it all because he sometimes isn't politically correct? He is also quite whinging and petty, though.

A lot of people like him because he isn't politically correct. Likewise a lot of people hate him for the same reason.

Although, I would say one doesn't have to be politically correct, and a lot of what political correctness requires is silly. Trump goes beyond being politically incorrect, though, for instance insulting people's appearances.

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems obvious to me that Trump will govern as a slightly erratic, very pro-big business moderate. I really don't see the attraction. Rubio and Kasich will at least be more electable.

Is it all because he sometimes isn't politically correct? He is also quite whinging and petty, though.

Well a lot of it is that he isn't politically correct, but I also think people are attracted to the big personality in general, not merely the things he'll say.

Maybe I'm a bit hyper masculine here, but I never understood the 'good little boy' model of "electability". You don't have to be polite to be chosen leader and I don't think a polite deferring man should be chosen in a direct contest with Clinton.

He won't have a choice in some respects. I don't know what his cabinet would look like, but he'll have to work with the legislature or be shut out entirely.