AKG wrote:

But isn't racial profiling itself largely based on the notion of racism which itself does assign different moral values based on race? 

Profiling works on the premise that certain values are more prevalent in a certain community e.g. ethnic, national et cetera et cetera. For it to actuelly qualify as racism in the sense I outlined the profilers would have to claim that the link between those values and that community were necessary as opposed to accidental e.g. that Italians have an inherent disposition towards organized crime or the Irish towards terrorism. Practically profiling on the former ground often has the unfortunate effect that racists will appeal to this contingent association in an attempt to justify their valuation of race.

Last edited by DanielCC (3/29/2017 4:14 am)

AKG wrote:

Well racism in itself is inherently wrong so I would say type-5 actions being racist, and wrong would make prejudice inherently wrong and always wrong as well. Also I think all actions done in the name of racism are wrong given that racism is itself inherently wrong. That includes racial profiling.

What I'm looking for, though, is some argument which concludes that "racism in itself is inherently wrong." Such an argument is going to have to define racism and then show why any action (or, I suppose, feeling) meeting that definition is eo ipso wrong.

That isn't a trivial matter. The focal cases of racism are clearly those identified by my sufficient conditions (1) and (2). And one could certainly imagine arguments that actions racist on account of satisfying the conditions of (1) and (2) are always wrong, by virtue of satisfying those conditions. For instance, if one thinks that all hateful acts are wrong, then it is easy to see why an action racist in the sense of (1) is wrong by virtue of being racist.

That's all well and good. But the same argument would not show that an action racist on account of satisfying the condition of (5) is immoral, for such an action need not (it seems) express hatred. That is not to say that it is not intrinsically immoral. Perhaps it is. But the same argument would not show it.

Say that we did not think any such argument existed. Then perhaps we would want to reject sufficient condition (5), because we want to preserve the thought that racism is always wrong. That would be a reasonable decision to make, but it's a decision. The term 'racism' has a somewhat ambiguous scope. It isn't obvious to me that there is a single argument that shows racism of both types (1) and (5) to be immoral by virtue of satisfying those descriptions (which is what it would take for racism, taken broadly, to be intrinsically immoral); there may be, but I should like to see it.

So, for instance, here, you give reasons why profiling is wrong that are extrinsic to the act itself:

AKG wrote:

The thing with profiling is that it can easily be abused, and creates a stigma associated with a certain group, which NEVER ends well. As an African-American Muslim I know people such as my dad who have faced unfair situations due to profiling. Also profiling has the potential to be very biased/abused by those unworthy of power, and cause other actions to be overlooked. ... In fact correct me if I'm wrong but I haven't heard of any positive benefits due to profiling.

This is to say that profiling tends to lead to bad outcomes. That is an empirical question, and the evidence very well might suffice to show that a particular society should restrict profiling of various kinds, for instance of the racial variety. But that is not an argument that profiling is intrinsically immoral.

But I think we also should not be seduced by words like 'profiling' and 'discrimination'. Owing to regimes of oppression that have existed especially in the United States, these are bad words, and we have laws that prohibit profiling on the basis of certain characteristics. But to discriminate on the basis of a characteristic is merely to choose on the basis of a characteristic. Someone who needs a black actor is, by choosing one, engaging in racial discrimination. Parents who choose a teenage girl rather than a teenage boy to babysit their infant, as most parents seeking babysitters do (I believe regardless of where they fall on the political spectrum), are engaging in discrimination on the basis of sex. I don't think such people are doing anything intrinsically immoral. So we shouldn't be wowed by words like 'discrimination' that remind us of cases where discriminatory action has been part of a larger scheme that grossly oppressed certain groups.

DanielCC wrote:

A simple remark on Racism: it's a category mistake to assume genetics or racial heritage, neither of which are free actions, are of moral import.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

Alexander wrote:

Timocrates wrote:

DanielCC wrote:

A simple remark on Racism: it's a category mistake to assume genetics or racial heritage, neither of which are free actions, are of moral import.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

Aren't you missing Daniel's point? He isn't saying that things other than free actions (such as one's heritage) can't impact moral decisions, he's saying that a moral judgement about a person cannot be based on something over which they have no control.

Well, "moral import" is ambiguous between these two senses. I'd typically read "X is not of moral import" as "X cannot be regarded as morally relevant"--but that isn't a plausible claim about genetics or racial heritage. (If it were true, moreover, it would also mean that race could not be used as a criterion for, say, affirmative action, or reparations.)

But right: in this context it would seem appropriate to take "race is not of moral import" as meaning that it isn't the subject of direct evaluation. That's fine, and I assume everyone here agrees with it; it shows irrationality to judge someone morally on the basis of what is outside of his control. But my sense is that there are cases of racism which do not involve judging people of any race to be morally inferior by virtue of being of that race. Someone who doesn't like people of a particular race and therefore throws all of their applications out without considering them, irrespective of their qualifications, is being racist, but need not, I think, be judging them to be morally inferior by virtue of being that race. (Indeed, I don't think his error is an intellectual mistake.)

Timocrates wrote:

By natural law we owe allegiance to our family and relatives and from there the allegiance is extended outward. If my sister is starving to death and a stranger begs me for food, I am obliged first to look after my sister.

As you would be to a friend or loved one. This additional obligation stems from the habitual affections between the two of you, however not any genetic bond. Were that sister adopted it would be of no relevance to the situation.

Timocrates wrote:

Her genetics are sufficient grounds for and grant her a right to expect preferential treatment from me: if my family is under threat of extermination, I am bound by natural law to protect them; by extension, my people or kin more broadly, and so on outward but in that natural order.

What argument do you have to justify that claim? On it's own it merely begs the question against my personal agency argument as to why this isn't the case. I'm not a natural law theorist, but even if I were it would require further argument to justify that point.

Timocrates wrote:

My nation cannot without absolutely just cause lawfully attempt to exterminate my family nor can they lawfully compel me to participate in it because the family is the first nation and wellspring of all nations.

Historically that may be the case, but that says nothing about its moral value. Even if we accept the nation is modeled after the family unit my account of filial love can accord for this (the family is a more biologically basic model of dependence, co-operation and gratitude). 

Timocrates wrote:

Moreover, it is just grounds for rebellion and even revolution if the State attempts to destroy families, specifically or generally. This is why Communist states and tyrannies have no legitimate rights or authority as such but only as much and to the extent just States are willing to concede them for the purposes of peace or to secure some greater good.

Totalitarian governments attack the family for the same reason they attack religious organizations outside of their control: because they cannot tolerate any competing moral obligations.  

Timocrates wrote:

False and a quick example will show its falsity: Let's say you were kidnapped and stolen from your actual parents in a human trafficking ring and sent to some foreign place or nation and you were rescued then adopted and raised by Christian foster parents. Why would you not still owe your natural mother and father filial love, devotion and respect?

Whether one owes the original parents anything beyond what one owes any human depends on their intentions: if they still will (to themselves bring about ) all the goods that are due that lost child then one owes them love at least. Your example though suggests that said original parents have already contributed to that child's upbringing though, hence can hardly be considered strangers.

Last edited by DanielCC (4/08/2017 3:00 pm)