1 - RomanJoe
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An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
Is anyone here aware of an argument for the existence of free will that is based on the premise that we have the ability to reason and arrive at truth? I have always thought that determinism is self-defeating. I don't believe you can rationally affirm the truth of determinism anymore than a tree branch can rationally affirm something. If determinism is true then our reason is purely determined by the sways of nature, every "truth" is arrived at accidentally. We cannot assess premises and weigh an argument on the merits of reason because when we do so, given the truth of determinism, there is no agent assessing the rationale of the argument--it is purely chance, accident, blind and fated.
In short, you cannot rationally affirm determinism because if you accept it as true then you must conclude that you didn't reason to that truth--rather, you were determined to arrive at that truth. On determinism you wouldn't be capable of assessing the evidence for and against determinism and freely making a decision based on that evidence. A sort of mental dizziness also sets in because your reasoning that you can't arrive at the truth of determinism, given that it is true, is also determined. So, in a general sense, nothing can be affirmed as true--not even your thought that nothing can be affirmed as true given the truth of determinism can be affirmed as true. So determinism could in fact be true, it's just that we could never rationally arrive at that truth.
So, does anyone have a good argument for free will that is based on our ability to reason towards truth? I would appreciate a syllogistic form of one too. Forgive me for, perhaps, the tinge of ambiguity in my language, I'm writing this hastily.
Last edited by RomanJoe (5/04/2017 2:43 am)
- Dennis
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
(1) Things come into existence and go out of existence.
(2) Whatever comes into or goes out of existence is not metaphysically necessary, but metaphysically contingent.
(3) Propositions are truth-bearers that supervene on being.
(4) If the beings are metaphysically contingent, then from (3), the propositions are metaphysically contingent as well, and thus, both beings and propositions are metaphysically contingent.
Does this argument work? If it does, we can ask a further question, "Contingent on what?"
For libertarian free will, we need at least 3 conditions to be satisfied;
(i) The act must be non-determined.
(ii) The act must be reasons-responsive (it must not be due to compulsiveness or neurotics).
(iii) The act must be self-sourced.
- Jeremy Taylor
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
I recall that both Lewis and Reppert imply the argument from reason means our reasoning cannot be determined.
- Calhoun
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
Dennis wrote:
(1) Things come into existence and go out of existence.
That seems only to be the case on Presentism(or any dynamic view of time)
or do you have some other notion of Things coming into existence in mind?..
- Dennis
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
Let's see if this works.
(1) Things undergo alterational or substantial change.
(2) Whatever undergoes alterational or substantial change is not metaphysically necessary, but metaphysically contingent.
(2b) If things undergo alterational or substantial change, then the state affairs need to be "brought about" by causal relations.
(3) Whatever is metaphysically contingent needs causal relations between substances and causal grounding relations in order to be brought about (contingent existence is a kind of potency).
Last edited by Dennis (5/04/2017 6:32 am)
- Calhoun
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
(1) Things undergo alterational or substantial change.
(2) Whatever undergoes alterational or substantial change is not metaphysically necessary, but metaphysically contingent.
(2b) If things undergo alterational or substantial change, then the state affairs need to be "brought about" by causal relations.
(3) Whatever is metaphysically contingent needs causal relations between substances and causal grounding relations in order to be brought about (contingent existence is a kind of potency).
Seems good(if the other analysis is right of course.)
- Calhoun
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
So, does anyone have a good argument for free will that is based on our ability to reason towards truth? I would appreciate a syllogistic form of one too.
This seems like that kind of argument..or the shorter version..(I am not sure exactly how good it is)
but note that these guys are much unsympathetic towards A-T ..
What would everyone's thoughts be about these critical(and extremely uncharitable) Analysis of Thomism and Free will (Here and Here) ?
Last edited by Calhoun (5/04/2017 7:03 am)
- Proclus
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
I think that for the argument to have traction, we need to be very careful about how we understand "believing something based on reasons" or "reason responsiveness." The Determinist does not deny that we have thoughts and that we make choices. He also believes that there are mechanisms in us that may systematically link these thoughts to the outcome of these choices in such a way that—under the right conditions at least—if the starting beliefs are true, then it will be guaranteed that we will choose to believe something true as a conclusion. A determinist may argue that this is all one needs for an inference to be valid. And in some sense he would be right to say that we choose to believe in the conclusion because the premises are true.
What I think we need is a thoroughgoing distinction between mechanical causation of any kind and rational inference. The choice to believe the conclusion of a rational inference must be grounded in the validity of the argument and not in any mechanistic sequence of causes. Kant makes this point.
- RomanJoe
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
(1) Things come into existence and go out of existence.
(2) Whatever comes into or goes out of existence is not metaphysically necessary, but metaphysically contingent.
(3) Propositions are truth-bearers that supervene on being.
(4) If the beings are metaphysically contingent, then from (3), the propositions are metaphysically contingent as well, and thus, both beings and propositions are metaphysically contingent.
Does this argument work? If it does, we can ask a further question, "Contingent on what?"
For libertarian free will, we need at least 3 conditions to be satisfied;
(i) The act must be non-determined.
(ii) The act must be reasons-responsive (it must not be due to compulsiveness or neurotics).
(iii) The act must be self-sourced.
Thank you. I'm going to think on this.
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Thread Starter- RomanJoe
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Re: An argument for free will via our ability to reason?
I think that for the argument to have traction, we need to be very careful about how we understand "believing something based on reasons" or "reason responsiveness." The Determinist does not deny that we have thoughts and that we make choices. He also believes that there are mechanisms in us that may systematically link these thoughts to the outcome of these choices in such a way that—under the right conditions at least—if the starting beliefs are true, then it will be guaranteed that we will choose to believe something true as a conclusion. A determinist may argue that this is all one needs for an inference to be valid. And in some sense he would be right to say that we choose to believe in the conclusion because the premises are true.
What I think we need is a thoroughgoing distinction between mechanical causation of any kind and rational inference. The choice to believe the conclusion of a rational inference must be grounded in the validity of the argument and not in any mechanistic sequence of causes. Kant makes this point.
Yes, I think that's the meat of the issue--do we actually believe in the truth of a conclusion on the merits of reason or are we mechanically determined to do so? You make a good point about a deterministic view of truth, that is, at least in a mechanistic way, "if the starting beliefs are true, then it will be guaranteed that we will choose to believe something true as a conclusion." However, I think the objection still holds, how can he ever know that the starting beliefs are true?
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