- 884heid
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
There is an attempt by Jeffery Brower and Michael Rea to demonstrate how unity can be preserved in the face of plurality by utilising a bronze statue as an example. A bronze statue is constituted by two discrete substances: a lump of bronze and a statue. Although the lump of bronze and the statue are distinct things, “they are numerically one material object. Likewise, the persons of the Trinity are three distinct persons but numerically one God” The writers didn't have Aquinas' formulation in mind but I guess that it isn't really straying away from the topic. I personally think that this account immediately falls prey to Bradley's regress either for the universalist or the trope theorist. Maybe Vallicella is right about there not being an ontological framework that can adequately solve this dilemma of relations. Has someone like James Dolezal attempted to solve the issue yet?
- John West
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
884Heid wrote:
There is an attempt by Jeffery Brower and Michael Rea to demonstrate how unity can be preserved in the face of plurality by utilising a bronze statue as an example. A bronze statue is constituted by two discrete substances: a lump of bronze and a statue. Although the lump of bronze and the statue are distinct things, “they are numerically one material object. Likewise, the persons of the Trinity are three distinct persons but numerically one God”
Having skimmed Brower and Rea's paper just now, their solution seems to rely on God having three distinct Trinitarian properties (to make up three numerically identical but otherwise distinct “hylemorphic compounds”).
But given Simplicity, God is strictly identical with each of his monadic properties[1]. So Brower and Rea's solution breaches Simplicity.
The writers didn't have Aquinas' formulation in mind but I guess that it isn't really straying away from the topic
But suppose you go with Brower and Rea's solution anyway. You're still making God a mereological sum (e + F + S + H), probably unified in some non-mereological manner, dependent on proper parts (e, F, S, H, F + H, etc). So you still seem to have to give up the claim that God is ontologically ultimate. So you may as well just go with Aquinas's solution.[2]
[1]Unless, I suppose, there is no strict identity. Then nothing is strictly identical.
[2]It might be interesting to dig out some of the old medieval mereologies to see if they change matters.
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Thread Starter- 884heid
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
[1]Unless, I suppose, there is no strict identity. Then nothing is strictly identical.
The arguments i am familar with regarding identity are in the relative sense which Geach proposed. But if I am not mistaken, it was rejected on the grounds that it unavoidably conflicted with Leibniz' law.
Strict identity would claim that it can't be possible for *a* to be identical with *b* in the strict sense unless *a* and *b* have all of their parts in common. Do most philosophers accept this premise? I am not really sold on the claim that two distinct things can be strictly identical in every possible way, especially if we are talking about persons or beings. But I haven't read any literature on it aside from Armstrong and Butler so the jury is obviously still out. Plus, if we accept strict identity, I still can't wrap my head around how God can remain simple if he is unified through parts rather than *sharing* a divine essence.
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
[2]It might be interesting to dig out some of the old medieval mereologies to see if they change matters.
From what I remember, medievals heavily disagreed on this topic. Boethius claimed if a part of Scorates ceased to exist, then Socrates as a whole would perish. Abelard I think flirted with this view while his followers (Nominales) wholeheartedly accepted Boethius' formulation. Later medieval thinkers rejected this on the ground that
principal part of x is that which, when removed, compromises the form of x, rather than following the extreme proposition of Boethius. I am not sure how they responded to the change of something pure like Gold being nicked as an example though. I also don't know if Aquinas identified with Boethius' view.
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
I am not really sold on the claim that two distinct things can be strictly identical in every possible way, especially if we are talking about persons or beings.
Your suspicion is right. If a and b are strictly identical, a and b are the exact same thing. One place this matters is with universals, which are strictly identical in each of their instantiations. (So if universals and no tropes, the specific redness of three distinct apples is the exact same redness wholly present in each item.)
Plus, if we accept strict identity, I still can't wrap my head around how God can remain simple if he is unified through parts rather than *sharing* a divine essence.
Well, mereological wholes need not have only substances as parts. So even if you have three properties sharing one essence, you still have a mereological whole composed of four entities. You just have a mereological whole with parts that are also unified in some further way.
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
The arguments i am familar with regarding identity are in the relative sense which Geach proposed. But if I am not mistaken, it was rejected on the grounds that it unavoidably conflicted with Leibniz' law.
Well, the claim that all identity is relative identity amounts to the rejection of Leibniz's law. So yeah, some people don't like it.
But it's worth reiterating that Geach argues for his thesis.
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
From what I remember, medievals heavily disagreed on this topic. Boethius claimed if a part of Scorates ceased to exist, then Socrates as a whole would perish. Abelard I think flirted with this view while his followers (Nominales) wholeheartedly accepted Boethius' formulation. Later medieval thinkers rejected this on the ground that principal part of x is that which, when removed, compromises the form of x, rather than following the extreme proposition of Boethius. I am not sure how they responded to the change of something pure like Gold being nicked as an example though. I also don't know if Aquinas identified with Boethius' view.
One thesis that has been accepted more or less uncritically so far is that the most radical view of Simplicity—associated with St. Thomas—is the only acceptable one (i.e. x is simple iff x has no components of any sort, mereological or otherwise[1]). It may be worth surveying scholastic views of Simplicity more broadly to see what all is doctrinally acceptable[2].
[1]cf. Adams, M. (1987) William Ockham, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, pp. 903 – 960.
[2]”No True Scottist” wrote a summary of Scotus's view that may be compatible with Brower and Rea's. I don't know enough about Scotus to tell whether it's accurate.
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Thread Starter- 884heid
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
Your suspicion is right. If a and b are strictly identical, a and b are the exact same thing. One place this matters is with universals, which are strictly identical in each of their instantiations. (So if universals and no tropes, the specific redness of three distinct apples is the exact same redness wholly present in each item.)
Yeah, and that's why Trope theory made sense to me prima facie, though I only got acquainted with it not too long ago. I more or less adhered to Aristotelian realism when it came to universals due to Armstrong's almost impenetrable critique of non-trope nominalism on the accusations of coextension and blob theory [1]. But I always thought that strict identity was somewhat implausible along with other issues of realism, which made me welcome the idea of Trope theory being an alternative and viable option. I've also heard that there is a possibility that many medieval philosophers were more alligned with trope theory than realism of Aristotle [2].
[1]"almost" because there was an interesting response that escaped the objections through appropriation of Lewis' Modal Realism.
[2] Marilyn Adams I think argued for this if I am not mistaken.
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
I've also heard that there is a possibility that many medieval philosophers were more alligned with trope theory than realism of Aristotle.
Yup. I mentioned this earlier in the thread.
(There is even a dispute over whether Aristotle believed in tropes/property-instances.)
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Re: The Problem of the Trinity and Divine Simplicity
If anyone is interested, Ed lays out his views on the Trinity here (and here). One thing mysterian replies have going for them is that, if there is a God, you wouldn't expect these questions to be easy to answer[1]. You may even expect some of them to be beyond our limited cognitive capacities.
(I'm not saying I think this answer right. Just that I have a lot of sympathy for where it's coming from.)
[1]A lot of personalist responses almost seem to make light of the study of God. But if God exists, why think questions about him any less difficult than some of the questions of fundamental physics?
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