Despite reading both TLS and Feser's Aquinas, I never understood how causal series per se and per accidens fit in with the First Way.  It seems to me every causal series we know about either ends with a cause per accidens or "We don't know."  For example, the example of the hand moving the stick moving the rock.  The hand-stick-rock is ordered per se, but what is causing the hand to move?  You can say various causes at that point, for example that the person who is moving their hand would not exist without having parents having conceived him, which is a cause per accidens, or you can say that he would not be able to move the stick were it not for the laws of physics and chemistry and biology, which are causes per se.  But what causes the laws of physics?  I would say the best answer science and philosophy have at this point is "I don't know."  (Granted to a certain point we do know, for example, we know that certain things happen because of the attraction of electromagnetic forces.  But eventually you reach a point, like the fundamental forces, where you say, "I don't know why there are fundamental forces").  I think someone on here once replied, "God causes the laws of physics," but we can't use that in a proof of God's existence without question begging.

Similarly with the case of the light hanging off a chain suspended from a ceiling, the light is supported by the chain which is supported by the ceiling as a causal series per se.  What causes the ceiling to remain suspended?  It is supported by the walls of the house.  And what causes the walls of the house to remain standing?  You can cite to the builder building it (a cause per accidens) or you can say it's supported by the foundation and then again cite to the laws of physics.  And again, what causes the laws of physics?  I don't know.

Which to my mind raises the question: how do we know that every causal series is not ultimately derived from causes per accidens?  How do we know Alexander's third premise?
 

Last edited by ArmandoAlvarez (6/05/2016 2:37 pm)

"I don't really see why we need only one first cause rather than one first cause for each causal series (i.e. the will of the person moving the rock is the first cause there, the earth is the first cause of the lamp-chain-house-earth causal series, etc.)" Think about this way, the will of the person directs itself towards something. In other words, the actualization of a potential. Since, one has potencies then they cannot be Actus Purus.

@AKG
Even though Alexander already responded (So far I agree with him) let me pitch in my two cents. In this case, the angel has potencies, so the angel is imperfect. If it is imperfect then that means that something actualized the angel and the angel is dependent on that something else. Only that of which is perfect in the most absolute sense cannot depend on anything else.