Offline
I've recently been thinking more about the idea of a sort of dualist panentheism, in which the world itself is manifest in two separate realms of body and spirit, yet is still reducible to and is essentially an infinitesimal manifestation of God himself. I'm liking it too, which kind of worries me, given it's heterodoxy in classic circles.
So I'd like you all to either give me compelling arguments for or against this particular idea.
Offline
Hi Etzelnik,
Both the First Way and the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts entail that God is absolutely simple. If God is absolutely simple, he has no parts (this premise is logically equivalent to the law of the excluded middle: God either has parts or does not have parts). Hence, if the First Way or cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, God has no parts.
But if panentheism holds, the universe--which itself has many parts--is part of God. If the universe is part of God, then God has parts. Hence, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, the universe is not part of God. Therefore, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, panentheism does not hold. So, for compelling arguments, I recommend the First Way and cosmological argument from metaphysical parts (which is, in essence, Plotinus's argument).
Offline
John West wrote:
Hi Etzelnik,
Both the First Way and the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts entail that God is absolutely simple. If God is either absolutely simple, he has no parts (this premise is logically equivalent to the law of the excluded middle: God either has parts or does not have parts). Hence, if the First Way or cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, God has no parts.
But if panentheism holds, the universe--which itself has many parts--is part of God. If the universe is part of God, then God has parts. Hence, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, the universe is not part of God. Therefore, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, panentheism does not hold. So, for compelling arguments, I recommend the First Way and cosmological argument from metaphysical parts (which is, in essence, Plotinus's argument).
I get that, but wouldn't that be contrary to your own Trinity?
Either way, for myself, why can't we approach the universe as all a manifestation of God's Will, created and constantly sustained on Will alone, while leaving God's essence untouched?
Offline
Etzelnik wrote:
Either way, for myself, why can't we approach the universe as all a manifestation of God's Will, created and constantly sustained on Will alone, while leaving God's essence untouched?
I don't see why we can't. The problem with panentheism hinges almost entirely on what we mean by "in." As John West says, if the Thomistic arguments work, then God is simple and without parts; any version of panentheism that implies otherwise would then have to be false. But if "being 'in' God" can be construed to mean something like "being an object of God's thought/intellect/will," then it's much less problematic; Scholasticism generally and Thomism particularly already have ways of understanding God's intellect/will that allow it to have multiple objects without compromising divine simplicity.
Offline
Etzelnik wrote:
John West wrote:
Hi Etzelnik,
Both the First Way and the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts entail that God is absolutely simple. If God is either absolutely simple, he has no parts (this premise is logically equivalent to the law of the excluded middle: God either has parts or does not have parts). Hence, if the First Way or cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, God has no parts.
But if panentheism holds, the universe--which itself has many parts--is part of God. If the universe is part of God, then God has parts. Hence, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, the universe is not part of God. Therefore, if the First Way or the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts go through, panentheism does not hold. So, for compelling arguments, I recommend the First Way and cosmological argument from metaphysical parts (which is, in essence, Plotinus's argument).
I get that, but wouldn't that be contrary to your own Trinity?
Either way, for myself, why can't we approach the universe as all a manifestation of God's Will, created and constantly sustained on Will alone, while leaving God's essence untouched?
You're approaching something like the Eastern Orthodox Essences-Energies Distinction here. On DS accounts though God's Will is identical with His Essence though.
(Let me say: I’m sympathetic to panentheistic ideas but I’ve came to see the Classical view of God as an exemplar which all beings participate in to satisfy that aspect of the Divine/Creature relationship. Nothing can ever be said to be fully apart or outside of God)
Offline
John West,
When you refer to the cosmological argument from metaphysical parts, do you mean the argument Dr. Feser calls the Neoplatonic version of the cosmological argument?
My understanding of traditional Platonism is it is essentially panentheist (perhaps Non-Dual is a better term).
Edit:I see you later refer to Plotinus by name, so you obviously did mean that argument.
Last edited by Jeremy Taylor (7/07/2015 6:27 pm)
Offline
Scott wrote:
Etzelnik wrote:
Either way, for myself, why can't we approach the universe as all a manifestation of God's Will, created and constantly sustained on Will alone, while leaving God's essence untouched?
I don't see why we can't. The problem with panentheism hinges almost entirely on what we mean by "in." As John West says, if the Thomistic arguments work, then God is simple and without parts; any version of panentheism that implies otherwise would then have to be false. But if "being 'in' God" can be construed to mean something like "being an object of God's thought/intellect/will," then it's much less problematic; Scholasticism generally and Thomism particularly already have ways of understanding God's intellect/will that allow it to have multiple objects without compromising divine simplicity.
Yeah, Maimonides has that too, in the sense that he's probably the most ardent proponent of negative theology, yet he still makes the distinction between verbalizing God's essential nature and verbalizing God by way of interactions.
Offline
Daniel,
Indeed, my understanding is that the Orthodox see the divine essence as simple only. This is similar to the Platonic position. Creation is held within his energies. I know it is a criticism of Western/Scholastic thought that the absolute focus on the wholly simple divine essence risks completely cutting off creation from the divine.
Offline
So now I'm reading that Spinoza actually felt like I do, and not like the Classical Pantheism he is generally associated with.