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So I've been reading this paper by Lloyd Gerson where he discusses Plotinus's argument for the One, and he says this with regards to complexity:
"A composite is anything that is distinct from any property it has." "What we might call a 'minimally
composite individual' is one with one and only one property from which it is itself distinct."
With regards to this could someone that for certain objects like say a quark that the properties it has such as smallness are essential to it and help make it what it is, and in a sense the property is not distinct from it due to the essential nature of it?
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No, I don't think that works. I'd have to look at Gerson more closely on that argument, but my initial reaction is to say that even essential properties are not identical with the object that possesses them. For, both gold and copper are essentially conductive material, but conductivity does not belong to either metals in a relationship of identity, since neither metal is the other insofar as each is conductive.
Which paper is this? Sometimes Gerson is more concerned to show why I think he ends up where he does and he forgets to make enough distinctions so that you might also end up in the same place as the thinker.
Last edited by iwpoe (3/20/2016 7:22 pm)
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It's the paper called Plotinus's philosophy of religion.
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Does Dr. Gerson himself adhere to Platonism as described by Plato or some form of Neoplatonism?
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AKG wrote:
Does Dr. Gerson himself adhere to Platonism as described by Plato or some form of Neoplatonism?
I can't tell with him. I think he does but doesn't foreground it. In none of his lectures have I ever heard him say anything like "this is how Platonists argue but of course that's totally wrong."
If I can ever establish a steady communication with him, I'll ask.
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@iwpoe,
Thanks. I might also be able to establish communication with him in a few months as I might attend the University of Toronto where he teaches(not on the same campus but still) when I graduate highschool.
(are there any more lectures of his online because I really enjoyed watching his lecture on what is Platonism).
Last edited by AKG (3/22/2016 7:22 pm)
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AKG wrote:
@iwpoe,
Thanks. I might also be able to establish communication with him in a few months as I might attend the University of Toronto where he teaches(not on the same campus but still) when I graduate highschool.
(are there any more lectures of his online because I really enjoyed watching his lecture on what is Platonism).
Here's a whole course:
Also:
Philosophy Series Lecture: "Platonism versus Naturalism."
"The Democracy Fallacy" Dr. Lloyd P. Gerson
Public Property? | Lloyd P. Gerson
If you can establish a connection with him, that would be ideal. I need some information from him about paradigmatic and instrumental causes, and he's not the best with emails.
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Dr. Gerson also argues that the First Principle of all must be unique because if say their were two of them which were differentiated by say a particular position, then according to him it would be distinct from say this position and thus be composite. One thing I would like to ask is why would this be true as could we not instead say that this particular position could only be accompanied by the being we are talking about, and thus is essential to its identity, making it not distinct from it?
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Hmm, that seems to be contrary to the meaning of "a position", unless I'm misunderstanding you: X being over here rather than over there implies a distinction of here from there and X from both.
I mean, let's say that, for whatever reason, we're on a 2d Cartesian grid and God can only ever be, for whatever reason, located at (3,15), it would not follow that (3,15) is essential to God in the sense that it is indistinct from him, since insofar as it's a coordinate it's in a relation to other coordinates qua coordinate. Or something like that. It seems to me that you've given away its distinction from God once you've admitted that it's a position like others.