John West wrote:

Jason wrote:

if God just sees His effects in Himself as their cause would that not be constituted as His Knowledge.

As far as I can tell, your reply is irrelevant. If God knows a proposition p in one world, ~p in another, and requires intrinsic items (such as belief states) whereby he knows those truths, it doesn't matter where the knowledge comes from.

And if God doesn't require intrinsic items whereby he knows the truths, you're back to requiring one of the aforementioned externalist conceptions of knowledge.

(It seems to create a further problem, too. How can God see different effects in different worlds in a self that's strictly identical across possible worlds?)

Thank you for your reply, I appreciate it. God know a proposition p in one world and ~p in another world because He is the cause of each of those propositions in each of those worlds. He does not need any belief states.
 

I'm curious: why are you guys avoiding arguing for externalist conceptions of knowledge? You keep trying to find some work around for the problem, instead of just facing it head on.

Dennis wrote:

I have a problem with the formulation: "But does that also mean he is identical with the content of that attribute?"

He can't be identical to the content of that attribute, not actually, at least. What sense would it make to say that God is identical with the content of the property of redness. Redness causes the perception of redness, it follows that God would cause it too. (I suppose I'm having a general problem with DS.) What am I missing?

If God is identical with his belief states and his belief states are individuated by their content, it doesn't matter whether God is also identical with the content of his belief states. (What matters is that since God's belief states have different content in different possible worlds, he has different belief states in different possible worlds (and that, since God is identical to each of those belief states, he therefore differs between those worlds).

(I have no idea why you're bringing up the colour red. No one is saying that God is identical to the colour red (or, for that matter, an instance of it).)

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

 Is there any actual change or alteration?

Nope. The argument is about whether God could have been different, if he had created some different world.

(God's Immutability entails that God couldn't have been different than he is, even if he had created one of those other worlds instead of this one. (The accidental property argument entails that he would have to be different than he is in some of them.))

Jeremy Taylor wrote:

Ah, I understand. If there is true contingency then things could have been different, which seems to mean so could God.

This wouldn't seem to affect an emanation view where all that could exist does exist. But that would be a somewhat unpalatable position.

If emanationism is either necessitarian or a form of theistic modal realism, it amounts to a rejection of Vallicella's second premise and avoids his argument—yes.* If not, it's probably no better off than regular classical theism.

I'll start a proper thread on the accidental property objection in a few months.* That will give anyone who wants to jump in time to research it.

*With some quibbling over details in the latter case.
*But as a regular old fashioned forum member. I'm resigning as administrator.