Has anyone read the paper by David Yates that discusses the powerful causation view of Aristotle? Yates argues that the Aristotelian powers can't be labeled intrinsic since they can't be instantiated by lonely particulars. Since most Aristotelians argue that powers are directed towards their own manifestations while remaining actual but not ontologically dependent on them, it is imperative that they are identified as intrinsic to their bearers. But if the above objection works, how would an Aristotelian respond? The tension seems to be created by the conflict between the acceptance of relational individuation which naturally entails commitment to immanent universals and the nature of intrinsic powers which are constrained due to the impossibility of instantiation of lonely particulars. Would an Aristotelian have to bite the bullet and attempt to incorporate elements of Platonic transcendent powers into the mix as suggested by the author? Or are there other ways of getting around?

Here is a link to the paper: http://philpapers.org/rec/YATIPC