Brian wrote:

1) How many people here subscribe to an ethical theory other than virtue ethics?   If so, what are your reasons?

I suppose I subscribe to a form of natural law theory, which might be thought of as distinct from virtue ethics (or else a kind of virtue ethics). Natural law theorists tend to think that virtue is an important component of ethics, but, in the following sense, they do not think they are central or fundamental. That is, you should be good, and you can only be good by acting well. You act well by acting in accordance with the principles of natural law, which specify the goods toward which human inclinations tend. (The brunt of the work is in showing what it means to act "in accordance with" the principles of natural law, as well as what the principles of natural law are.) If you have been habituated well, or if you act well, you might become virtuous and will habitually aim at the good. Contemporary virtue ethicists tend to emphasize that virtue gives you these dispositions to perceive what is good in a situation and act on that basis, if you have virtue, even though you won't necessarily be able to give a studied explanation of why you did what you did. They tend to like the "situational" and unsystematic component of virtue. Natural law theorists tend to think that virtue does play this role and for that reason is important in man's aiming at the good, but they want to give a more direct analysis of the good.

Partially this is just difference in emphasis; strictly, natural law theorists might be virtue ethicists of a sort (though many virtue ethicists would reject the "natural lawyer" label). But it isn't entirely a matter of emphasis, since there are disagreements as to how systematic Aristotle thinks ethics can be.

Brian wrote:

2) What is the relationship between classical theism and virtue ethics for those of you who do subscribe to virtue ethics?

I do not see a terribly direct connection. I think my own ethical theory involves final causality, and I think final causality implies the existence of the God of classical theism. Moreover, I don't think natural law is recognizable as law unless you know of God's existence.

There's sort of an open debate about the extent to which natural law theory relies on God's existence. Some have argued (this sort of argument originates in Peter Geach--see also O'Brien's dissertation) that moral absolutes require God's existence, for you can't know that you shouldn't (for instance) sully your own character by lying to prevent something else that is terrible, even if you know that lying is always bad. I am not really sure how I feel about that argument. I guess I still hold out for thinking that someone could recognize the force of a moral absolute without knowing that God exists, but I am not confident in that position.

Brian wrote:

It seems that if you adhere to something like Platonism, then one of the results of classical theism is that God is at the Pinnacle of Being (to speak loosely, and perhaps not with complete accuracy), and matter is at the bottom, while every being is somewhere else in the Great Chain of Being.  If you take this as your metaphysics, then it seems the goal of ethics, or at least one of the goals, is to affirm your place in that chain by being the best type of thing you are--presumably human.  If this is how you view ethics, then it seems that being a good person (virtue ethics) is prior to creating good states of affairs (consequentialism) or performing good actions (deontology).

That is an interesting thought. It seems like, in general, people want to find alternatives to arguing that being rational/moral is what distinguishes us from lower animals and thus is what constitutes what is best for us. The case is more convincing, though, if one argues in terms of what one shares with God.

Brian wrote:

Greg wrote:

I suppose I subscribe to a form of natural law theory, which might be thought of as distinct from virtue ethics (or else a kind of virtue ethics). Natural law theorists tend to think that virtue is an important component of ethics, but, in the following sense, they do not think they are central or fundamental. That is, you should be good, and you can only be good by acting well. You act well by acting in accordance with the principles of natural law, which specify the goods toward which human inclinations tend. (The brunt of the work is in showing what it means to act "in accordance with" the principles of natural law, as well as what the principles of natural law are.) If you have been habituated well, or if you act well, you might become virtuous and will habitually aim at the good. Contemporary virtue ethicists tend to emphasize that virtue gives you these dispositions to perceive what is good in a situation and act on that basis, if you have virtue, even though you won't necessarily be able to give a studied explanation of why you did what you did. They tend to like the "situational" and unsystematic component of virtue. Natural law theorists tend to think that virtue does play this role and for that reason is important in man's aiming at the good, but they want to give a more direct analysis of the good.

Partially this is just difference in emphasis; strictly, natural law theorists might be virtue ethicists of a sort (though many virtue ethicists would reject the "natural lawyer" label). But it isn't entirely a matter of emphasis, since there are disagreements as to how systematic Aristotle thinks ethics can be.

The relationship between virtue and natural law is certainly interesting.  Perhaps, if one views virtue as a moral state that produces the disposition in one to act habitually in a certain good way, one could say that a proper virtue is one which produces the disposition to act habitually in line with natural law. I don't think the virtue ethicist has to say anything like this, and I think Aristotle doesn't say this, but that might be an interesting way of framing the relationship between the two.  I'm sure there are others who have worked this out in the past though.

Greg wrote:

That is an interesting thought. It seems like, in general, people want to find alternatives to arguing that being rational/moral is what distinguishes us from lower animals and thus is what constitutes what is best for us. The case is more convincing, though, if one argues in terms of what one shares with God.

Well, I wasn't really arguing that to be a good human is to do something other than be rational/moral. I think being moral is defined in terms of being the best human you can be, and I think part of the essence of humanity is to be rational, although simply being rational is not sufficient to make one a good human being.

Why should one want to be a human being?
 

Brian wrote:

Well, presumably because you are a human being. Really, you shouldn't want to be a human being, you should want to be good, but since the good manifests itself differently for different brings, you should realize that for you, a human being, the good will necessarily look like a human good.

I agree with the highlighted premise, which is the reason I made that post. There is an hidden premise in all this talk of being a human and that's that one is human essentially i.e necessarily as opposed to contingently. I'll grant you that one is rational essentially but it doesn't follow one is thereby human unless on takes the two as identical. Likewise thinking and being just would seem 'good characteristics' for any being capable of possessing them to do so (or maybe good characteristics in general).