Abstract objects are problematic for us insofar as they are abstractions from material conditions. I have a hard time taking seriously an attempt to argue that an 'object' that is not 'itself' ultimately an abstraction from material conditions (God) could possibly be a problem on the side of abstraction qua abstraction. Quite the contrary, in fact.

Last edited by Timocrates (3/05/2016 6:29 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

Core first paragraph to tackle is:


"God can't be the cause of abstract objects, for
*being omnipotent* is both an abstract object and one
of God's essential properties. If so, then it must
exist and be instantiated before God can do anything
at all. But God can't create and instantiate his own
essential properties, for that would require him to be
causally prior to himself, and that's wacko (and you
can just forget about the Thomistic solution of
collapsing the essence/existence distinction for God).
But if at least some abstract objects aren't due to
God's causal activity, then theistic activism is
unmotivated. "

Ugh. Yeah, so that's the problem he's making. God is not Himself an abstract object.

iwpoe wrote:

Well, that might be true, but it would be interesting to try to figure out why he would think so and then tackle that. It does seem to be some prima facie plausibility to the objection. I understand why you would think that makes sense.

Stones aren't and presumably can't be themselves the cause of anything's existing in the abstract (except in an extremely qualified sense). But so what? That hardly means and definitely does not prove stones don't or can't exist.

Last edited by Timocrates (3/05/2016 7:13 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

No, but I mean, why does he think that God is an abstract object?

Is that a consequence of how analytic philosophy usually construes God or would one be led to that conclusion from the way God is usually argued for or what, exactly? I mean, for instance, I see why you might be inclined to think that omnipotence, as such, is an abstract object.

Keep in mind I'm bumbling around here too. I primarily read phenomenology, German philosophy, Greek philosophy, and the history of philosophy more generally. Sometimes contemporary analytic philosopher say some shit and I have no idea why they would do so except obliquely.

No I see where you are heading here.

I can definitely see how thinking of God in reference to the abstract can certainly be cause of perfectly reasonable confusion. I think we need to ask him why he would think that - even granting that God needs to be the cause of abstract objects - why a thing should be thought not to be or exist simply because it isn't the cause of abstract objects existing? But regardless he's wrong. Had he said instead that being a horse is being an abstract object he'd be more obviously wrong.

Last edited by Timocrates (3/05/2016 8:21 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

Core first paragraph to tackle is:
"God can't be the cause of abstract objects, for
*being omnipotent* is both an abstract object and one
of God's essential properties. If so, then it must
exist and be instantiated before God can do anything
at all.

I don't see why this present a problem for Omnipotence in as much as if creating an abstract is impossible then the requirement to do so is a pseudo-task. It only becomes problematic if one insists on certain readings of creato ex nihilo for doctrinal purposes (I'm looking at you WLC, how once feared that the existence of the number 9 functioned as a defeater for Christianity|). For those like Inwarden or early Plantinga how are happy to admit the existence of abstract objects separate from God then it posses no problem at all.

iwpoe wrote:

But God can't create and instantiate his own
essential properties, for that would require him to be
causally prior to himself, and that's wacko (and you
can just forget about the Thomistic solution of
collapsing the essence/existence distinction for God).
But if at least some abstract objects aren't due to
God's causal activity, then theistic activism is
unmotivated. "

This crude post gestures at the famous Bootstraping objection to Theistic Activism, that is that if God is separate from his properties then Theistic Activism means that He must posses powers for the objects He is going to create. Divine Simplicity is a recognized solution to this problem, however it hasn't received the attention it ought to have due to the one of the original proponents of Theistic Activism, Thomas Morris, also being a staunch critic of Divine Simplicity. Greg Welty, in his[url=https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwj9vvja7qrLAhWObZoKHWiPBz4QFgg3MAU&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.proginosko.com%2Fwelty%2Fmphil.pdf&usg=AFQjCNF3ctyVpVCtFOdOEMH3C1lveqU74w&sig2=7iWHOZRPKA4bm62klomVJA&bvm=bv.116274245,d.bGs]MA thesis criticizing Theistic Activism[/url], even uses the argument that TA leads to Simplicity as a reason for rejecting the former!