Well, I have been more interested in practical philosophy recently. So part of my interest in theoretical philosophy is that it sometimes bears on practical philosophy.

Strictly speaking, according to the way I understand the division between theoretical and practical philosophy, this would make my study of theoretical philosophy in fact a study of practical philosophy. I follow Aristotle, that is, in holding that the theoretical and practical intellects are the same power; the one is intellect directed to contemplation, the other is the intellect directed to action. Practical knowledge is knowledge about singulars in action. But other truths are practical in a certain respect if they are or can be used in practice.

So throughout the Ethics, Aristotle will mention 'theoretical' points about how the virtues are defined, etc., and note that these too are included in ethics and politics. But he is also constantly saying that we need not inquire into certain matters further, as far as action is concerned.

Realistically, though, prior to engaging in theoretical inquiry, we do not know which theoretical truths are useful for ethics.

But I think another option that is not listed is the most classical one (albeit close to (1)): theoretical philosophy is worth doing simply for the sake of contemplation. This activity is enjoyable but enjoyment is its result, not its purpose.

Greg wrote:

Another option, which I suppose is not too common among members of this forum, is quietism, of the sort defended (advocated?) by Wittgenstein and McDowell: The point of philosophy is to convince yourself that there are no true philosophical problems. Such philosophy is also called therapeutic.

Naturally this blurs theoretical and practical philosophy.

I think one could have a "therapeutic" motivation for pursuing theoretical philosophy without going to this extreme (e.g. Epictetus).  One might recognize that the disorder of one's mind is pathological and consider the rigorous pursuit of truth through disciplined dialectic the best (or at least a pretty good) antidote for this disorder.  It doesn't follow from this that the problems thus pursued are not real problems.  (Although one intellectual pathology certainly is incessant anxiety over pseudoproblems that only arise within a post-enlightenment frame of reference, and perhaps Wittgenstein and McDowell serve a helpful purpose for such a person.)

For my part, I pursue theoretical philosophy as an act of obedience to the particular call of God upon my life.  I see myself as one organ within the total body of Christ, part of whose function it is to pursue the truth in as disciplined a fashion as possible and transmit the truth thus learned together with its justification to the rest of the body.  I also find it fun, but I see this as merely one signal among others that this is indeed the call of God, i.e. a sign that he made me for this in the way that the racehorse's love for the race is a sign that he was bred for this activity.

Proclus wrote:

For my part, I pursue theoretical philosophy as an act of obedience to the particular call of God upon my life.  I see myself as one organ within the total body of Christ, part of whose function it is to pursue the truth in as disciplined a fashion as possible and transmit the truth thus learned together with its justification to the rest of the body.  I also find it fun, but I see this as merely one signal among others that this is indeed the call of God, i.e. a sign that he made me for this in the way that the racehorse's love for the race is a sign that he was bred for this activity.

Thank you for your response.

Could you please clarify what is meant by truth?
Truthfulness of God's existence, Christianity and its teachings? The truth regarding natural world? Truth regarding politics, economy and so on?

Last edited by nojoum (3/25/2017 2:13 pm)

Proclus wrote:

Here is a fun rearrangement of letters:  Pilate asked "Quid est veritas?"  The tacit answer staring him in the face is "est vir qui adest."

A true sentence is one in which the contents correspond with reality.  Specifically, the relation between the subject and the predicate of the sentence bears an analogical relation to the relation between an object in the world and a some real feature of that object.  Or paraphrasing Aristotle, speaking true sentences happens when we say about what is that it is or about what is not that it is not, and speaking false sentences happens when we say about what is that it is not or about what is not that it is (Metaphysics 1011b).

Truth is to "true" what Beauty is to "beautiful," in other words, the Truth is that in virtue of which true things are true.  Ultimately, I think that this is Jesus Christ the λόγος of God, in virtue of whom (1) there is a world at all, (2) the structure of that world is intelligible, and (3) a correspondence can exist between our thought and the intelligible structure of that world.  (Incidentally, Νοῦς plays something like this role in Plato and Aristotle.)  At a lower level of analysis, knowing the truth can mean latching onto even a corner of his robe, i.e. achieving even a partial coincidence between our thought and the intelligibility of the world.  And at a still lower level, a correspondence between what we say about the world and the way the world is.

Thanks.

I somehow get the feeling that you want to have knowledge of everything. This brings me to another point that such a task is impossible to do and you have to narrow your inquiry. So then what would your inquiry and its goal be?

Last edited by nojoum (3/25/2017 3:51 pm)

Proclus wrote:

I think one could have a "therapeutic" motivation for pursuing theoretical philosophy without going to this extreme (e.g. Epictetus).  One might recognize that the disorder of one's mind is pathological and consider the rigorous pursuit of truth through disciplined dialectic the best (or at least a pretty good) antidote for this disorder.  It doesn't follow from this that the problems thus pursued are not real problems.

I think that's right. These days, 'quietism' (which is a thesis about the solubility of the problems of philosophy) seems to be the label that is introduced first; this approach is then characterized as being therapeutic. But other approaches might be therapeutic without being committed to quietism.