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Hi all,
I'm working on developing an argument from the unity of the world to God as the principle of its unity. This is an argument that I've come across in a few scholastic manuals. I would very much welcome any input you could offer, should you have the time.
I begin first with the following quote from Tertullian (Apology, 17):"The object of our worship is the One God, He who by His commanding word, His arranging wisdom, His mighty power, brought forth from nothing this entire mass of our world, with all its array of elements, bodies, spirits, for the glory of His majesty"
What is it that Tertullian thought required an explanation in terms of God as the ‘commander’ and ‘arranger’ of the world? Arguably, the arranging and joining together of the many “elements” of the world into some kind of unity. So understood, I read Tertullian negatively, as making the following claim:
C: The world exhibits a unity not of itself
How might one argue for C? One might follow Kant in thinking that the unity of the world is given to us a priori in conscious experience. Kant, as I understand him, argued that, just as the very possibility of conscious experience presupposes that there must be a unity of consciousness -- the “I” that accompanies all of our representations -- so this unity of consciousness presupposes that there must be a unity of the laws according to which we experience the world. The unity of consciousness thus presupposes the unity of the world. This won’t do, since, even if true, it would only follow that the world is a unity in the order of knowledge. We want to know what it means to say that the world is a unity at the ontological/metaphysical level.
Maybe we can say this. We observe that the world consists of an ordered system of many component elements, all of which interact with one another in regular, reciprocal relationships which we understand as physical laws. Peter Kreeft refers to the tendency of hydrogen atoms to combine with oxygen atoms in a ratio of 2:1. A similar tendency is found in the chemical valences of many elements, as well as in those particles with mass that move in proportion to the law of gravity, and the way the fundamental physical constants depend on one another for their particular values (as per fine-tuning theory). So, I suggest that the unity of the world consists in the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of its members, such that each component is defined by its relation with other components, with their natures and activities being ultimately unintelligible apart from the world-*system* that determines them.
Probably this needs to be parsed out better, but it seems that there is an ontological/metaphysical unity to the world. (Note, I don't mean to imply that the universe is one substance; the unity in question is per accidens, not per se). Following Aquinas, I want to argue that if the world exhibits an ontological/metaphysical unity, then there must be a principle of unity behind it. Consider this argument from the Summa Theologiae, First Part, Question 11, Article 3 (see also Summa Contra Gentiles, book 3, chapter 64, article 6):
“For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the [essential] cause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one."
Argument 1: For Aquinas, the unity of a multitude cannot be explained without recourse to some outside, unitary principle, by which diverse things are united into a single order or mode of operation. In other words, a multitude as such cannot be the cause of its own unity. This could be simply interpreted as an expression of the principle of proportionate causality: the unity present in an effect – in this case, the world – must exist, whether virtually, formally, or eminently, in the cause; and, since the unity of the world does not come from its members, the principle or cause of the unity of the world cannot reside within the world, but must be extrinsic to it.
Argument 2: I have suggested that the world might be best understood as a world-system. So understood, the many constituents of the world are neither self-sufficient -- since their existence and operations are always relative to other component parts or elements -- nor self-explanatory -- since no part of a system is intelligible apart from the whole. We must therefore posit a transcendent principle of unity, a unifying efficient cause, to account for the world as a unified whole.
I’ll leave the discussion about the divine attributes for a later time. Thank you all for your time.
Paulo
Last edited by Paulo (1/19/2017 10:00 am)
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Hi Paulo:
Paulo wrote:
So, I suggest that the unity of the world consists in the interrelatedness and interconnectedness of its members, such that each component is defined by its relation with other components, with their natures and activities being ultimately unintelligible apart from the world-*system* that determines them.
Suppose there is a possible world in which only one contingent object—a bare material substance composed of the materia secunda parcel a and substantial form (natural kind instance) F—exists.
Could you give an example of how the constituents' “natures and activities [are] ultimately unintelligible apart from the world-*system*”?