JayDee wrote:

Kevin, regarding the FTA and Divine Psychology objection; if one could show that;

a) the three options (really) are only Design, Chance, and Necessity
b) Chance and Necessity are extremely low probability

Then as you mentioned earlier, if the probabilities sum to 1, i.e. p(D + C + N) = 1; wouldn't that allow the proponent of the FTA to claim that design - despite our not initially knowing what the probability was because of the divine psychology objection - is automatically the most probable? because p(D) = 1 - ( an extremely low number ).

Perhaps then the controversial point would become whether or not they are the only three options, and/or whether or not the probability of Chance and Necessity are extremely low.

But I suspect that possibly someone like Dr. Craig might be tempted to use the sum of probabilities in support of the idea that just showing C and N to be very low in probability, this might serve to increase the probability of D.

What are your thoughts?

I think you're exactly right about this -- you'd need to show that the options are independent of one another (so they can be summed) and that they are exhaustive (so they sum to 1). I also think you're right that this is what Craig is thinking.

However, your equation should be P(D)+P(C)+P(N)=1.

A lot depends on what goes into the chance column. For example, an all powerful but not very smart god accidentally creates the universe while trying to do something else. Is that design or chance? What if the universe is an unforeseen and unknown side effect of some other project for a god that isn't omniscient?

I like this line of inquiry. it might be fruitful.

On Aquinas' Fourth Way

The argument as presented by Aquinas in “The Five Ways”:

Aquinas wrote:

The fourth way is taken from the gradations that are found in the world: In the world some things are found to be more and less good, more and less true, more and less noble, etc. But more and less are predicated of diverse things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a given respect. For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches that which is maximally hot. Therefore, there is something that is maximally true, maximally good, and maximally noble, and, as a result, is a maximal being; for according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 2, things that are maximally true are maximally beings. But, as is claimed in the same book, that which is maximal in a given genus is a cause of all the things that belong to that genus; for instance, fire, which is maximally hot, is a cause of all hot things. Therefore, there is something that is a cause for all beings of their esse, their goodness, and each of their perfections—and this we call God.

  
Here’s what I said about it:

KevinScharp
wrote:

This one seems to me to be the least plausible. We know now that quantities come with different scale types. Some scales allow for comparative judgments (X is more F than Y) but not for superlative judgments (X is maximally F). Desire is an example -- in the standard theory, desire comes in degrees (so we can say that someone desires one thing more than another) but there is no maximal degree of desire (for anything you desire, you can desire something else more). Greater than and less than on the positive integers are another example. 

 
After being told that my reading was appallingly bad, I looked at Chastek’s blog post on Perseity and the 4th way[/url], [url=http://philosophy.lander.edu/intro/gradation.shtml]the interpretation of the 4th way on p.l.e.[/url], and [url=http://www.amazon.com/Aquinas-Beginners-Guide-Edward-Feser/dp/1851686908]Feser’s Aquinas book.  

Let’s look at their interpretations.

Here is Loop’s reconstruction of the argument, which is discussed and praised by Chastek.
1.  The more and less exist with respect to a standard from which they really fall short of.
2.  It is only possible to really fall short of a standard if that standard is really possible.
3.  In order for a standard to be really possible, and not just logically possible, it must either exist or be in the power of some agent to bring about.
4.  Thus there is a real standard of goodness, which is not just more or less (i.e. relatively) good, which either exists or is in the power of an agent to make.
5.  Thus, there either is a being that is absolutely good, or who can bring forth absolute goodness from its own power.
6.  Such a being all call God.

We can see exactly the problem I raised in premise 1. It is false that anything there can be more of or less of has some standard that it falls short of. This is just to assume that all scales are absolute – i.e., have some maximum value. Note that premise 1 is about more and less in general, not about more or less of some specific quantities. So we can see in this “sophisticated” interpretation the exact blunder I originally diagnosed. 

Let’s look at the Lander University website:
1. There are different degrees of goodness in different things.
2. There are different degrees of being in different things—the more being, the more goodness. (The notion of the Great Chain of Being is being presupposed.
3. For there to be degrees of being at all, there must be something which has being in the highest degree.
4. Therefore, a Being in the Highest Degree or Perfect Being exists.

Here the problem is premise 3. Again, there is no reason given for thinking that for there to be degrees at all, there must be a maximum. This principle here is applied only to being, which seems a misreading of the Aquinas text. Either way, there’s nothing here to use to reply to my objection.  

Finally, we have Feser. His interpretation is obviously the best one (I can see why people on this forum like his work). He writes:

Feser wrote:

“Let us note first that Aquinas is not in fact trying to argue in the Fourth Way that everything that we observe to exist in degrees (including heat, smelliness, sweetness, etc.) must be traceable to some single maximum standard of perfection. Here (as elsewhere in the Five Ways) his archaic scientific examples have led modern readers to misread him. Given the (false, we now know) medieval theory that fire is the source of all heat, he naturally appeals to fire and heat merely to illustrate the general principle that things that come in degrees point to a maximum. But heat itself is not among the things he is trying here to explain. (This should be obvious when you think about it, since Aquinas would clearly not regard heat or fire as divine attributes!) Rather, he intends to use the principle in question to explain truth, goodness, nobility, being and the like specifically. As the reader may have noticed, this list is very similar to the list of “transcendentals” we discussed in chapter 2, which are (unlike heat, smelliness, etc.) above every genus and common to every being, unrestricted to any particular category or individual. And as commentators on the Fourth Way generally recognize, Aquinas is mainly concerned in this argument to show that to the extent that these transcendental features of the world come in degrees, they must be traceable to a maximum.” (Feser, ch. 3).

Okay, so here we have a much better defense – rather than saying that anything that comes in degrees has a maximum, Feser takes Aquinas to be saying that anything that comes in degrees and is transcendental has a maximum. First, this is obviously a bad interpretation of the text because Aquinas thinks that the principle in question applies to heat, which is obviously not transcendental (surprisingly Feser notices this but somehow doesn't realize that it undermines his reading). Aquinas in the passage quoted above clearly commits himself to the following principle: “more and less are predicated of diverse things insofar as they approach in diverse ways that which is maximal in a given respect.” And then he kindly gives us an example: “For instance, the hotter something is, the closer it approaches that which is maximally hot.” There is no way to consistently read Aquina’ fourth way as applying ONLY to transcendentals. Second, the appeal to transcendentals in no way helps Aquinas’ case. Feser sums up Aquinas’ view nicely:

Feser wrote:

“Being is also what is called in Thomistic philosophy a transcendental, something above everygenus, common to all beings and thus not restricted to any category or individual. The othertranscendentals, on Aquinas’s account, are thing, one, something, true, and good, and each is“convertible” with being in the sense that each designates one and the same thing – namely being –under a different aspect (QDV 1.1). (To put the point in terms made familiar by the logician GottlobFrege, the transcendentals differ in sense but not in reference, referring to the same thing underdifferent names just as “Superman” and “Clark Kent” do.)” (Feser, ch.2).

The fact that the transcendentals are above every genus and common to every being has no bearing at all whether they, as quantities, have maximums. For example, length applies to every being as well, and it doesn’t have a maximum. There is no reason to think that some quantity that is above every genus must have a maximum. Moreover, most of the transcendentals aren’t quantities at all, and so don’t admit of more or less in any way. ‘One’, ‘thing’, and ‘something’ don’t even have the right grammar to be quantities or to admit of more or less. Talk about appallingly bad.  

Last edited by KevinScharp (5/07/2016 1:24 pm)

Alexander wrote:

For what it's worth, this also annoyed me.

KevinScharp wrote:

The fact that the transcendentals are above every genus and common to every being has no bearing at all whether they, as quantities, have maximums. For example, length applies to every being as well, and it doesn’t have a maximum. 

No Thomist would accept that length applies to every being! At least give a counter example that's less contested than a dogma of materialism.

Ah! Fair enough. So, what's the argument supposed to be? X is transcendental; X admits of more or less; thus, X has a maximum. What's the justification here? Better yet, derive a contradiction for me from {X is transcendental, X admits of more or less; X has no maximum}.
 

KevinScharp wrote:

Ah! Fair enough. So, what's the argument supposed to be? X is transcendental; X admits of more or less; thus, X has a maximum. What's the justification here? Better yet, derive a contradiction for me from {X is transcendental, X admits of more or less; X has no maximum}.
 

If X is a non-empty set with a total order (presumably what is meant by "X admits of more or less"), then it is trivial to prove that X has a top element.

Tomislav Ostojich wrote:

KevinScharp wrote:

Ah! Fair enough. So, what's the argument supposed to be? X is transcendental; X admits of more or less; thus, X has a maximum. What's the justification here? Better yet, derive a contradiction for me from {X is transcendental, X admits of more or less; X has no maximum}.
 

If X is a non-empty set with a total order (presumably what is meant by "X admits of more or less"), then it is trivial to prove that X has a top element.

The positive integers are a non-empty set with a total order under "less than or equal to" (i.e., total, anti-symmetric, transitive), but they have no top element. Did you misspeak?