So far I'm sitting on (phrases in "scare quotes" are traditional latinate translations that are misleading which are kept only for the sake of communication. Beside these is usually given a traslation which can be more easily discussed in English to bring out what's at stake in the classical account, e.g. Thing instead of substance, since what is at issue is precicely what is meant in common between big red thing and cold hard thing and etc. The point is to target that which is the source of all the emerging properties, the fullness of being that underlies the myriad descriptions of some organized whole, its thinghood, its ousia):

Π is the "efficient cause" (maker/the primary source of the change or rest) of "Substance" (Thing) O insofar as Π draws up out of "material" (the out of which/what is present for change or rest) Ε to bring about O.

Further note: All proper Π are "primary" sources of motion, which are organized wholes such as animals, arts, people, or the cosmos. It's not quite right to call intermediate sources of motion such as claws, screwdrivers, voices, or some gust of wind, that simply pass motion around without originating it Π except in a derivative sense (I think it will turn out when I give an account of "instrumental causes" that these will be accounted for).

Aristotle lists as examples: the artisan, the art of bronze-casting, the man who gives advice, the father of the child.

Ε is the "material cause" (the out of which/what is present for change or rest) of "Substance" (Thing) O insofar as Ε is drawn from by some "effector" (maker/source of change or rest) Π to bring about O.

Aristotle lists as examples: "the bronze of a statue and the silver of a cup, and the classes which contain these"

Timocrates wrote:

Looks really, really good to me, iwpoe.

Still working it out. 

Timocrates wrote:

As regards 'Π', I might only want perhaps something that might qualify it as necessarily actual

I agree, though Aristotle on actuality and potentiality is harder than the Latin-Scholastic tradition makes it out to be. I've been skeptical of the easy neatness of the division for some time so I'm unwilling to import it directly into this discussion. For some remarks see Joe Sachs' attempt to render something of a Greek-Primitivist account of Aristotle on motion:

http://www.iep.utm.edu/aris-mot/

That said, if I was to be easygoing about it, I would say that Π clearly has an affinity with the actual and Ε with the potential.

Timocrates wrote:

even though, of course, as in the case of a father begetting a child, it need not remain actual although again, at the same time, there are 'Π' that do and presumably must remain actual for 'O' to be.

I follow you up to here, but I'm not sure why you begin a discussion of its remaining actual in time.

Also, I'm not sure about this with respect to all cases. There may be some O which have strange Π I've not considered. I'm particularly thinking about how to talk about mathematicals on this account.

But some of this also rests on a better understanding of potency and actuality.

Timocrates wrote:

Similarly it can be dertermined as primary to the extent that it is or must be sufficient to act on 'Ε' to bring about 'O'; for (presumably) 'Π' is never (properly) 'Π' unless it actually results in (an) 'O'. In other words, no 'O' then no 'Π' (nothing does not have nor does it need an 'Π' - to pursue this would presumably be vain).

This isn't quite right. Π need not be "sufficient" since you can have more than one Π for a given O. After all, my personal Π includes my father and my mother (and, presumably, the cosmos). Now, indeed, you're right to say that Π must be (co)responsible for drawing forth an O from out of an Ε or else it's not rightly a Π at all.

And of course, no thing at all is not even an O, so it cannot be said to have either a Π or an Ε.

This is all still in line with my general idea that God cannot be acting as a Π in creatio ex nihilo, for while there is an O the O is not the product of the drawing out of an O by a Π from an Ε since nothing cannot be an Ε.

The two classical alternatives to creatio ex nihilo- creatio ex materia (Plato in the Timaeus) and creatio ex dio (some readings of Plotinus) -can probably rightly assign God as a Π (though in the latter case this would require that God can change himself).

Oh I see. Well that's true, but you don't have a Π if you don't have an E. The operative metaphor in Greek is that of crafting. Indeed, poiesis, would come over into English most directly as poeticizing. A Π draws an O up out of an E- fashions or makes it out of something.

I'm willing to admit that God can be a Π (the biblical God making man out of the dust of the earth clearly is acting as a Π), but he cannot be so in this sense if he's Creating out of nothing. Creation is not something that can be fashioned out of nothing because nothing isn't anything. I don't know exactly what the operative metaphor for God's work in creation would have to be- 'He will it be, lends it being, enacts it, sings it into being (as Tolkien would have it)' but he does not draw it out of an out of which.

We could abandon Aristotle's Greek but that leads down a path where causation becomes the discussion of temporal proximity not mutual responsibility. Something I haven't discussed is that Aristotle's account is hierarchical. Π sits over and above its O as an independent mover of O. That's not a merely temporal priority over O but one of order. Ed talks about this in terms of simaltanious causation, but time is not the key to this account of causation. What Aristotle want's to know for the sake of explaining an O is what of higher order than O is responcible for O's motion. That could precede it temporally, but if we're talking about God it's not clear that it's possible that God precede us.

I have Aristotle's Metaphysics by Joe Sachs with me right now, is it true that on his reading Aristotle denies such a thing as efficient causation? I've been super busy this week, and not that happy but I'm interested in this whole topic. I may have something to add later on.

iwpoe wrote:

Timocrates wrote:

iwpoe wrote:

Oh I see. Well that's true, but you don't have a Π if you don't have an E. The operative metaphor in Greek is that of crafting. Indeed, poiesis, would come over into English most directly as poeticizing. A Π draws an O up out of an E- fashions or makes it out of something.

I think I understand. So in your account E is necessary and basic for Π? What might either Π's or E's relation to any O be or does there need to be one?

Every O insofar as it is in motion or comes to rest has both a  Π & an E for its motion/rest.

So what is being moved or brought to rest by Π: the E or the O or somehow both? Is E related to O by Π as means to an end?