Hello,

I was wondering if anyone could further elaborate upon a question that I posed to Dr. Feser in an email, which he briefly responded to.  I had emailed him regarding a comment that David Bentley Hart made regarding the "free-will" argument against universalism in the now infamous comment section of this blog.  Basically, Hart (being a universalist) thinks that the free will defense fails because it presupposes a "libertarian" or voluntarist view of free will instead of an intellectualist one.  He says: 
[quote888]The classical Platonic-Aristotelian-Christian understanding of freedom is one in which the rational will of necessity, when set free from ignorance, wills the good end of its own nature; and perfect freedom is the power to achieve that end without hindrance…"[/quote888]
 
[quote888]…no choice of evil can be free in a meaningful sense.  For evil is not an end, and so can be chosen under the delusion that it is in some sense a good in respect of the soul (even if, in moral terms, one is aware that one is choosing what is conventionally regarded as "evil"); and no choice made in ignorance can be a free choice...[t]his is why the free-will defense of the idea of an eternal hell is essentially gibberish.
[/quote888]

I took issue with Hart's view here because it seemed to me to be describing the specifically Platonic view (where evil can only really be willed out of ignorance), instead of the view of Aristotelians and Christians, who would say that evil can be willed even if we are perfectly knowledgeable of the good to be sought.  And I pointed out that Feser seems to agree with me.  On the version of intellectualism that he subscribes to -- the conception of free-will as "freedom for excellence" -- "the will is inherently directed toward the good in the sense that pursuit of the good is its final cause," but "the implication is that the will is more free to the extent that it finds it easy to choose what is good, and less free to the extent that it does not," rather than of necessity choosing what is good, as Hart seems to think.  Hart's freedom would be characteristic of God's freedom and possibly our freedom in heaven, but not of our natural freedom here on Earth. 

I asked Feser if this was correct.  He responded by saying, "Yes, no choice we make in this life is necessitated." So again, if anyone here could perhaps elaborate more on why this is right, and why Hart is mischaracterizing the intellectualist/voluntarist dichotomy, that would be greatly appreciated.  Aquinas would certainly characterize himself as an intellectualist, and yet he would ostensibly agree with the free-will defense of hell.

Thanks.