Skeptics can say a lot of things. The question is whether they can argue for them. And they can't do that for propositions that don't make sense.

For example, the proposition that Being Itself might not exist is simply incoherent. Completely aside from the fact that the classical theist gives a metaphysical argument that God's essence is identical with His existence (which is why He must be Being Itself), what in the world could it possibly mean for "Being" not to be? (Something similar is true of the claim that God's nonexistence is "conceivable." No, it isn't, if the skeptic means the God of classical theism; Aquinas's Third Way has that covered. And if he means some other "god," who cares?)

So yes, a skeptic could say such things, but he would thereby be showing that either (a) he wasn't talking about the God of classical theism, or (b) he didn't understand what he was saying. Why would anyone think he was making serious arguments?

Last edited by Scott (7/09/2015 10:18 pm)

So if a skeptic says something along the line that if God's existence is identical to his essence, should'nt that entail he exist by simply knowing and since they don't believe in him, this is false, they have'nt understood what Aquinas and others meant at all? What exactly do they mean if this is not the case?
P.S do you reccomend any books or media that explains classical theism, and the arguments in more depth. 

AKG wrote:

So if a skeptic says something along the line that if God's existence is identical to his essence, should'nt that entail he exist by simply knowing and since they don't believe in him, this is false, they have'nt understood what Aquinas and others meant at all? What exactly do they mean if this is not the case?
 

If one were to directly perceive the essence of God one would indeed know that God’s non-existence is contradictory. As it stands some claim we can reason from propositions made true by that essence (as opposed to definitive knowledge of the essence itself) to God’s necessary existence. Indeed if the Fool - I mean 'sceptic' knows what he or she is talking about they must claim God is impossible (and, if so, why) since the idea of a merely possible necessary being is incoherant.
 

Last edited by DanielCC (7/10/2015 6:50 am)

AKG wrote:

So if a skeptic says something along the line that if God's existence is identical to his essence, should'nt that entail he exist by simply knowing . . .

If I'm understanding your question correctly, then I think DanielCC has given a sound answer to it. If we knew God's essence directly, then not only would we know without doubt that He exists, but our very knowing of His essence would itself entail that He existed.

Timocrates's point is a good one too; most of us are all too adept at not believing things that we really know -- or that we should know better than to think we don't know. 

AKG wrote:

P.S do you reccomend any books or media that explains classical theism, and the arguments in more depth. 

Probably my favorite general introduction overall is George Hayward Joyce's Natural Theology, which is the one I always recommend to people fairly new to the subject (as I was myself just a few years ago when I read it). You can follow that link to read it online, or you can buy a hard copy inexpensively.

There are others and we can make additional recommendations as needed, but I'd just get that one and read it first.

AKG wrote:

Could it be said that under a Platonic view . . .

I suppose so, but if so, the relevance of that fact to Thomism* isn't obvious. Thomism does include some Platonic elements (unsurprisingly to those of us who regard Aristotle as a Platonist!), but it doesn't hold that the laws of physics have independent existence. On the contrary, it follows the Augustinian version of Platonism (usually called "neo"-Platonism even though its adherents took themselves simply to be interpreting Plato) that locates stuff like that in the Divine Intellect. And it doesn't believe that the "laws" of physics are anything more than descriptions of how physical things behave given their natures/essence; it's those natures/essences, not the "laws," that subsist in the Divine Intellect .(Whenever there are actual created substances that have those natures/essences, the Divine Ideas are exemplars that God in some sense used as a "model.")

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* I'm taking it that we're still on the subject of your original question about Ed's "Fifty Shades of Nothing" blog post. The physicists he's discussing aren't Platonists of the sort you describe and neither is Ed.

Last edited by Scott (7/10/2015 5:10 pm)

AKG wrote:

I know Ed is a Thomist, but is'nt platonism itself relevant to classical theism

Sure, but as I said in my footnote, I took it that we were still addressing your original question about Ed's post, and the physicists he was describing wouldn't take that Platonic approach either.

But yes, a Platonist who thinks physical (or even mathematical or logical) "laws actually have independent existence" (as not all Platonists do) could very well hold that such laws were metaphysically necessary (in, probably, any of several senses).

For the record, though, nothing in Thomism requires that God be the only being that exists necessarily. It's just that all other necessary beings derive their necessity from God.

(Dinner beckons, so TTYL.)

Last edited by Scott (7/10/2015 5:52 pm)