KevinScharp wrote:

He ascended into heaven according to the story.

Thanks for that. I didn't realize that Christ's body ascended to heaven before the resurrection. I will, of course, take you at your word unless someone speaks up.

In the meantime, we can run the argument for some of the other miracles (e.g. Jesus's walking on water).

It was, however, in my original question:

As far as I know, Jesus's body didn't disappear before the resurrection. His tomb was empty after it because he got up and walked around. Am I missing part of the historical account?

I didn't realize you were talking about the Ascension. I thought you were talking about the actual resurrection event, and my argument was focussed on it. (Incidentally, it still seems to work for the resurrection event.)

I'm not sure what the standard use of "resurrection" is in Catholic circles. I know the Resurrection and Ascension are considered distinct Glorious Mysteries.

Last edited by John West (4/17/2016 7:46 pm)

John West wrote:

It was, however, in my original question:

As far as I know, Jesus's body didn't disappear before the resurrection. His tomb was empty after it because he got up and walked around. Am I missing part of the historical account?

I didn't realize you were talking about the Ascension. I thought you were talking about the actual resurrection event, and my argument was focussed on it. (Incidentally, it still seems to work for the resurrection event.)

I'm not sure what the standard use of "resurrection" is in Catholic circles. I know the Resurrection and Ascension are considered distinct Glorious Mysteries.

My bad. Carry on.
 

KevinScharp wrote:

Because it would be so irrational to give up our best scientific theories in favor of some ancient texts about miracles. And it's not what the same person would do with respect to other ancient texts about miracles (e.g., Homer).

This is what I've contested, ever since. There's nothing I would need to give up. Those theories are contingent upon how the world works, and how the world works is contingent upon God's creative causality. Hitting the 'reset' button simply means a suspension of the conditions which are contingent upon God himself.

Here's another form of critique. If you're conception of science simply concerns itself without leaving defined what it is actually describing (since you've repeatedly failed to answer this), then there's no reason to assume it'd be irrational to do anything. You're the one refusing to define what science is about. And that is plenty insufficient. That's why I said, other than for mere pragmatic purposes (say that we even give those theories up), what form of critique would this be? You've not established that science produces actual knowledge of the world. In fact, you refuse to say what it is about. If that's the case, why would it be irrational to do this disservice? This would actually hurt your conception of what science is, since it's nothing but methodological device. To what end? 

Say that now you mention how science functions without making an appeal to these things. So what? For methodological purposes, it has left those things out,

Bertrand Russell wrote:

It is not always realised how exceedingly abstract is the information that theoretical physics has to give.  It lays down certain fundamental equations which enable it to deal with the logical structure of events,while leaving it completely unknown what is the intrinsic character of the events that have the structure… All that physics gives us is certain equations giving abstract properties of their changes.  But as to what it is that changes, and what it changes from and to—as to this, physics is silent. (My Philosophical Development, p. 13)

My point is, this would hurt, if it at best it even hurts, your conception of science (I have no idea what that is, but since you've been so implicit, I'm going to infer.) If the best critique you have got out there is that 'x' would hurt the prediction of said scientific theory, and thus you have to give it up. It's a poor critique. And it's a poor critique simply because of the reasons concerning concurrentism laid up above. In short, it is a wrong inference from your end that you think it forces someone to give it up.

KevinScharp wrote:

Why think that that is metaphysically possible?

Because, for the Classical Theist, Metaphysical possibility is Grounded in God. If everything is contingent, even the principle of conservation, then it is simply a contingent affair. There would be no contradiction if the principle of conservation is contingent on God.

KevinScharp wrote:

If Jesus's body disappears, and it had mass, and no new mass/energy is added by God, then then we're talking about a mathematical contradiction. That's not metaphysically possible.

is answered with,

John West wrote:

It's also not against God's nature for him to make the distribution of mass/energy what conservation of mass/energy predicts it should be even if he resurrects Jesus. Hence, God can make the distribution of mass/energy what conservation of mass/energy predicts it should be even if Jesus rises from the dead.

This has been my point, and I thinks adequately addresses any such issues with science and prediction. But as I've said, it would probably hurt your conception of science (probably, because I have no idea what it is other than methodological device.) 

Professor Scharp, I've nearly finished typing up a summary for your part of the original debate, and I think I've understood you to claim that the "No Divine Psychology Argument" cuts against the cosmological argument and the teleological argument. (see around 23:00 in the linked video).

I have something like 83.1415926535% confidence that we classical theists will disagree with you on fundamental metaphysical grounds, but I would like you to expand on this claim before I forward a criticism of it, since it would be helpful to understand what you mean by it. The cosmological argument and the teleological argument are easy to misconstrue, and even theists do so frequently, so I want to make sure there isn't a simple misunderstanding. I see how one could make an *easy* misunderstanding re the teleological argument, but I'm having a hard time seeing how the divine psychology objection would, even on a loose understanding, affect the cosmological argument.