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Re: Problem of Hell
iwpoe wrote:
How should a Platonist justify nos 5 and 6 - if anything they appear antithetical to Platonic concerns even disregarding the issue of this worldly reincarnation (although I have always thought that could be interpreted in a more modern sense as birth in higher or lower levels of reality, with one's journey upwards being a kind of spiritual purgation).
Classically, they cannot (note that I don't include it in the long summary), but a near Christian position follows fairly neatly just on that modification (with maybe some extras about post-death education), since quite clearly the entire impetus to find order *now* implies that death may not be a preferable state for doing so. I mainly meant to show that you don't need broadly Christian assumptions about ressurection, sin, and grace borrowed from revelation to worry about something like Hell. I actually take revelation to be a distraction, since the worry can easily shift to fear of a vengeful God, which is nonsense.
That said the belief in reincarnation seems rather common and not merely a spiritual metaphor. Plotinus and Proclus teach very clearly that the journey of your soul after death depends on the trajectory of your soul in life, and very wicked people end up in lower forms of life. I take Plato seriously on it also, concerned as he was to replace the Homeric religion and its conception of the afterlife as a miserable and dim image of life wherein the shades of the dead envy and hate the living from Hades.
I'll admit, I do have sympathies to your view of revelation considering I'm currently struggling with this. Plutarch made a similar point in his Superstions.
As a Platonist do you personally believe in reincarnation and intermediate reward/punishment between lives?
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Re: Problem of Hell
A couple comments. First, it's always a good idea to formulate these kinds of problems explicitly so that everyone can see where the logical difficulty for Christian doctrine is. No one has said we will like everything God does. (Here is a paper by David Lewis toward that end. But, pace Lewis, if you know of something more nuanced, I encourage you to link it.)
Second, since it's really easy to accidentally slip into straw men with hell, some links on Aquinas on hell here, here, here, here, here, and here.
The logical problem would be somewhere along the lines of everlasting punishment being incompatible with the Justice and Divine Goodness of God. More specifically, the issue of Penal Substitutionary theory of the Atonement and how humans offending God doesn't justify everlasting punishment.
Here are excerpts from an Eleanore Stump book that discusses PST. I decided to copy and paste from a random blog to make it easier to show her points:
She first discusses what the doctrine of Penal Substitutionary theory of Atonement is:
Human beings by their evil actions have offended God. This sin or offense against God generates a kind of debt, a debt so enormous that human beings by themselves can never repay it. God has the power, of course, to cancel this debt, but God is perfectly just, and it would be a violation of perfect justice to cancel a debt without extracting the payment owed. Therefore, God cannot simply forgive a person’s sin; as a just judge he must sentence all people to everlasting torment as the just punishment for their sin. God is also infinitely merciful, however; and so he brings it about that he himself pays their debt in full, by assuming human nature as the incarnate Christ and in that nature enduring the penalty which would otherwise have been imposed on human beings. In consequence, the sins of ordinary human beings are forgiven; and, by God’s mercy exercised through Christ’s passion, human beings are saved from sin and hell and brought to heaven (pp. 427-28).
She gives the following problems with this concept of the atonement.
1. It does not present God as forgiving sin.
"[C]ontrary to what it intends, this version of the doctrine does not, in fact, present God as forgiving human sin. To forgive a debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due. But, according to (P) [PST], God does exact every bit of the debt owed him by human beings; he allows none of it to go unpaid. As (P) [PST] tells the story, God himself fully pays the debt owed him. This part of the story is perplexing; but what it shows is only that God himself has arranged for the debt to be paid in full, not that he has agreed to overlook any part of the debt" (p. 428).
2. It is a denial of justice.
"[i]t seems not to emphasize God’s justice but to rest on a denial of it. For all the talk of debt is really a metaphor. What (P)[PST] is in fact telling us is that any human being’s sins are so great that it is a violation of justice not to punish that person with damnation. What God does in response, however, is to punish not the sinner but a perfectly innocent person instead (a person who, even on the doctrine of the Trinity, is not the same person as God the Father, who does the punishing). But how is this just? Suppose that a mother with two sons, one innocent and one disobedient, inflicted all her disobedient son’s justly deserved punishment on her innocent son, on the grounds that the disobedient one was too little to bear his punishment and her justice required her to punish someone. We would not praise her justice, but rather condemn her as barbaric, even if the innocent son had assented to this procedure. If the mother could after all forego punishing the disobedient son, why did she not just do so without inflicting suffering on the other child? And how is justice served by punishing a completely innocent person" (p. 428)?
3. It does not represent a full payment for the penalty of sin.
"[PST] claims that in his suffering and death on the cross Christ paid the full penalty for all human sin so that human beings would not have to pay it; and yet it also claims that the penalty for sin is everlasting damnation. But no matter what sort of agony Christ experienced in his crucifixion, it certainly was not (and was not equivalent to) everlasting punishment, if for no other reason than that Christ’s suffering came to an end" (p. 429).
"One might escape this by saying the the penalty for sin is merely physical death but as Stump shows:
On Christian doctrine, the punishment for sin is not just death but hell, so that this alteration of (P)[PST] has the infelicitous result that what Christ undergoes in his substitutionary suffering is not the traditionally assigned penalty for sin. But even if it were, Christ’s suffering would not remove the penalty from human beings since they all suffer death anyway" (p. 429).
4. It demands universal salvation.
"[PST] maintains that Christ pays the penalty for all sin in full so that human beings do not have to do so. But it is a fundamental Christian doctrine that God justly condemns some people to everlasting punishment in hell. If Christ has paid the penalty for sin completely, how is God just in demanding that some people pay the penalty again" (p. 429)?
5. It does not offer a full solution to the sin problem.
"Finally, it is not clear what the atonement accomplishes, on the account given in (P)[PST]. According to Christian doctrine, the main problem with human evil is that it leaves human beings alienated from God. Human beings tend to will what they ought not to will, and so their wills are not in conformity with God’s will. Consequently, they do not live in peace with God now, and in that state they cannot be united to God in heaven. Now, according to (P)[PST], the atonement consists in Christ’s paying the penalty for sin. But nothing in (P){PST] suggests in any way that the atonement alters human nature and proclivities which are responsible for sin. In (P)[PST]'s version of the doctrine, the atonement is efficacious to remove not sinful nature or proclivities for moral evil, but only the penalty for sin. In that case, however, the atonement is not really an at-one-ment; for, as (P)[PST] tells it, the atonement leaves human beings with just the same tendencies to will what is contrary to God’s will, so that their wills are no more conformable to God’s will, they are no more tending toward unity with God, than they were before the atonement" (p. 429)
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Thread Starter- Jason
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Re: Problem of Hell
First of all, I have not read Eleanore Stump’s Aquinas book so I am not sure what context she was using in saying this but here is my reply to this.
The logical problem would be somewhere along the lines of everlasting punishment being incompatible with the Justice and Divine Goodness of God. More specifically, the issue of Penal Substitutionary theory of the Atonement and how humans offending God doesn't justify everlasting punishment.
I do not think that there is a logical problem with it. As a matter of fact I think it compliments it.
1. It does not present God as forgiving sin.
"[C]ontrary to what it intends, this version of the doctrine does not, in fact, present God as forgiving human sin. To forgive a debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due. But, according to (P) [PST], God does exact every bit of the debt owed him by human beings; he allows none of it to go unpaid. As (P) [PST] tells the story, God himself fully pays the debt owed him. This part of the story is perplexing; but what it shows is only that God himself has arranged for the debt to be paid in full, not that he has agreed to overlook any part of the debt" (p. 428).
The simple reason why He does not allows it go unpaid is because He is not only a Perfect Judge but also a Loving and Merciful God. Justice needs to be carried out at the same time of being a Merciful and forgiving God. Fulfilling both “roles” is not a simple task.
2. It is a denial of justice.
"[i]t seems not to emphasize God’s justice but to rest on a denial of it. For all the talk of debt is really a metaphor. What (P)[PST] is in fact telling us is that any human being’s sins are so great that it is a violation of justice not to punish that person with damnation. What God does in response, however, is to punish not the sinner but a perfectly innocent person instead (a person who, even on the doctrine of the Trinity, is not the same person as God the Father, who does the punishing). But how is this just? Suppose that a mother with two sons, one innocent and one disobedient, inflicted all her disobedient son’s justly deserved punishment on her innocent son, on the grounds that the disobedient one was too little to bear his punishment and her justice required her to punish someone. We would not praise her justice, but rather condemn her as barbaric, even if the innocent son had assented to this procedure. If the mother could after all forego punishing the disobedient son, why did she not just do so without inflicting suffering on the other child? And how is justice served by punishing a completely innocent person" (p. 428)?
I disagree, it is the meeting of justice. Her mother’s example fails to equate with God’s atonement. It would be somewhat equivalent if the mother herself served the punishment for her disobedient son’s grave mistake and the son realizing what he had done, would genuinely repent. Reminds me of the prodigal son passage in Luke 15:11-32
3. It does not represent a full payment for the penalty of sin.
"[PST] claims that in his suffering and death on the cross Christ paid the full penalty for all human sin so that human beings would not have to pay it; and yet it also claims that the penalty for sin is everlasting damnation. But no matter what sort of agony Christ experienced in his crucifixion, it certainly was not (and was not equivalent to) everlasting punishment, if for no other reason than that Christ’s suffering came to an end" (p. 429).
It does not represent a full payment only if you do not believe that God Himself came down to earth and was crucified on the cross. If you do not believe that then that is another case, but keeping in mind that Christians believe that God Himself came down I do not think there is a problem here either.
"One might escape this by saying the the penalty for sin is merely physical death but as Stump shows:
On Christian doctrine, the punishment for sin is not just death but hell, so that this alteration of (P)[PST] has the infelicitous result that what Christ undergoes in his substitutionary suffering is not the traditionally assigned penalty for sin. But even if it were, Christ’s suffering would not remove the penalty from human beings since they all suffer death anyway" (p. 429).
The Christian doctrine of Atonement is not about escaping suffering or death in this life but it is about escaping suffering and death (second death) of the after life.
4. It demands universal salvation.
"[PST] maintains that Christ pays the penalty for all sin in full so that human beings do not have to do so. But it is a fundamental Christian doctrine that God justly condemns some people to everlasting punishment in hell. If Christ has paid the penalty for sin completely, how is God just in demanding that some people pay the penalty again" (p. 429)?
God is Just because according to the Christian view, He has given us a way to commune with Him but we ourselves need to freely accept Christ’s sacrifice. If we do not then we are not made holy in the sight of God. It would be better to stay in hell eternally separated from God then to be in the presence of a Holy God.
5. It does not offer a full solution to the sin problem.
"Finally, it is not clear what the atonement accomplishes, on the account given in (P)[PST]. According to Christian doctrine, the main problem with human evil is that it leaves human beings alienated from God. Human beings tend to will what they ought not to will, and so their wills are not in conformity with God’s will. Consequently, they do not live in peace with God now, and in that state they cannot be united to God in heaven. Now, according to (P)[PST], the atonement consists in Christ’s paying the penalty for sin. But nothing in (P){PST] suggests in any way that the atonement alters human nature and proclivities which are responsible for sin. In (P)[PST]'s version of the doctrine, the atonement is efficacious to remove not sinful nature or proclivities for moral evil, but only the penalty for sin. In that case, however, the atonement is not really an at-one-ment; for, as (P)[PST] tells it, the atonement leaves human beings with just the same tendencies to will what is contrary to God’s will, so that their wills are no more conformable to God’s will, they are no more tending toward unity with God, than they were before the atonement" (p. 429)
It is perfectly clear that it provides a solution to the sin problem. Just like the prodigal son who returns to his father so do we return to our Father in Heaven. The beauty of the atonement is that once genuinely accepted in your heart it slowly but surely transforms your heart to be in line with God’s will. Yes you could fall into sin even after (since we are in a fallen world) but if you do not genuinely repent of it and make it right you would still be in sin. The cross of Jesus Christ is the only place in history that I know of where God’s Wrath, God’s Love, God’s Holiness and God’s Justice all converged.
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Re: Problem of Hell
As a Platonist do you personally believe in reincarnation and intermediate reward/punishment between lives?
I believe in some premises that point in that direction, but I know of no direct argument for the position. For instance, if ethics is ultimately about the good of the soul, which I think is true, and the soul is immortal, which I think is true, it would be surpassing strange that death be such that ethics doesn't matter. Soul-sleep, for instance is intelligible but what point is there to getting my soul in order if I may die at any time and my soul loose all activity?
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
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Re: Problem of Hell
As a Platonist do you personally believe in reincarnation and intermediate reward/punishment between lives?
I believe in some premises that point in that direction, but I know of no direct argument for the position. For instance, if ethics is ultimately about the good of the soul, which I think is true, and the soul is immortal, which I think is true, it would be surpassing strange that death be such that ethics doesn't matter. Soul-sleep, for instance is intelligible but what point is there to getting my soul in order if I may die at any time and my soul loose all activity?
No I don't mean soul sleep. Something like the souls enjoying some time above in either punishment/bliss like in the Myth of Er.
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Re: Problem of Hell
I think that's an image, and that the punishment is the more immediate punishment of ignorance: movement contrary to one's ends.
I think that reward and punishment are themselves ambiguous notions that are merely aids to understanding. After all, the point is *attaining* the good itself because that's the fulfilment of all of my ends. Rewards are just like little mixed inadequate snippits of the good and punishment is either an external correction of error or retributory disordering of my body.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger
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Re: Problem of Hell
I think that's an image, and that the punishment is the more immediate punishment of ignorance: movement contrary to one's ends.
I think that reward and punishment are themselves ambiguous notions that are merely aids to understanding. After all, the point is *attaining* the good itself because that's the fulfilment of all of my ends. Rewards are just like little mixed inadequate snippits of the good and punishment is either an external correction of error or retributory disordering of my body.
In Platonism is reaching the Good involve a loss of self due to assimilation sort of like Nirvana or is it individuality retained?
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Re: Problem of Hell
Individuality is retained. Plotinus stressed this with his remark 'Why should Socrates cease to be Socrates just because he's gone to the best of all abodes?'.
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Re: Problem of Hell
Individuality is retained. Plotinus stressed this with his remark 'Why should Socrates cease to be Socrates just because he's gone to the best of all abodes?'.
Interesting. I just have another question. What is union with the One like exactly?
- iwpoe
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Re: Problem of Hell
In Platonism is reaching the Good involve a loss of self due to assimilation sort of like Nirvana or is it individuality retained?
Individuality is retained. It seems also to be retained in rebirth, though I'm uncertain how that works.
Buddhist's are in a strange position, since they think that there is no permanent self (nor permanent anything) in the first place to either reincarnate or "attain" Nirvana.
Fighting to the death "the noonday demon" of Acedia.
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It is precisely “values” that are the powerless and threadbare mask of the objectification of beings, an objectification that has become flat and devoid of background. No one dies for mere values.
~Martin Heidegger