Offline
So my copy of Feser's Aquinas finally arrived in the mail and I've started reading it.
I am struggling a little bit to understand his example of the rubber ball. He says that rubber is the matter and the ball is the form. Then he goes on to mention "prime matter", which is matter without form. So is rubber a form of "prime matter"? In which case, isn't his original example wrong – prime matter is the matter, and both the ball and rubber are forms of "prime matter"?
Are there many types of matter (rubber, bronze, etc.), or only one type of matter ("prime matter") with the different types of matter just different forms of prime matter?
Does prime matter exist in different quantities (volumes, masses, etc.)? Or are volume and mass also just forms?
Offline
It helps to distinguish the Aristotelian sense of matter (mattera) from the scientific sense of matter (matters). mattera is the base constituent that accounts for potency and instantiates kinds and properties; matters is usually defined as already instantiating some property like spatial extent, or mass, or having energy.
Aquinas would have said that matters is at least mattera stamped with spatial dimensions by the substantial form (natural kind-universal) with which it's unified into a "material substance".
Offline
Incessable wrote:
Are there many types of matter (rubber, bronze, etc.), or only one type of matter ("prime matter") with the different types of matter just different forms of prime matter?
Aquinas talks about three different types of mattera: materia prima (prime matter), materia secunda (matter instantiating a kind-universal), and materia signata quantitate (matter signed with dimensive quantity). I suspect, however, that he identifies every case of materia secunda with a case of materia signata quantitate.
(He would probably say the bronze is a material substance—mattera instantiating the bronze kind-universal. Likewise rubber.)
Does prime matter exist in different quantities (volumes, masses, etc.)? Or are volume and mass also just forms?
Materia signata quantitate exists with different dimensions. But when Thomists talk about something having mass, they're probably talking about a specific kind of material substance instantiating a mass property (accident).