I wanted to get a scholastic approach to an issue that's been bothering me. So assuming we take epistemology as first philosophy, were going to run into the problem of begging the question against alternative theories of truth and knowledge. I'm not sure how to get outside of that, besides something like pragmatism, which is just sort of a revisionary approach toward the idea of truth itself (different approach, just as unsatisfying). 

To clarify, this is a form of the problem of the criteria, yet not trying to assume epistemology as first philosophy in it's formuation. 

So this this understood as a conflict/interdependence between two questions 

1. What do we know? 
2. How do we know? 

The problem is that any satisfactory answer to either one of those questions assumes a sufficient answer to the other. More specifically, how does one offer a non-circular, non question begging, comprehensive answer to both of those questions? 

Now assuming we take metaphysics as first philosophy, but we have alternative accounts, how do we adjudicate this issue without getting ourselves back into the original problem? 

Last edited by Indeterminate (6/27/2016 4:17 am)