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Since God is immaterial then what does this mean exactly. I know it means devoid of matter but is he immaterial like abstract objects such as those affirmed in Platonism(such as numbers in the mathematical form) who are stated to not have causal effect on the world. If so then what does it exactly mean for God to be the 1st cause if he is immaterial in this aspect?
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Who states that? Parfit or Armstrong or someone? They are specifically given to be paradigmatic causes in classical thought. It's a major aspect of the classical ontology that causation is not simply mechanical.
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Well I was Stanford on Platonism and they mentioned that abstract objects are acasual and do not have causal relationships to the world. Regarding what you said about classical ontology does God also act in a paradigmatic way as He is immaterial like abstract objects.
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The distinction you're looking for is between abstract objects and concrete objects, not immaterial objects and material objects. Abstract objects are acausal. Concrete objects are causal. Platonic objects, in the sense that almost everyone uses the term now, are immaterial abstract objects. God is an immaterial concrete object.
The term cause is used to mean efficient cause, not formal cause. Denying one may not entail denying the other, unless we equivocate on the word cause.
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In classical ontology the forms are also likely immaterial concretes, though I'm not sure why we would admit of the class of immaterials that don't do anything. I suspect that the category is a confusion of intellect and imagination.
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AKG wrote:
Well I was Stanford on Platonism and they mentioned that abstract objects are acasual and do not have causal relationships to the world. Regarding what you said about classical ontology does God also act in a paradigmatic way as He is immaterial like abstract objects.
Depends on the thinker, but God has a unique set of causal powers- creation and the sustaining of being -whose exact nature isn't clear to me. It's probably wrong to call that either efficient or paradigmatic.
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If there can exist immaterial concrete objects then how come in modern day platonism they are immaterial but abstract and thus acasual. I'm primarily focused on platonism because for me people like Frege have shown that philosophy can tell us that the immaterial exist such as in the form of abstract objects, and if this is established then for I think that philosophy can also tell about the existence of other immaterial things such as God, but the abstract/concrete immaterial distinction is something I'm having trouble understanding as at what point does philosophy tell that this immaterial object is abstract/concrete?
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Because it isolates Platonists like Russell from repugnant metaphysical conclusions.
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AKG wrote:
...I'm having trouble understanding as at what point does philosophy tell that this immaterial object is abstract/concrete?
By 'this' do you mean God or any immaterial object? You can reflect on when and why it became clear to you that something was immaterial. From your posts it is clear you accept some immaterial things.
Regarding causality, consider that you can know something required a cause even if you do not know what the cause is. If there are things in the world that require a cause or causes the nature of which cannot be material, then you have reason to suspect an immaterial cause for those effects. Regarding how the immaterial or the abstract can be causal, the objects of desire are traditionally given. Often such things may not even exist yet but that does not prevent you from pursuing them.
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@Timocrates,
So are you saying that if philosophy can already establish the existence of one immaterial thing(abstract objects) then it can also establish the existence of others(God) and the abstract/concrete distinction depends on what situation the existence of the immaterial is in.