FZM wrote:

] FZM, do you have Scholastic metaphysics?

Yes, on my Kindle. I think I'm going to look at the relevant passages again. It's been a while since I consulted it.


 

Under four dimensionalism, the argument from empirical incoherence as argued by Healey is described. It also goes over whether inference can coherently be described under the the temporal parts theory argued from eternalist and four dimensionalism.

If you have the time, give it a read and see if I have adequately and faithfully grasped the issues. I just want to be sure.

Hello FZM welcome to this discussion...

FZM wrote:

So the interesting question would be whether what the observer experiences in their consciousness can be fully accounted for on some variant of eternalism while excluding anything like the act/potency distinction.

Sure Why not ? I have attempted to show how again and again..

Like said previously Change for B-theorist could be described this way..that If an object was X at t1 and not X at t2, and the object exists at both of these times and what ever time is between t1 and t2 , then the object can be said to be changed in relation to X. 

This is perfect description of change in our consciousness but it doesn't require that only present objects exist and that would be required to make Ac/potency intelligible(at least thats my contention but if Callum is correct its false ,but that remains to be seen)..there is nothing so insane and contradictory about it for it to deserve the label "incoherent"  ..or I just don't get how it would undermine science..

of course there are other sophisticated ways ..to make sense of it ..but it hasn't been shown what exactly is incoherent here..

Calhoun wrote:

Callum wrote:

Nope. Still haven't come to grips with the argument. Even worse you just assert it's wrong vaguely without dealing with it in any specific way.

Well I actually dealt with it, I told you that Philosophers object to both of the premise , there is much to be said about phenomenology of temporal experience by Cognitive scientists..

for example here you say 

Callum wrote:

Also, eternalism via temporal parts just has no change. Simply different "parts".

 
well I don't understand why having different parts is not really change(indeed I just can't really understand this demand for something more from A-theorists) what we normally call change just could be an object Perduring  .

Callum wrote:

It's actually pretty simple. You start with what is absolutely neccessary for science. It turns out you need a certain kind of change i.e hypothesis to experiment, inference etc. Any possible science needs this. And our consciousness cannot be *completely illusionary*. If a hypothesis denies this it is self undermining and incoherent The argument is that eternalism can't accommodate this, especially the most popular four dimensionalism with it's view of temporal parts analogous to spatial parts. It may incorporate a certain kind of "change" but that needs to he evaluated. If one spatial part (my hair) is brown and another (my hand) is not brown it is difficult to think this deserves to be called a change. But that is simply the analogy temporal parts rests on. 
.

 
Well this is what I don't get ..why the at-at theory of change that B-theorists are trying to uphold not adequate  for doing science ? What in this hypothesis (that Change is just being different at different times) is something so insane and self-contradictory to deserve the label incoherent..what in this renders our  consciousness complete illusory?  

About temporal parts theory ..its not clear first of all why B-theorists just has to be a four dimensionalist? its True as Prof. Oderberg says that Endurantist-B-theorists seem to be a "rare breed" but those two positions are not incompatible...secondly I still just don't get that why don't think this deserves to be really called change ..because in any case there actually is genuine difference between parts ..there is genuine transition of properties ..

Callum wrote:

"Yes,this is correct ..its far from clear to us that they can succeed but its also far from clear to us that they would just definitely fail ...how can we ever decide?" 

. . . Wait? This can't be settled by rational argumentation, ergo, we are to remain agnostic as to whether eternalism is even coherent?!

 

No, only about whether they can completely accommodate it or not ..

Callum wrote:

Also, how can you say you have a poor grasp of a topic, not know what the issue even is but conclude that eternalism can still deal with it?

 
Well I was just telling that about myself..I've seen other Eternalists deal with it so..

Callum wrote:

Notice that i have shown you how you can argue for hylemorphism, essence/existence without efficient causality or things being corrupted (which were always shorthand anyway).

Wait? when did you show me ..you have just told me that they are entailed by Scholastic Realism being true which is entailed by some argument that I am not yet aware of..(maybe I have missed something important)

Ok now torwars the Sweet Part..:

Callum wrote:

 
Third Way
- argue that substances are Hylemorphic 

- prime matter is neccessary 

- form is neccessary 

- neither prime matter or form have their necessity in and of themselves but derive it from something neccessary 

- a neccessary being exists

IF I am correct above then 1 hasn't been shown yet..
2 .seems undermined there is nothing has potentiality for anything..
3 ..also yet to be shown..
4..both of those things need to be shown..
5..would be correct .if above is true..

in the above arguments I think eternalism would preclude prime matter  I think..even if other premises are true ...
 

Callum wrote:

Second Way 

-Things have essences

- Things are composite of essence with an act of existence 

- Things must depend at every moment from their existence from something which has existence identical with it's essence. 

Eternalism has nothing to say about substances or essence/existence. 

First Way

- Causal Principle can be derived from Scholastic PSR 
 

Well first lets talk about first way..what do you exactly mean by Scholastic PSR here? (just for clarification,I haven't read Scholastic Metaphysics) do you mean doctrine of transcendental?  ..
I don't see how it would help principle of motion here could you please elaborate? 

Callum wrote:

- within eternalism this always going to be one particular moment in time. You are confusing a causal series per se with a per accidents. On eternalism, a volume of water will exist at time  t1. But at t1 it depends on it's existence for hydrogen and oxygen  to be arranged water like, which depend on subatomic particles being arranged.  . . No sense of temporal becoming is needed

 

Well the problem is on eternalism, the very talk of per se of per accidents causes is rendered useless because, per se causation would presuppose that Substances can stand in causal relations to each other..this is whats seems not to be the case on eternalism...while there is some relation between parts and whole ..its not ontological dependence ..If there doesn't exist efficient causality(parts don't bring the whole in existence) its difficult to see how there could be said to be any actualization of potential .as first way says..

And there seems to be bigger problem on eternalism ..one could ask How can God really be said to be A Creator if world exists tenselessly? when does God ​conjoins the essence of the world to its existence if  it just always is there ? there is no sense in which one could say that World has gone from Not existing to existing..
It seems to me that only an Occasionalistic-Panentheistic view of God would make sense on Eternalism?( I am sure I am missing something important here as there clearly are Christian Philosophers who are Eternalists but this is the question I had in mind and I just wanted to ask someone.)..

So I think maybe you should elaborate that argument for Realism that is underlying your defence...Maybe then I would be able to decide if you actually succeed or not..

Sigh. We have gone round in circles. Multiple times. You haven't addressed the argument. You have misunderstood it and addressed another argument. I'll set it out one more time and hope you can attack the actual premises. If we just speak past each other again, im simply not going to attempt yet again to explain the argument.

So any scientific method is going to rely on empirical evidence. It's also going to rely on the ability to form hypothesis, infer what experiments can test these hypothesis etc. This sense of change is absolutely neccessary. Without it science fails and any scientific evidence that is used to deny such change is empirically incoherent.

Now, the eternalist thinks he can still maintain such change. But, on closet inspection it is suspect as to whether he can. The argument that our block universe has temporal parts which are analogous to spatial parts is the main way to argue for such change. The scientist makes forms one part of the hypothesis at one temporal part, infers what this hypothesis entails at another temporal part. This doesn't seem to be change at all. Anymore than a spatial part of me (my hair) is brown whilst another (my foot) is not. That is a very weak argument as a kind of "change". Now, if someone has a piece of paper with 'Scorates is a man and all men are mortal" in one hand, with 'Socrates is mortal" in the other. It is absurd to think this spatial change is an inference in any way. Conscious subjects dont help. If fred thinks the first two premises at one spatial location and jim thinks the conclusion at another then that still wouldn't count as an inference. Yet temporal parts are supposed to be analogous to spatial parts. By the same token, how does Fred think the two premises at one temporal part and fred think the conclusion at the next temporal part count as an inference? The analogy it rests on simply cannot make it work. Similarly, how can it be said that Fred is really undertaking a scientific experiment if he is formulating a hypothesis at one temporal part and performing the experiment at another? The neccessary cognitive task needed for science havent been shown to have been met by the eternalist. But that is incoherent.

You say you dont understand how this isn't change. Could you explain to me why two seperate spatial parts, my foot and my hair, are different colours and how this actually is any meaningful change? This is what the temporal part theory rests on. That one temporal part is different from the other is change in the sense that a spatial part is different from the other. Part the latter seems false. Ergo, there seems not to capture the neccessary change needed for science.

"
No, only about whether they can completely accommodate it or not"

But whether the neccessary change needed for any possible science can be accommodated or not is precisely the issue as to whether such a theory is coherent! It's just not rational to say that the B theory is probably true one minute then "well it's not clear to us whether it's coherent" the next . . . .

"Well I was just telling that about myself..I've seen other Eternalists deal with it so."

But how can you say other theorists have dealt with it if you don't know what the issues are? This isnt a huge point, but as others have pointed out it's very common to say "Well this philosopher has said this. . " as an objection.

"
Wait? when did you show me ..you have just told me that they are entailed by Scholastic Realism being true which is entailed by some argument that I am not yet aware of."

Ok, shown or demonstrated is the wrong word. Argued more like. But Aristotelian realism, the argument from the mind-body problem needing substances to have qualities like qualia and inherent teleology argue directly for Hylemorphism. Aristotelian realism just is a substance instantiating universals. Having certain forms or essences. The argument from Qualia is another similar but independent argument for this as is from intentionality (inherent teleology). Arguments against Atomism are indirect arguments for Hylemorphism.

This looks like it could take a while? Just how familiar with A-T are you? You don't seem to know what hylemorphism actually is or how the arguments actually work (not offence). If something needs it's essence joined to an act of existence then it simply needs susbsitent existence itself. Even tenselessly, it would need something outside of it to keep it in existence, it doesnt have within itself the ability for existence. That's just apart of the argument.

Neither is the PSR a transcendental. The scholastic version can be defined as "Whatever is, has that whereby it is".

Notice the PSR does not depend on temporal becoming but entails a causal principle.

"
Well the problem is on eternalism, the very talk of per se of per accidents causes is rendered useless because, per se causation would presuppose that Substances can stand in causal relations to each other.."

Could you expand on that? Would eternalism entail eliminative materialism in the sense that all there is are quantum fields arranged certain ways at different temporal points?

Callum wrote:

So any scientific method is going to rely on empirical evidence. It's also going to rely on the ability to form hypothesis, infer what experiments can test these hypothesis etc. This sense of change is absolutely neccessary.

What sense of change? I can form the hypothesis that Species adapt to their surroundings and test whether there is any evidence but why do I need change for this ability to work?  

Callum wrote:

Now, the eternalist thinks he can still maintain such change. But, on closet inspection it is suspect as to whether he can. The argument that our block universe has temporal parts which are analogous to spatial parts is the main way to argue for such change. The scientist makes forms one part of the hypothesis at one temporal part, infers what this hypothesis entails at another temporal part. This doesn't seem to be change at all. Anymore than a spatial part of me (my hair) is brown whilst another (my foot) is not. That is a very weak argument as a kind of "change". Now, if someone has a piece of paper with 'Scorates is a man and all men are mortal" in one hand, with 'Socrates is mortal" in the other. It is absurd to think this spatial change is an inference in any way. Conscious subjects dont help. If fred thinks the first two premises at one spatial location and jim thinks the conclusion at another then that still wouldn't count as an inference. Yet temporal parts are supposed to be analogous to spatial parts. By the same token, how does Fred think the two premises at one temporal part and fred think the conclusion at the next temporal part count as an inference? The analogy it rests on simply cannot make it work. Similarly, how can it be said that Fred is really undertaking a scientific experiment if he is formulating a hypothesis at one temporal part and performing the experiment at another? The neccessary cognitive task needed for science havent been shown to have been met by the eternalist. But that is incoherent.

 

Well I think most of these objections could be evaded if one believes that those things(scientists) which are persisting have particular temporal parts at particular stages to which these things have  some kind of relation ..its that relation which makes all that talk intelligible...so when I say earlier(in B-theoratic sense,) that 'Scorates is a man and all men are mortal'  and I say later that 'Socrates is mortal"  then this is made intelligible because I have some kind of relation with temporal part that is earlier me or the part that is later me.. Change here would involve change Later stages have with respect to earlier stages ..so It seems the rationality won't be destroyed as you contend..

Now, I admit that I have poor grasp of this particular issue and I really feel dumb saying all this ..I have no idea what this some kind of relation could be, I am aware of various theories on these relations . but I have no idea if any of that is correct or not ..so you have made some major points here..

Callum wrote:

o, only about whether they can completely accommodate it or not" 

But whether the neccessary change needed for any possible science can be accommodated or not is precisely the issue as to whether such a theory is coherent! It's just not rational to say that the B theory is probably true one minute then "well it's not clear to us whether it's coherent" the next . . . .

Well Like I said above I only have very rough ideas about some these issues.. but from what I know I can't there being any contradiction or incoherence in B-theorists account..and I think if word "Probably" is used then it basically mean not absolutely clear..doesn't it? 

Callum wrote:

Wait? when did you show me ..you have just told me that they are entailed by Scholastic Realism being true which is entailed by some argument that I am not yet aware of." 

Ok, shown or demonstrated is the wrong word. Argued more like. But Aristotelian realism, the argument from the mind-body problem needing substances to have qualities like qualia and inherent teleology argue directly for Hylemorphism. Aristotelian realism just is a substance instantiating universals. Having certain forms or essences. The argument from Qualia is another similar but independent argument for this as is from intentionality (inherent teleology). Arguments against Atomism are indirect arguments for Hylemorphism.

Well I was talking about the argument from Universals for existence of God..it seems to me that earlier you were saying Scholastic realism is entailed by that..M/B problem is also an argument for Hylemorphism but I don't see how Hylemorphism is better answer to M/B problem then Neutral Monism, Pan-Pcychism, Substance dualism o even Non- Reductive Physicalism..

Also it seems to me that you can't go from Aristotelian realism/Aristotelian conception of teleology to..Scholastic Realism/fifth way..because on the former view its just a necessary feature of reality ..but on the later it requires arguments like five ways to work..its precisely the premises of those arguments that are suspect on Eternalism

Callum wrote:

This looks like it could take a while?

Yes, it might ..I just hope your bear with me .I actually really appreciate your effort..Thank You.

Callum wrote:

You don't seem to know what hylemorphism actually is or how the arguments actually work (not offence). If something needs it's essence joined to an act of existence then it simply needs susbsitent existence itself. Even tenselessly, it would need something outside of it to keep it in existence, it doesnt have within itself the ability for existence. That's just apart of the argument.

Well I don't know it just seems weird ( but I should be the last man to describe my opponents view that way shouldn't I ? hahah..) it seems like it would imply that there is a time when nothing exists and then God joins world's essence with its existence..

Callum wrote:

Neither is the PSR a transcendental. The scholastic version can be defined as "Whatever is, has that whereby it is".

No,I didn't mean that it is a transcendental ..i mean that it could be derived from the transcendental "True"

Callum wrote:

 Notice the PSR does not depend on temporal becoming but entails a causal principle. 

"
Well the problem is on eternalism, the very talk of per se of per accidents causes is rendered useless because, per se causation would presuppose that Substances can stand in causal relations to each other.."

Could you expand on that?

Well what I mean is that Eternalism would imply that things don't stand in Causal relations ..for example right now I am pressing  keys ..here whatever causation is its not a relation between Thing that is me and Keys..it instead might be between those events..me moving my fingers ..and keys getting pressed...

so I would like to ask you how would you reformulate first premise of first way? it seems to me you are just making an argument from contingency..

Callum wrote:

Would eternalism entail eliminative materialism in the sense that all there is are quantum fields arranged certain ways at different temporal points?

Well, I don't see how..where would it imply that Qualia,intentionality,Rationality just doesn't exist.? Indeed as I said above I don't see how how even Aristotelian Realism and Aristotelian conception of teleology is even ruled out ..only that its hard to see how can it be used to support five ways..for example..even if Aristotelian conception of teleology is true ...the premises of fifth way that states that Future state the thing points to by virtue of its nature doesn't exist yet and it has to exist in some way so it is grounded in divine intellect ..becomes a suspect..



 

Callum wrote:

Im not quoting because it's getting long an my phone doesn't like it! 

No worries..

Callum wrote:

 Lets put A/B theory aside. I've enjoyed the discussion and by thinking of the clearest why to articulate my points ive come to understand the strengths and weaknesses for it...,

Yes, me too,these issues are very thorny ...but problem is in a deductive arguments like five way..the premises need to known to be true ..if a specific view of time leaves those premises undermined ..then even if one thinks that view is not really true  as long as it is coherent ..these arguments are undermined....other than this ..I don't despise A-theory/Presentism too  :-)
but given how much confidence A-Tist put into their arguments they bear some serious burden here..so there arguments better be compatible with both views ..or else they just prove too little..

Callum wrote:

. Im no expert in this area! Anyway

yea , same here ..but charge of absolute incoherence seems to be mistaken to me..specifically how self-evident this incoherence is deemed 

Callum wrote:

I think that hylemorphism completely outstrips non the other options regarding mind/body issue and would regard it as an argument for hylemorphism. More on that later. 

Sure, we'll see ..but remember the problem seems to be that ..even with all these ingredients proven ..its difficult to see how one could argue from world to God if some of those premises don't seem to work..

Callum wrote:

Yes, i think the Fifth Way as formulated by Aquinas with the idea of a final cause is up in the air with eternalism, but a broadly fifth way can still go through from temporal ordering. Swineburne's argument is an example, I take it that this version was also what persuaded Flew.

Well could you briefly lay out or link me to such an argument ? I've never read Swinburne ..and I've never been interested in arguments that go from order to God (such as design or Fine tuning) because they just collapse under the pressure of Skeptical theistic response to Problem of evil..

Callum wrote:

When you said that the First Way is something like contingency - Yes!! The first 3 ways are all cosmological arguments which explain why there is something rather than nothing and need a cause outside of themselves. Feser's formulation ultimately argues that existence itself needs an explanation and is the most fundamental potency to be actualised.

I see you have brought up Humean accounts. Perhaps we can go over those later. 

Ok we shall see what you have to say about ..that but keep in mind that it seems one can't just dissolve arguments like five ways into rationalistic contingency arguments(which take PSR to be something like a law of thought) because those are susceptible  to objections like those from Hume or Kant etc..

Thanks...

 

Last edited by Calhoun (4/08/2017 3:18 am)