KevinScharp wrote:

(which I'll take to be a supernatural cause of a natural effect), resurrection for example, then that event would have been incompatible with our best scientific theories of today

Again, how? There are no provisions in any of our best scientific theories today for the constraints on the behavior of natural things in the event of supernatural action, no more than they are falsified by either the possible or actual existence of a seperate universe in which they don't apply or a pre-history of the universe in which they didn't apply.

The implicit metaphysical assumption here seems to be that our scientific theories imply actual (rather than methodologically assumed) causal closure of a very narrow sort.

Also, conservation of mass/energy can be preserved rather simply by admitting that God would amount to an opening in the system.

Lastly, this phrase " our best scientific theories " seems to be doing a lot of work. If you mean to be importing from science metaphysical claims of all sorts then I don't see why I should defer. A bad metaphysician is still a bad metaphysician even if he wears a lab coat and gets better state grants than I do.

KevinScharp wrote:

Theories like general relativity and quantum field theory and conservation principles apply to all natural phenomena. They don't need clauses explicitly about events with supernatural causes. They apply to all natural phenomena. I know this because I can look at the theories. You can too.

This is purely methodological device. And this is your position if there is nothing over and beyond this, it is your conception of what science is.

KevinScharp wrote:

My position here is neutral on scientific realism. All I'm assuming is that there are scientific theories (e.g., general relativity, quantum field theory, evolutionary theory, plate tectonics), and that certain ones have colossal amounts of evidence for them (enough to make me believe that I'm moving at about 700 miles per hour toward the East right now). I'm assuming nothing about natural laws -- not even that there are any. I agree that on some conceptions of natural laws, true scientific theories would be (or express?) natural laws. I have no idea whether our best scientific theories of today are true. And it doesn't matter to my case whether they are true. All that matters for my purposes is that they have tons of evidence for them. If God had performed a miracle (which I'll take to be a supernatural cause of a natural effect), resurrection for example, then that event would have been incompatible with our best scientific theories of today (e.g., conservation of mass/energy). So that would mean that conservation of mass/energy is a false scientific theory. And so it would tell us nothing about the natural laws. So I'm not committed to miracles being violations of natural laws (which I take to be a good thing).

KevinScharp wrote:

Here's the point with an example. Let time 1 be before the resurrection. Let time 2 be after the resurrection. Conservation principles say that, given the way the world (i.e., the entirety of natural phenomena) is at time 1, it has to be a certain way at time 2. If the resurrection occurred between those two events, then the world is not the way predicted by the conservation principle at time 2. So resurrection is incompatible with the conservation principle.

Constructing a certain theory that doesn't take into account the intervention and prevention of supernatural causes wouldn't violate the theory, it only means that for its methodological purposes, it leaves those things out. There seems to be no such contradiction here, despite you trying to demonstrate one. That doesn't mean there isn't more to reality, or that there couldn't be. 

Let me put it another way, is your position dependent on the fact that we cannot know anything about the world or have direct access to it? You sitting on the fence isn't a justifiable position unless you do indeed argue for some sort of anti-realism. There's no specific reason to accept your conception of science (which is reduced to methodological assumptions about reality), but even if we did, there would be nothing contradictory about it. If miracles ever occur, and can be established as a possibility in our ontology as suspension of said-laws effect on which scientific thesis's depend for their continuity, there is no reason to talk of 'giving up' anything that is originally owed to the natural world. It would only mean that there is a faucet of the world that isn't natural. So in short, no, I don't understand what you mean.

Why you think that something like an intervention by God is a direct violation of our predictions is beyond me. The supernaturalist is predicting things in nature when left to their original devices, discarding the fact that supernatural occurrences can happen, which is seriously a matter of ontology. This is to be expected, rather than to say, "This violates our theory." We should say, "We didn't usually predict this sort of intervention and only ruled it out for methodological purposes, if such a thing happens. So it happens." The supernaturalist is simply unmoved by this, again, whether miracles could occur or not, is a matter of ontology.

Last edited by Dennis (4/15/2016 7:53 pm)

John West wrote:

I think this is why Christians seem so puzzlingly puzzled by your argument. They're concurrentists.

I suspect Kevin is just going to say that the deism/concurrentism distinction relates to causes and (perhaps) natural laws, while he cares about scientific theories and generalizations. The generalizations are false if they do not describe how the world evolves from t1 to t2.

He infers that one would have to give up the scientific theories if a miracle occurred. I reject that inference, because I have a view of how scientific theories relate to laws and causes. (That said, even on pretty standard philosophies of science, a single counterexample wouldn't be a reason to give up a theory. The counterexample would generally have to be repeatable and a replacement theory would have to be available.) And while he would like to avoid saying anything about natural laws, there's no reason the theist has to share those shackles, for which reason I think the theist in response only has to provide his model of natural law and divine action.

But it seems to me like even a deist could make such an appeal.

iwpoe wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

They don't need clauses explicitly about events with supernatural causes. They apply to all natural phenomena.

Why not? Supposing such things occur, why wouldn't they need such clauses?

This isn't controversial. You can just look at the theory and see that it has no such clauses. Look for yourself.
And, you can't just "suppose" that there are supernatural entities in a debate about whether supernatural entities exist. That's precisely the point at issue. The fact is that our best scientific theories have no such clauses. Many have no restrictions on their application at all (like general relativity and quantum field theory -- that's a necessary condition for them to be incompatible, by the way). To pretend like these theories have such clauses is really the wrong path. There has to be a better option for you.

KevinScharp wrote:

This isn't controversial. You can just look at the theory and see that it has no such clauses. Look for yourself.
And, you can't just "suppose" that there are supernatural entities in a debate about whether supernatural entities exist. That's precisely the point at issue. The fact is that our best scientific theories have no such clauses. Many have no restrictions on their application at all (like general relativity and quantum field theory -- that's a necessary condition for them to be incompatible, by the way). To pretend like these theories have such clauses is really the wrong path. There has to be a better option for you.

That the meaning of a scientific statement can be immediately be read off of scientists' statements of the theory is itself a controversial thesis in the philosophy of science. Pragmatists, for instance, wouldn't think so, and the existence of a unpredictable phenomenon 2000 years ago would not, on their terms, require rejection of a theory, if the theory remains effective today in generating predictions.

Other interpretations of scientific statements are possible (and might be more piecemeal and less radical than pragmatism). It is entirely open to the philosopher to argue that scientific laws include tacit clauses or have implicit but restricted domains of application; pointing to scientists' statements of the theories no more refutes iwpoe than it would refute the pragmatist.