Timotheos wrote:

Also, before we get too far down the rabbit whole, are we talking about Humean causation, with its "loose and separate" view of cause and effect, it's treatment of cause and effect as two separate events, it's complete identification of cause and effect with close correlation of cause and effect in space-time, and it's complete repudiation of any talk of casual powers? **Boo!**

Or are we talking about a more Aristotelian account, which features a necessary connection between cause and effect, treats cause and effect as one event looked at from two different perspective or with two different aspects, is quite hesitant to jump from a mere correlation to causation, and can get hardly a word out without referring to casual powers? **Yeah!**

Which idea of causation we have in mind will radically change the discussion, and also how we think causation is supposed to work.

Agreed. And I'm sure there are other important distinctions like this that one could plausibly take to distinguish other concepts of causation. But it's your argument, so you should tell me which one you intend.
 

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

The problem is that armchair reasoning about causation is completely unreliable because cause and effect are two very old and imprecise concepts. 

The concept of causation is old indeed, but it is not at all imprecise. The Kramers–Kronig relations imply that in physical systems causality is logically equivalent to stating the analyticity of response functions in the closed upper half plane.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kramers%E2%80%93Kronig_relations

You've only cited a mathematical theory. What's the theory of causation based on it?

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Trying to uncritically use the concepts of cause and effect in the context of general relativity and quantum field theory would be like if Aristotle were transported to a contemporary chemistry conference and complained that fire isn’t on the periodic table.  “Don’t you believe in fire?” “Yes, we do, but we just don’t think it’s fundamental any more.”

This flies in the face of modern philosophy of science. Let me put it to you like this: if causality could be "reduced" to something more fundamental, then we no longer need to replicate scientific experiments, as we could simply build equipment that detects the "particles of causality" and prove induction right then and there.

Excellent -- give me citations of those who disagree with me. I have no idea what your last sentence means. I'm not saying causation is reducible.

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Causation is not a conceptual tool of advanced scientific theories.

Except that it absolutely is a tool of advanced scientific theories. This statement is flat out false. The opposite of truth.

Great, let's hear some examples.

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

For example, in the statement of Quantum Mechanics, the word ‘cause’ doesn't appear at all, nor does it in the statement of general relativity.

However, the Kramers–Kronig relations do appear in quantum mechanics when it comes to determining the properties of any linear response function, such as that of an photon, and can even be used to calculate optical properties such as the absorption coefficient and permittivity.

Agreed, but I'm not clear on what you think the relation is between these Hilbert transforms and causation.

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

General relativity works the same way by applying tensor fields—a kind of mathematical structure studied in differential geometry, one studies it typically as a new graduate student in math or physics.

One of the reasons why General Relativity uses tensor fields is because tensors are invariant with respect to coordinate transformations, and it is a metaphysical (meaning the "physics of physics") requirement that the laws of physics are the same regardless of choice of coordinates. So here in General Relativity we see that metaphysical considerations are used to determine what theories are physically admissible. Causality also plays the same role here: it limits the admissible mathematical structure of the universe to that of a globally orientable Lorentzian manifold.

Can you give an argument for how causality is supposed to determine a manifold?

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Instead, the point is that the concept of causation is dispensable in mature sciences that rely heavily on mathematical models. Using causes to make predictions turns out to be vastly less precise than using mathematical models. Remember, causal concepts by themselves provide much in the way of understanding or predictive power.

(1) No it isn't, as I have demonstrated before.

(2) You are setting up a false dilemma, as if causality and mathematical modeling are mutually exclusive, but in some circumstances, causality can actually be formulated in explicitly mathematical terms!

Examples?

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Cause and effect aren’t scientific concepts.

Neither are numbers.

KevinScharp wrote:

Moreover, causation isn’t just dispensable, it’s easy to show that using it all to reason about certain aspects of scientific theories leads one into contradictions.

How does it lead to contradictions?

Look at the paper I cited.
 

To start I'd like to say a little about the No Divine Psychology Argument. I'm not using the Fine Tuning Argument in the example because it grants that it is in principle possible for something other than God to be responsible for Fine Tuning.
 
First of all what version of the Problem of Evil are we talking of? Assumable the Evidential version as most philosophers of religion, including atheists, admit that the Logical problem is no longer relevant.
 
As for point I even a theist of the Plantinga camp need not accept it. All they will argue for is the more modest claim 'We don't know everything about God's plans'. Yet this would seem trivial given the scope on which God works. Likewise for point II. We do however know that in principle there must be some reason for God's actions - in fact we can use this to rule out the possibility of a world where God randomly interferes with the laws of nature to deceive everyone for all eternity. An interesting discussion of that can be found here. 
 
Point III coupled with Kevin's earlier remark on the Fine Tuning Argument to the effect that 'it would have to be the case that God WOULD create the universe.' is more interesting. Are you saying that God must have a reason to actualise exactly this world (here I'm using the possible world sense) over any other - in which case we have modal collapse problems anyway - and that us theists need to show you what that reason is*? Or are you going for a weaker claim as in God must have a reason to create this kind of universe (used in the non-possible world sense) and that us theists should show you what that reason is*?

* In both cases why should not it be sufficient to claim that there is a reason even if we don't have access to it?

Now I grant this objection does present a challenge to Fine Tuning Arguments, as its proponent could go on to say that for all we know God could have an equally good reason to create a universe which does not have the appearance of Fine Tuning.

And now for causation...

KevinScharp wrote:

The problem is that armchair reasoning about causation is completely unreliable because cause and effect are two very old and imprecise concepts.

Moreover, there are other principles about causation that seem to go against this argument—causes are governed by natural laws, causes and effects are events, causes precede their effects. None of these is compatible with God’s agency causing the universe.

Talk of Cause and Effect is often imprecise because we in our more 'folky' discourse do not take into account all relevant factors e.g. conditions, causing working together and so forth. Thankfully in more precise scenarios such those involved in molecular chemistry and some forms of particle physics we stand a better chance of attaching rigourus explaination.

And here we return to our old point of contention about Laws of Nature and the nature of scientific endeavor. Most of us here would deny that the casual relation holds between events - instead, so the proponents of 'Aristotelian' metaphysics hold, is that it is a relationship between two substances (natural kinds). 

As for causes being governed by 'natural laws' we would agree in as much 'natural laws/laws of nature' are ways of talking about an entity's nature, its categorical and dispositional properties. As you again no doubt know this can hardly been seen as an arbitrary regress to an ancient system of explanation for apologetic reasons, as many of the 20th and 21th century pioneers of this approach were naturalists interested in providing robust realist theories of science e.g. Molnar, Martin, Ellis and co. 

You can (and probably will!) disagree with all of these positions, however as the critic we'd like to hear from you what's wrong with said accounts, and what alternative you'd propose (what are the laws of nature and what are they about?).

KevinScharp wrote:

WLC Cause Example
“If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity.”  

Easy answer to these: WLC is just dead wrong in his characterization of causation here (in that it's hard to say say exactly what he is getting at - States-of-Affairs as casual agents? A Counter-Factual account). This is precisely because, as he himself admitted in one of his debates with Sean Carroll, he has rejected the older substantial view of causation.

As for the water example: we agree. WLC's example is imprecise and to vague for satisfactory explanation in physics or chemistry. This is because Water, as in a lake or a puddle, is not Water as in an instance of an individual substance i.e. a H2O molecule, but an aggregate of substances, ergo we should expect issues of vagueness to occur. A proper answer to the question would contain a long list of interactions between individual molecules [substances] (re transference of kinetic energy?) and their structural relations to one another.   
 

Last edited by DanielCC (4/22/2016 5:52 pm)

iwpoe wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

They aren't obsolete in the sense that we should stop using them altogether.

I was reffering merely to your suggestion that their age was relevant. I do believe you called them old, and then I recall reading your charming tale about Aristotle asking chemists where the element fire is talked about.

KevinScharp wrote:

Either way I'm not dismissing them. I'm giving reasons for what I say. There's a difference.

Gosh golly, Scarlett, ray-sons? I ain't never heard of them no place no how.

Did I claim you dismissed them out of hand? No, I don't recall doing so. A dismissal with reasons is a dismissal.

KevinScharp wrote:

How have I poisoned the well? How have I disparaged myself?

'Armchair theorizing' is a rhetorical slur which can be thrown at any philosopher (or mathematician, or logician, or econimist, or...) including yourself at any time because of the nature of what we do (unless you think you somehow take the concepts of science to some philosophic lab somewhere). To start your remarks with it is odd indeed. I don't understand self-hating philosophers.

I mean, did it ever occur to you that you oughtn't call metaphysical work, which many of our posters are working on professionally, "armchair reasoning" before you begin to address them? Or maybe you were under the impression that the phrase isn't a slur. It is.

I have far better ways to spend my time than putting up with this level of hostility.

KevinScharp wrote:

Timotheos wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Thanks, that's helpful. Let's look at versions of the cosmological argument that depend on principles of causation.

The problem is that armchair reasoning about causation is completely unreliable because cause and effect are two very old and imprecise concepts. Our intuitions about them can easily be led astray; for example, that causation is transitive—if a causes b and b causes c then a causes c. But it’s easy to come up with counterexamples to this—a hiker sees a boulder bouncing toward her and ducks to avoid it. The threat of the boulder caused her to duck and her ducking caused her to survive but the threat of the boulder didn’t cause her to survive. Moreover, there are other principles about causation that seem to go against this argument—causes are governed by natural laws, causes and effects are events, causes precede their effects. None of these is compatible with God’s agency causing the universe.

Trying to uncritically use the concepts of cause and effect in the context of general relativity and quantum field theory would be like if Aristotle were transported to a contemporary chemistry conference and complained that fire isn’t on the periodic table.  “Don’t you believe in fire?” “Yes, we do, but we just don’t think it’s fundamental any more.”


Causation is not a conceptual tool of advanced scientific theories. For example, in the statement of Quantum Mechanics, the word ‘cause’ doesn't appear at all, nor does it in the statement of general relativity. Instead, what you have is a complicated mathematical structure (e.g., an infinite dimensional, separable, Hilbert space that has inner products—this is a particular kind of object commonly studied in the branch of mathematics called abstract algebra, one studies it typically as an advanced undergraduate in math or physics) and a way of interpreting it (e.g., various things that can be measured are associated with different aspects of the mathematical structure—e.g., time as an self-adjoint operator on the space). General relativity works the same way by applying tensor fields—a kind of mathematical structure studied in differential geometry, one studies it typically as a new graduate student in math or physics. Very roughly, scientists observe the world, feed their measurements into a mathematical model, use the model to calculate predictions and then try to test those predictions. Using the concept of causation need not come into it. Notice—I didn’t say that it cannot come into it, so when Craig throws together a bunch of quotes of scientists (usually in popularizations of course) using the word ‘cause’, that will be totally irrelevant. He’s going to do it if he ever bothers to respond to this objection because that’s his number one research tool, and now you know that it will be just as illicit this time as it always is. Instead, the point is that the concept of causation is dispensable in mature sciences that rely heavily on mathematical models. Using causes to make predictions turns out to be vastly less precise than using mathematical models. Remember, causal concepts by themselves provide much in the way of understanding or predictive power. Cause and effect aren’t scientific concepts. Moreover, causation isn’t just dispensable, it’s easy to show that using it all to reason about certain aspects of scientific theories leads one into contradictions. Causation, it turns out is part of a way of thinking about the world that dominated for a long time, but is now slowly being replaced by much more precise ways of thinking about the world. So any time Craig makes point using the concept of causation, he needs to stop and first provide a detailed justification for thinking that causation is even the right concept to be using here. That would be tantamount to justifying the claim that our world is a world governed completely by the principle of cause and effect. Check out John Norton’s paper “Causation as Folk Science,”—it’s free and it does a good job of summarizing and defending this point.
 
WLC Cause Example
“If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity.”  This is a perfect example of the imprecision of using the concepts of cause and effect to try to reason about the existence of anything much less gods or Christianity. The cause of water’s freezing is the temperature being below 0 degrees C. If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect then if the cause is there, the effect must be there. But anyone who takes an intro to chemistry class knows that water can be below 0 degrees C and still be water. In fact you can take liquid water down below -50C if you don’t allow crystals to form. You can also experience this supercooled water in the form of freezing rain. So although you might all nod your head and say “yeah, that sounds really obvious” when asked if having a temperature below 0C is the case of water’s freezing, it isn’t true. Or maybe it is true that that’s part of a cause or whatever. The point is that causal talk is not very precise and totally inadequate for the uses of science, which is ultimately measured by predictive success. So Craig’s own example illustrates perfectly the confusion I’m talking about and this kind of confusion is rampant throughout his work.



 

Even if we grant you that causation is not a useful concept for high-level mathematical physical theories, this does not address how it might be used in biological, medical, geological, and possibly even chemical fields of scientific study; as you have argued against Craig himself, the sciences are a package deal, and unless one is a reductionist, which you are not, I cannot see why causation cannot at least be a useful concept in those other fields of study, even if it's not at the level of theoretical physics.

And even if we grant you that the sciences don't deal with cause and effect, why would that prove their unreality? Science does not deal with the abstract objects, but that doesn't mean they are therefore off the conceptual table. Heck, try writing a history book without ever speaking of causation!

Also, I find your example quite strange; why is it that water can stay unfrozen in generally unexpected way not just a sign that we were moving too fast in our generalization? Most people would grant you the premise that, say, all penguins are black and white, but that there is a non black and white penguin does not show that people are somehow conceptually confused about the color black and white.

Furthermore, please design for me an experiment that makes no use of the notion of cause and effect; even if theoritical physics need not discuss it, how exactly are we to confirm theories without causes?

Causation is useful in some sciences. I'm happy with that. Why is that a problem for me?
I'm not saying causation isn't real. I'm saying if it is real, then it isn't fundamental. It's fine to use causation in lots of circumstances.

On the penguin example -- I was trying to show that principles involving causation one might find initially very plausible can turn out to be mistaken. I'm not saying such a person is confused about causation. I'm saying that the principles at play in the cosmological argument are similar.
 

But you're not a reductionist about the sciences, so while your talk about theoritical physics might indeed prove that causation is a non-fundamental concept in that field, why should that example generalize to all of the sciences, unless one is inclined to reduce say biology to physics? Causation might not be fundamental in physics, but it might be in biology, and it doesn't seem nearly as viable a possibility to dispense of it in biology as in theoritical physics, to say nothing of experimental physics.

And showing that our intuitions are messy about it does not show that it is not useful, correct, or sensible, as I think quantum physics has well shown us.

Last edited by Timotheos (4/22/2016 7:37 pm)