iwpoe wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Sweet, thank you. Yes, I think it affects the cosmological argument. I went over this a bit in the discussion, but didn't really explore it well. I can write up something on this point this afternoon.

Yeah, that's going to be a big deal for us. There has been something of a minor renaissance in philosophical theism after Plantiga and we classical theists are much happier with the traditional ontology because we reject certain ontological ideas that may amount to a rejection of what you're calling divine psychology. Craig might not be defensible on those grounds (without finding a way to reject your argument itself) since I do think he relies on divine psychology in a rather mundane sense, but we don't.

It's not worth talking about until I know more from you.

Fair enough. I was working on this yesterday but life got in the way. I'll get it done.
 

KevinScharp wrote:

John West wrote:

Oh, we can do worse than that. On most standard definitions of matter (in the relevant sense), matter must exist in space. So it's a broadly logical contradiction. No conservation of mass/energy needed.[1]

One could try “Matter is what has mass”. Pruss points out that would have to include the mass coming from energy (relativistic mass) or exclude photons and gluons.

He also points out that if mass is a natural kind tightly tied to the world's physics, then if the laws of nature were different there would be no matter.

Do me a favor -- reread your comment and look at how often you write about natural laws instead of scientific theories. I'm not talking about natural laws or the physics of a world (which I take to be an instance of the former). I'm talking about our current scientific theories.

​Only in the third paragraph, where it was relevant. It was part of an argument against saying that "Matter is what has mass". (I point it out because I think most theories of laws people here would argue for, would tie them together in such a way. You may be trying to avoid doing so, but few if any people here would reply without at least implicitly assuming arguments for much of a certain metaphysic.)

My point about the conservation laws was that, I would only give it up, if God's creative causality was different than what already is. If it's true that the conservation laws are second-order-properties, then say if the laws were different, then there would be no conservation laws. Everything is again, decidedly contingent on God on independent grounds.

KevinScharp wrote:

A sun is a star -- any physical object with enough mass to ignite nuclear fusion in its core and held in equilibrium by gravity.

A planet is a physical objection orbiting The Sun whose shape is the result of gravitational equilibrium and which has cleared its orbital neighborhood.

I know a fair bit about the representational fallacy, so don't worry. This is your ontology. Make no mistake about it, this does commit you to these entities here.

I'm sure you can use the term the way you've done later. I'm not a fan of reading ontology off of language in the very leasts. Metaphysics is almost purely an a posteriori enterprise for me.

I don't think ontological commitment arguments are useless, I am more interested in how propositions and predicates relate to the object or the properties or phenomena that actually do the causal work in the natural world that we graph into our scientific theories, given your take, it seems that just is the point of science. We're much closer than we think. I've given you a definition of what the empirical sciences does, given what you have said, the business of science is to find the proper ontology of the world. IOW, ontological commitment arguments do commit you to something, but not necessarily, wipes out any reference. The point of nuclear fusion in its core held in equilibrium are terms that refer to something, rather than nothing, don't they? If they don't, they're useful fictions. If you're wrong about them, you need a better ontology that explains what is already explained and moves on to do more than what the original theory bid.

If so, these things are doing the causal work in your theory to support what a sun is and thus you're committed to them. I gave you a definition of what the empirical sciences concerned itself with. If you wish to blur the lines as such? Fine by me. What is not fine by me is ignoring what you are committed to do and that you are doing metaphysics along the way. If that's the case, the argument isn't 'scientific' per se, but metaphysical. I suppose these aren't points you'd contest, would you? If you do, I'm contesting the point that scientific theories are more intricately related to natural phenomena than you think they are. The major point is that if you want to establish that there is any knowledge from this affair, then it's a major metaphysical point, no matter your insistence to the contrary.

You admit that there's no 'bright dividing line between science and metaphysics.' I argue, unless you argue for some form of realism/anti-realism this remains a bold assertion. Sciences makes one ontologically committed to entities, what those entities might turn out to be later on (via scientific investigations), is altogether a different affair and that's where the sciences come in to help us find the correct ontology.

KevinScharp wrote:

Do me a favor -- reread your comment and look at how often you write about natural laws instead of scientific theories. I'm not talking about natural laws or the physics of a world (which I take to be an instance of the former). I'm talking about our current scientific theories.

As long as scientific theories are about natural phenomena where they produce any knowledge of the world at all, and natural phenomena is something you're committed to doing metaphysics by your own admission. You are not just talking about scientific theories, you're talking about metaphysical existents.


EDIT: I just saw West's reply.

Last edited by Dennis (4/19/2016 12:34 pm)

The law of conservation of mass or principle of mass conservation states that for any system closed to all transfers of matter and energy, the mass of the system must remain constant over time, as system mass cannot change quantity if it is not added or removed.

Could the theist just hold that the physical universe is not closed to all transfers of matter and energy?

KevinScharp wrote:

iwpoe wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

So he has a material body -- and it ended up in heaven, which I'm assuming is not a location in spacetime. So some mass/energy disappeared.

No. Christ does not sit bodily as God. That makes no metaphysical sense. God didn't one day become material in his being. A major aspect of classical christology centers around this. Assuming that the post-resserection body is in any way material it would have needed to be shed and physically destroyed or placed somewhere intact or made to not be.

Do these details really matter? What exactly what the miracle? What natural event or phenomenon related to resurrection had a supernatural cause?

It may if we're talking about theory conflict, yes. If it turns out either that the miracle amounts to a non-natural event (as the Spirit's procession from the father) and/or a non-conflicting but extraordinary natural event (as the parting of the red sea), then we've no actual conflict.

Miracles can simply be straightforwardly natural events with special supernatural relevance (Hume was mistaken in his conflict analysis.). The ten plagues of Egypt are not, for instance, incompatible with natural theory. Their miraculous character is simply their timing and significance as a sign of divine will. They manifest as intentional events writ-large.

I like the red sea case particularly for this: it is not a miracle because it is impossible that natural theory account for it mechanically. It is a miracle because a highly extraordinary path in the sea opened up in front of God's chosen people at the right time.