- Callum
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Calhoun wrote:
That's just scientism which is demonstrably false
well I do agree with you on that ..but the problem is it just can not be shown in the first place that Eternalist has unbearable burden of proof ..that they just can't account for our experience of passage of time or that their claim that the passage is an illusion just "Can not" be made coherent ..
- Without meaning offence, it's not a red herring you just dont undertsand it, as you admitted. If physics attempts to show change is illusory, it essentially pushes change from the external world to an observer's consciousness in the same that physics has 'shown' that colour and sound doesnt exist as we experience them. However, what cannot be shown is that change occurs at least within the the observer's consciousness. It cannot be done. We experience change. Nor is this question begging. The objection is not "we experience change therefore there is a passage of time". The objection is "we experience change, so even if we accept for the sake of argument change is an illusion of consciouness that illusion still nevertheless involves change". So the first aspect is that change cannot be completely eradicated. The second part is that if someone tries to deny our conscious experience, =smallthis is implicitly to deny the very empirical evidential base on which physical theory is supposed to rest. Essentially Democritus' paradox all over again. This is similar to what Healey noted as "empirical incoherence'.
- "whatever exist,exists always=small". Then there is no change. Eternalism can call it change, but it isn't. It is using the term in a different sense. If something is always a certain way at a specfic time and always another way at another time, then it changeless has different parts. There is no change between a tree with leaves at one time and none at another because they are just different temporal parts. Temporal parts are supposed to be analogous to spatial parts. But there is no change from someone having black hair at one spatial part and a white hand at another.here again this is just reiteration of the same old red herring ..this is the problem with Presentists ,they just can't wrap their head around it and they just can't settle for anything less than what their intuition demands, they just always demand this something more .(give this one read tho, its very relevant)
Compare how the compatibilist's account of freedom just doesn't seem to be a description of freedom to the libertarian...
THIS^ ....this is the problem just because it seems to libertarians that its not really freewill doesn't mean there is no imaginable way the compatiblist can account for it..
You basically never move past this argument ..
[list=circle]
[*]We have experiences as of the passage of time.
[*]If we have experiences as of the passage of time, then any reasonable explanation for this relies on the passage of time being an objective feature of reality.
[*]therefore, The passage of time is an objective feature of reality.
[/list]
Thats the problem ..there actually are ways in which Philosophers can reject both of these premises( some deny that we can actually even experience the passage, let that sink in but most and indeed in your opinion the sane ones just deny the second premise that experience gives any credence to it being objective) and still maintain coherency ..there are many ways from Philosophy of Cognitive science and Phenomenology of temporal experience which they might adopt..of course non of it is conclusive so one might still maintain his justified belief in above argument..but it doesn't mean its impossible to reject the above argument..I can link you to various papers on the topic if you are interested...there is nothing incoherent though maybe incomplete about it..
You if you are just so sure that this argument that Passage of time just can't be coherently denied and can't be explained in any other way then by all means you might accept any interpretation of SR you like (even though that one is clearly evidently inferior) but still when one crucial premise of crucial argument for important thesis are concerned then you can't just rely on these intuitions to do the work for you...
So this comment of mine was dedicated to your claims about some Dynamic theory of time being just so obviously true ..
you give some nice arguments for other claims ...I would assess them in the next comment..but i would only able to do that later..please wait for it..
just the bottom line is, One has just no reason to buy into that whole incoherent charge thing...
You still haven't addressed the argument. That was an interesting post, but irrelevant to the charge of coherence. Arguing that we experience a passage of time is neither a premise or conclusion. It argues that even an illusory experience must involve change otherwise it is self undermining our empirical observations. Eternalist views can attempt to account for the neccessary change needed, but it's far from clear that they can succeed. Take one of the most popular from four dimensionalism; temporal parts as spatial parts. It's been pointed out that inferences alone seem incompatible with this theory, let alone many other crucial aspects of scientific enquiry. If eternalism cannot use it's accounts of "change" for the specific, neccessary aspects of change for science then it suffers from empirical incoherence.
Also, you keep repeating that A-Theories of time are empirically inferior. They are not. Regardless of which theory is right, they are just physical interpretations that can only be settled by philosophical arguments.
Anyway, since the start of the discussion we have simply talked past each other and repeated ourselves. It would be better to not waste time and focus on your primary concern; assuming eternalism and whether any of the Five Ways work.
- Calhoun
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Arguing that we experience a passage of time is neither a premise or conclusion. It argues that even an illusory experience must involve change otherwise it is self undermining our empirical observations
And thats exactly what second premise says..and one can attempt to deny it without any incoherence what so ever , I've told you many times that no one is denying change , its just that change doesn't involve the circumstances that A-theorists can't move past ..Its called B-theory of time ,it describes the relation of time it doesn't deny it...so its not undermining any of our empirical observations ..
And like I said, A-theorists won't wrap their head around it but some philosophers Even deny that we can actually experience time in the first place..for example Here and Here ..so I think this charge of incoherence can be adequately dealt with ..and with it goes any rationale A-theorist has for still postulating the existence of undetectable Aether..
Eternalist views can attempt to account for the neccessary change needed, but it's far from clear that they can succeed.
Yes,this is correct ..its far from clear to us that they can succeed but its also far from clear to us that they would just definitely fail ...how can we ever decide?
Take one of the most popular from four dimensionalism; temporal parts as spatial parts. It's been pointed out that inferences alone seem incompatible with this theory, let alone many other crucial aspects of scientific enquiry. If eternalism cannot use it's accounts of "change" for the specific, neccessary aspects of change for science then it suffers from empirical incoherence.
Well I have poor grasp of issue of identity and persistence ,so I don't know what really is at issue here ..but it doesn't seem anything Eternalist/B-theorists can't deal with..
Also, you keep repeating that A-Theories of time are empirically inferior. They are not. Regardless of which theory is right, they are just physical interpretations that can only be settled by philosophical arguments.
No, I don't just assert I have told you exactly why is it inferior ..
From Wikipedia : Lorentz Ether Theory
" Today LET is often treated as some sort of "Lorentzian" or "neo-Lorentzian" interpretation of special relativity. The introduction of length contraction and time dilation for all phenomena in a "preferred" frame of reference, which plays the role of Lorentz's immobile aether, leads to the complete Lorentz transformation (see the Robertson–Mansouri–Sexl test theory as an example). Because the same mathematical formalism occurs in both, it is not possible to distinguish between LET and SR by experiment. However, in LET the existence of an "Undetectable Aether" is assumed and the validity of the relativity principle seems to be only coincidental, which is one reason why SR is commonly "preferred over LET."
There you go you see? thats why its inferior and if charge of incoherence goes, so does any reason whatsoever for still accepting it...
Anyway, since the start of the discussion we have simply talked past each other and repeated ourselves. It would be better to not waste time and focus on your primary concern; assuming eternalism and whether any of the Five Ways work.
Sure, lets now turn to that (though as a side note Dr. Feser does seem to admit in his presentations at Science and Faith conference that only way to argue from wold to God is through Change,but maybe thats nitpicking)
If you accept a Hylemorphic view of substances and matter (rejecting the Atomist account) then the Third Way goes through. Hylemorphism is entailed by Aristotelian realism (as i said, at least to a degree. It would mean matter instantiates universals. It may not be enough to get prime matter and substantial form, but then again it might. Could Atomism be plausibly said to incorportae universals in the Aristotelian sense?? Anyway, i would maintain that Aristotelian realism, the mind body problem with it's need for immanent teleology for intentionality and universals for qualia plus the other arguments for Hylemorphism and against Atomism will get you to Hylemorphism without needing Act/Potency in the temporal becoming sense.
Essentialism and the essence/existence distinction are needed for the Second Way to go through. There are independent arguments for the distinction but my personal opinion is to only accept the distinction based on Hylemorphism. Given that form depends on matter and matter on form, it follows that a substance does not have existence inherent to it. Though this is not strictly parasitic on the Third Way or hylemorphism as there are independent arguments for the distinction apart from hylemorphism, it is the main reason i accept it and so as far as i am concerned it is parasitic.
Well this is confusing it means you are just basing your case for all these ways on Arguments for Scholastic Realism..but can any of those ways succeed on their own? it seems until I really see reformulations of those ways which could be made intelligible I can't be sure that they succeed ...for example ..
in First way ..Eternalism would undermine the premises ..Some things are moving and Whatever is moved is moved by something else..
its effects on second way depends on your interpretation of Causal Chains ( but note that Aristotelian causal principle also used in First way is suspect..)
in third way Eternalism would undermine the premise that things are generated or corrupted or at one time there could have been nothing...
I hadn't paid Attention to Fourth Way so I don't know what implications are here...(though I found this interesting thesis online, seem worth a real)
in Fifts way it would undermine the premise that Things by there very nature point toward some other thing or state in the future that doesn't exist yet.
Only the First Way could be said to directly depend on Act/potency. However, let's remember that the fundamental ascpect of A/P that the first way uses to get to Act/Potency is per se series on causation. That is, causal series which derive power from others. This doesn't depend on Temporal becoming (essentially a hat tip to Jason for pointing this out). So in the Minkowski example, the universe would be said to depend on laws of nature for it's existence (if we know think events are more ontologically fundamental that substances) Are the laws of nature fully actual or depend on their existence from something else? Will why those laws as oppossed to other laws? Why was our particular law of gravitation actualised rather than another law of gravitation? etc. Of course if you think substances are fundamental still, that just raises the question as to how best to interpret a substance vis a vis hylemorphism or atomism.
well this comment is very important..I have several remarks to make.. correct me if I am wrong but isn't that idea causation already derived from this notion that things are moving? so it would seem that Jason's view might be wrong.... even speaking of Potentiality of light bulb just presupposes presentist view of the world ..that bulb never went from potentially being there to actually being there..it just always was there ..its just not on the wall at spaciotemporal location X(which is earlier) and its on the wall at Y..so there doesn't seem to be any Actualization of any Potential here what so ever..
Secondly about this :
the universe would be said to depend on laws of nature for it's existence (if we know think events are more ontologically fundamental that substances) Are the laws of nature fully actual or depend on their existence from something else? Will why those laws as oppossed to other laws? Why was our particular law of gravitation actualised rather than another law of gravitation?
Well one there could be two simple answers to this..one is adopting humean conception of laws of nature..second is Adopting Lewisian Modal Realism this would answer why these particular laws than other ones...
and finally about
Of course if you think substances are fundamental still, that just raises the question as to how best to interpret a substance vis a vis hylemorphism or atomism.
Well I am not sure what implication Eternalism has for theory of Substances...but this seems to be a false dichotomy ...
So I think You still have your work cut out for you to show that they are really compatible..maybe you would succeed but you would need to point out how those premises in these arguments which Eternalism/B-theory seems to undermine can be reformulated to accommodate this different concept of reality..
And I am unaware of this arguments from universals you seem to entirely rest your case on..but I can't see how it by itself would be sufficient to remedy all these absurdities these premises face? that argument might prove to be proving too little ..and this is the point ..I am not claiming that A-T is just demonstrably false ..it just seems to be that A-T proves just so little..that was my impression after reading Dr. Feser's "Refutation" ..it just can't be intelligibly called that ..all he has actually shown is that ..There is a slim chance that if such and such features of reality hold then we can rationally affirm these these arguments go through..
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Thread Starter- Jeremy Taylor
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
[
And thats exactly what second premise says..and one can attempt to deny it without any incoherence what so ever , I've told you many times that no one is denying change , its just that change doesn't involve the circumstances that A-theorists can't move past ..Its called B-theory of time ,it describes the relation of time it doesn't deny it...so its not undermining any of our empirical observations ..
And like I said, A-theorists won't wrap their head around it but some philosophers Even deny that we can actually experience time in the first place..for example Here and Here ..so I think this charge of incoherence can be adequately dealt with ..and with it goes any rationale A-theorist has for still postulating the existence of undetectable Aether..
Maybe it's me, but this doesn't seem to properly respond to Callum points. All you really say is that he is wrong, without giving any explanation of your position.
You can find philosophers to defend almost any position, including incoherent ones. I'm not sure that a few articles means much.
- Callum
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Arguing that we experience a passage of time is neither a premise or conclusion. It argues that even an illusory experience must involve change otherwise it is self undermining our empirical observations
And thats exactly what second premise says..and one can attempt to deny it without any incoherence what so ever , I've told you many times that no one is denying change , its just that change doesn't involve the circumstances that A-theorists can't move past ..Its called B-theory of time ,it describes the relation of time it doesn't deny it...so its not undermining any of our empirical observations ..
And like I said, A-theorists won't wrap their head around it but some philosophers Even deny that we can actually experience time in the first place..for example Here and Here ..so I think this charge of incoherence can be adequately dealt with ..and with it goes any rationale A-theorist has for still postulating the existence of undetectable Aether..
Eternalist views can attempt to account for the neccessary change needed, but it's far from clear that they can succeed.
Yes,this is correct ..its far from clear to us that they can succeed but its also far from clear to us that they would just definitely fail ...how can we ever decide?
Take one of the most popular from four dimensionalism; temporal parts as spatial parts. It's been pointed out that inferences alone seem incompatible with this theory, let alone many other crucial aspects of scientific enquiry. If eternalism cannot use it's accounts of "change" for the specific, neccessary aspects of change for science then it suffers from empirical incoherence.
Well I have poor grasp of issue of identity and persistence ,so I don't know what really is at issue here ..but it doesn't seem anything Eternalist/B-theorists can't deal with..
Also, you keep repeating that A-Theories of time are empirically inferior. They are not. Regardless of which theory is right, they are just physical interpretations that can only be settled by philosophical arguments.
No, I don't just assert I have told you exactly why is it inferior ..
From Wikipedia : Lorentz Ether Theory
" Today LET is often treated as some sort of "Lorentzian" or "neo-Lorentzian" interpretation of special relativity. The introduction of length contraction and time dilation for all phenomena in a "preferred" frame of reference, which plays the role of Lorentz's immobile aether, leads to the complete Lorentz transformation (see the Robertson–Mansouri–Sexl test theory as an example). Because the same mathematical formalism occurs in both, it is not possible to distinguish between LET and SR by experiment. However, in LET the existence of an "Undetectable Aether" is assumed and the validity of the relativity principle seems to be only coincidental, which is one reason why SR is commonly "preferred over LET."
There you go you see? thats why its inferior and if charge of incoherence goes, so does any reason whatsoever for still accepting it...
Anyway, since the start of the discussion we have simply talked past each other and repeated ourselves. It would be better to not waste time and focus on your primary concern; assuming eternalism and whether any of the Five Ways work.
Sure, lets now turn to that (though as a side note Dr. Feser does seem to admit in his presentations at Science and Faith conference that only way to argue from wold to God is through Change,but maybe thats nitpicking)
If you accept a Hylemorphic view of substances and matter (rejecting the Atomist account) then the Third Way goes through. Hylemorphism is entailed by Aristotelian realism (as i said, at least to a degree. It would mean matter instantiates universals. It may not be enough to get prime matter and substantial form, but then again it might. Could Atomism be plausibly said to incorportae universals in the Aristotelian sense?? Anyway, i would maintain that Aristotelian realism, the mind body problem with it's need for immanent teleology for intentionality and universals for qualia plus the other arguments for Hylemorphism and against Atomism will get you to Hylemorphism without needing Act/Potency in the temporal becoming sense.
Essentialism and the essence/existence distinction are needed for the Second Way to go through. There are independent arguments for the distinction but my personal opinion is to only accept the distinction based on Hylemorphism. Given that form depends on matter and matter on form, it follows that a substance does not have existence inherent to it. Though this is not strictly parasitic on the Third Way or hylemorphism as there are independent arguments for the distinction apart from hylemorphism, it is the main reason i accept it and so as far as i am concerned it is parasitic.
Well this is confusing it means you are just basing your case for all these ways on Arguments for Scholastic Realism..but can any of those ways succeed on their own? it seems until I really see reformulations of those ways which could be made intelligible I can't be sure that they succeed ...for example ..
in First way ..Eternalism would undermine the premises ..Some things are moving and Whatever is moved is moved by something else..
its effects on second way depends on your interpretation of Causal Chains ( but note that Aristotelian causal principle also used in First way is suspect..)
in third way Eternalism would undermine the premise that things are generated or corrupted or at one time there could have been nothing...
I hadn't paid Attention to Fourth Way so I don't know what implications are here...(though I found this interesting thesis online, seem worth a real)
in Fifts way it would undermine the premise that Things by there very nature point toward some other thing or state in the future that doesn't exist yet.
Only the First Way could be said to directly depend on Act/potency. However, let's remember that the fundamental ascpect of A/P that the first way uses to get to Act/Potency is per se series on causation. That is, causal series which derive power from others. This doesn't depend on Temporal becoming (essentially a hat tip to Jason for pointing this out). So in the Minkowski example, the universe would be said to depend on laws of nature for it's existence (if we know think events are more ontologically fundamental that substances) Are the laws of nature fully actual or depend on their existence from something else? Will why those laws as oppossed to other laws? Why was our particular law of gravitation actualised rather than another law of gravitation? etc. Of course if you think substances are fundamental still, that just raises the question as to how best to interpret a substance vis a vis hylemorphism or atomism.
well this comment is very important..I have several remarks to make.. correct me if I am wrong but isn't that idea causation already derived from this notion that things are moving? so it would seem that Jason's view might be wrong.... even speaking of Potentiality of light bulb just presupposes presentist view of the world ..that bulb never went from potentially being there to actually being there..it just always was there ..its just not on the wall at spaciotemporal location X(which is earlier) and its on the wall at Y..so there doesn't seem to be any Actualization of any Potential here what so ever..
Secondly about this :
the universe would be said to depend on laws of nature for it's existence (if we know think events are more ontologically fundamental that substances) Are the laws of nature fully actual or depend on their existence from something else? Will why those laws as oppossed to other laws? Why was our particular law of gravitation actualised rather than another law of gravitation?
Well one there could be two simple answers to this..one is adopting humean conception of laws of nature..second is Adopting Lewisian Modal Realism this would answer why these particular laws than other ones...
and finally about
Of course if you think substances are fundamental still, that just raises the question as to how best to interpret a substance vis a vis hylemorphism or atomism.
Well I am not sure what implication Eternalism has for theory of Substances...but this seems to be a false dichotomy ...
So I think You still have your work cut out for you to show that they are really compatible..maybe you would succeed but you would need to point out how those premises in these arguments which Eternalism/B-theory seems to undermine can be reformulated to accommodate this different concept of reality..
And I am unaware of this arguments from universals you seem to entirely rest your case on..but I can't see how it by itself would be sufficient to remedy all these absurdities these premises face? that argument might prove to be proving too little ..and this is the point ..I am not claiming that A-T is just demonstrably false ..it just seems to be that A-T proves just so little..that was my impression after reading Dr. Feser's "Refutation" ..it just can't be intelligibly called that ..all he has actually shown is that ..There is a slim chance that if such and such features of reality hold then we can rationally affirm these these arguments go through..
Nope. Still haven't come to grips with the argument. Even worse you just assert it's wrong vaguely without dealing with it in any specific way.
It's actually pretty simple. You start with what is absolutely neccessary for science. It turns out you need a certain kind of change i.e hypothesis to experiment, inference etc. Any possible science needs this. And our consciousness cannot be *completely illusionary*. If a hypothesis denies this it is self undermining and incoherent. The argument is that eternalism can't accommodate this, especially the most popular four dimensionalism with it's view of temporal parts analogous to spatial parts. It may incorporate a certain kind of "change" but that needs to he evaluated. If one spatial part (my hair) is brown and another (my hand) is not brown it is difficult to think this deserves to be called a change. But that is simply the analogy temporal parts rests on.
Also, eternalism via temporal parts just has no change. Simply different "parts".
And wiki isn't the place to settle a philosophical discussion. That section doesn't help you at all. Note how it even mentions it is empirically equivalent. Yes it has an undetectable component. So what? It can be justified. Neither is the Neo-Lorentzian view depend on the charge of incoherence regarding change needed to go through. Not at all. John Bell, for one, notes the ease at which it sits with Bell inequalities and there are issues with where Spacetime actually exists ontologically. Weinberg has noted that this fixation on geometry has held back the unification of gravity as a force with the other fundamental forces . . .
"Yes,this is correct ..its far from clear to us that they can succeed but its also far from clear to us that they would just definitely fail ...how can we ever decide?"
. . . Wait? This can't be settled by rational argumentation, ergo, we are to remain agnostic as to whether eternalism is even coherent?!
Also, how can you say you have a poor grasp of a topic, not know what the issue even is but conclude that eternalism can still deal with it?
You turned to the Five Ways (I think your nitpicking was mistaken. Feser argues that change is the best way to argue to God, especially when his writings are taken as a whole. It's pretty weak to take an introductory comment at a conference as the whole truth regarding metaphysics).
You point out that the way the traditional Five Ways are laid out are an easy fit under presentism but not eternalism. Not really an objection at all, as my entire point has been that they can be formulated with eternalism.
Notice that i have shown you how you can argue for hylemorphism, essence/existence without efficient causality or things being corrupted (which were always shorthand anyway).
Third Way
- argue that substances are Hylemorphic
- prime matter is neccessary
- form is neccessary
- neither prime matter or form have their necessity in and of themselves but derive it from something neccessary
- a neccessary being exists
Second Way
-Things have essences
- Things are composite of essence with an act of existence
- Things must depend at every moment from their existence from something which has existence identical with it's essence.
Eternalism has nothing to say about substances or essence/existence.
First Way
- Causal Principle can be derived from Scholastic PSR
- within eternalism this always going to be one particular moment in time. You are confusing a causal series per se with a per accidents. On eternalism, a volume of water will exist at time t1. But at t1 it depends on it's existence for hydrogen and oxyge to be arranged water like, which depend on subatomic particles being arranged. . . No sense of temporal becoming is needed.
"Well one there could be two simple answers to this..one is adopting humean conception of laws of nature..second is Adopting Lewisian Modal Realism this would answer why these particular laws than other ones..."
The first simple answer would be useless. A humean concept of laws doesn't explain anything but simply redescribes the way the block universe is. The laws can not be said to be fundamental and have no way for prescribing the universe to behave in accordance. In fact, that humean laws are descriptive they make the actual, single substance of the universe more fundamental which only raises the issue of substances. . .
The second one could argue why certain laws are instantiated rather than others but you would have to actually argue for Lewis' modal realism rather than bring up it's bare possibility. Not so simple afterall. Further, Lewis' theory cannot account for what a law of nature is so even if you could argue his modal realism you would not be finished.
"
Well I am not sure what implication Eternalism has for theory of Substances...but this seems to be a false dichotomy ..."
Well if substances are fundamental it begs the question as to what a substance is. Especially as that is what the Third Way argues from. Eternalism would be irrelevant if substances are fundamental and you argue in a similar vain to the Third Way.
Also, hylemorphism and atomism aren't the only views of substances. But actually, when you look at others (Pansychism, neutral monism) none really help or arguably are as powerful as hylemorphism.
It seems to me your major problem is assuming that the Five Ways cannot change their premises for some reason to account for eternalism. This isn't an objection at all. Unless you want to say A-T proves too little because it's original formulations aren't eternalism friendly, but that's really weak especially as essence/existence and hylemorphism have no bearing on temporal becoming. The core of the arguments are untouched in the reformulations. Only the first premise is changed. But i have given independent arguments for the core metaphysics and you havent really objected to them.
Last edited by Callum (4/07/2017 4:55 am)
- Calhoun
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Maybe it's me, but this doesn't seem to properly respond to Callum points. All you really say is that he is wrong, without giving any explanation of your position. You can find philosophers to defend almost any position, including incoherent ones. I'm not sure that a few articles means much.
Dear Jeremy, I have tried my best to respond to this assertion that B-theorists can't describe change , I have tried Pointing out that B-theorist might use at-at theory of change to describe it (change is just being x at time t1 and being y at time t2) this is genuine change, it is genuine transition from one state to the other ..but it doesn't involve things going in and out of being. but it just doesn't seem like change to A-theorists ,they always insist that there is more to change..they think our everyday experience makes this assertion reasonable its about that I have shared those articles ... how many of them do you want me to share? I am not just assuming that whats written there is definitely right only that its possible ..even those authors themselves think they still got lots of work to do.. But there is nothing what so ever ever incoherent about B-theory of time.. this charge is nothing but red herring...and even besides that ..its just a kind of secondary issue here because what actually the question here is weather Five ways are compatible with B-theory or not..regardless of whether A-theory is true..
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Thread Starter- Jeremy Taylor
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
I should say I have no beef in this argument, except that I agree eternalism would only be problematic for the First Way. I'm not committed to any of the views on time discussed here. I'm a not even a Thomist.
Anyway, that is certainly a defence of the eternalist view of change, but it seems to be one that Callum has already given arguments against. I'd certainly be interested in the eternalist response to them.
I can sometimes see the benefit in posting articles, but I think in a debate like this, it would be better to present the main points oneself. Remember, there are eliminative materialists who have published articles. Behaviourists once published plenty of articles.
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
here again this is just reiteration of the same old red herring ..this is the problem with Presentists ,they just can't wrap their head around it and they just can't settle for anything less than what their intuition demands, they just always demand this (give this one read tho, its very relevant)
Compare how the compatibilist's account of freedom just doesn't seem to be a description of freedom to the libertarian...
THIS^ ....this is the problem just because it seems to libertarians that its not really freewill doesn't mean there is no imaginable way the compatiblist can account for it..
You basically never move past this argument ..
[list=a]
[*]We have experiences as of the passage of time.
[*]If we have experiences as of the passage of time, then any reasonable explanation for this relies on the passage of time being an objective feature of reality.
[*]therefore, The passage of time is an objective feature of reality.
[/list]
I'm not sure that this addresses the point Callum made here very clearly:
Without meaning offence, it's not a red herring you just dont undertsand it, as you admitted. If physics attempts to show change is illusory, it essentially pushes change from the external world to an observer's consciousness in the same that physics has 'shown' that colour and sound doesnt exist as we experience them. However, what cannot be shown is that change occurs at least within the the observer's consciousness. It cannot be done. We experience change. Nor is this question begging. The objection is not "we experience change therefore there is a passage of time". The objection is "we experience change, so even if we accept for the sake of argument change is an illusion of consciouness that illusion still nevertheless involves change".
...which it looks like it was meant to respond to.It focuses on experience of the passage of time and the passage of time being an objective feature of reality, instead of about change. From my reading Callum's point was mainly focused on change, whether or not it exists objectively or even only in an observer's consciousness.
So the interesting question would be whether what the observer experiences in their consciousness can be fully accounted for on some variant of eternalism while excluding anything like the act/potency distinction.
Well I have poor grasp of issue of identity and persistence ,so I don't know what really is at issue here ..but it doesn't seem anything Eternalist/B-theorists can't deal with..
This is just a personal impression but I think this issue of identity and persistence is pretty important to understanding the implications of different B-theories on things like the act/potency distinction.
Last edited by FZM (4/07/2017 5:30 am)
- Callum
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
Definitely should not forget to apologise for how poorly i have written. So many grammer and spelling mistakes. It's pretty bad!
- Callum
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
here again this is just reiteration of the same old red herring ..this is the problem with Presentists ,they just can't wrap their head around it and they just can't settle for anything less than what their intuition demands, they just always demand this (give this one read tho, its very relevant)
Compare how the compatibilist's account of freedom just doesn't seem to be a description of freedom to the libertarian...
THIS^ ....this is the problem just because it seems to libertarians that its not really freewill doesn't mean there is no imaginable way the compatiblist can account for it..
You basically never move past this argument ..
[list=a]
[*]We have experiences as of the passage of time.
[*]If we have experiences as of the passage of time, then any reasonable explanation for this relies on the passage of time being an objective feature of reality.
[*]therefore, The passage of time is an objective feature of reality.[/list]
I'm not sure that this addresses the point Callum made here very clearly:Without meaning offence, it's not a red herring you just dont undertsand it, as you admitted. If physics attempts to show change is illusory, it essentially pushes change from the external world to an observer's consciousness in the same that physics has 'shown' that colour and sound doesnt exist as we experience them. However, what cannot be shown is that change occurs at least within the the observer's consciousness. It cannot be done. We experience change. Nor is this question begging. The objection is not "we experience change therefore there is a passage of time". The objection is "we experience change, so even if we accept for the sake of argument change is an illusion of consciouness that illusion still nevertheless involves change".
...which it looks like it was meant to respond to.It focuses on experience of the passage of time and the passage of time being an objective feature of reality, instead of about change. From my reading Callum's point was mainly focused on change, whether or not it exists objectively or even only in an observer's consciousness.
So the interesting question would be whether what the observer experiences in their consciousness can be fully accounted for on some variant of eternalism while excluding anything like the act/potency distinction.Well I have poor grasp of issue of identity and persistence ,so I don't know what really is at issue here ..but it doesn't seem anything Eternalist/B-theorists can't deal with..
This is just a personal impression but I think this issue of identity and persistence is pretty important to understanding the implications of different B-theories on things like the act/potency distinction.
FZM, do you have Scholastic metaphysics?
- FZM
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Re: Five ways vs Eternalism/B-theory of time ..
] FZM, do you have Scholastic metaphysics?
Yes, on my Kindle. I think I'm going to look at the relevant passages again. It's been a while since I consulted it.