Camoden wrote:

Callum wrote:

Thoughts on this passage from Pruss' Blackwell Companion article?

" For the cosmological argument, the most important case of libertarian choice is God’s choice what world to create.  In this case, I actually think it is a necessary truth that God is impressed by the reasons S on account of which he created the actual world, just as it is a necessary truth that God was impressed by a different set of reasons on account of which he might have created another world.  After all, necessarily, an omniscient and morally perfect God is impressed by all and only the good reasons.  What the reasons on the basis of which God created this world are is something largely beyond my ken, though we can say a few standard things about the value of beings that participate in God’s life.

            As a modification of my hypothesis, I should note that it might be that what matters explanatorily is not only the fact of the agent’s being impressed by the reasons, but also the degree to which the agent is impressed by them.  It is easy to modify the account to take this into account, by explaining not just in terms of a set of reasons but in terms of a set of reason-weight pairs.

            There is, still, something uncomfortable about the proposed explanation of libertarian action.  I think a reader is likely to have the sense that while it is correct to say that the choice of graduate school might be explained by what is better for a spouse, even though this factor would have equally been present had a different choice been made, this kind of explanation is explanatorily inferior to, say, deterministic causal explanation or explanation in terms of a necessitating metaphysical principle.  That may be.  But there is no need to take the PSR to say that there is always the best kind of explanation—the PSR I am defending merely says that there is an explanation of every contingent proposition.  And that is all I need for the cosmological argument."

This is more or less my thoughts. It isn’t like God is strictly ordered to a particular good, just like the man who is wise isn’t strictly ordered to the formation of the triangle.

Could you expand that a bit more, Camoden? I guess where I am confused is how we explain a God that is impressed with one set of reasons  (as Pruss puts it) for creating world A exists over a God that is impressed by the set if reasons to create world B?

It's a neccessary truth that God is impressed by 'set A'? But then that seems to mean that he couldn't have been impressed by 'set B'?

UGADawg wrote:

I'm not sure I understand his argument completely, because frankly he's not a very good writer and he seems to conflate a several issues.

But one big problem with this is that he's simply ignoring different conceptions of modality, e.g. following Leibniz we may distinguish between hypothetical necessity and absolute necessity. The universe, for the reasons Feser lays out in Five Proofs, cannot possibly be absolutely necessary, because it exhibits characteristics, such as change or composition, that imply it is dependent (if you accept his causal premises, at least).

However, the universe can still be hypothetically necessary, i.e. if God exists and if it's in his nature to create the world, then it follows of logical necessity that the universe exists. 

It's entirely consistent to hold the universe is hypothetically necessary yet metaphysically contingent, and in fact many classical theists have held precisely this view, e.g. Leibniz and Lloyd Gerson (who Feser cites regarding the Neo-Platonic argument).

Does this get at what you mean?

"There is also to be considered the Scholastic distinction between that which is necessaryabsolutely and that which is necessary only by supposition. For example, it is not absolutelynecessary that I write this blog post – I could have decided to do something else instead – but on the supposition that I am in fact writing it, it is necessary that I am. Similarly, it is not absolutely necessary that God wills to create just the world He has in fact created, but on the supposition that He has willed to create it, it is necessary that He does. There is this crucial difference between my will and God’s, though: Whereas I, being changeable, might in the course of writing this post change my mind and will to do something else instead, God is immutable, and thus cannot change what He has willed from all eternity to create. In short, since by supposition He has willed to create this world, being immutable He cannot do otherwise; but since absolutely He could have willed to create another world or no world at all, He is nevertheless free."

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.co.uk/2010/05/davies-on-divine-simplicity-and-freedom.html?m=1

Callum wrote:

Camoden wrote:

Callum wrote:

Thoughts on this passage from Pruss' Blackwell Companion article?

" For the cosmological argument, the most important case of libertarian choice is God’s choice what world to create.  In this case, I actually think it is a necessary truth that God is impressed by the reasons S on account of which he created the actual world, just as it is a necessary truth that God was impressed by a different set of reasons on account of which he might have created another world.  After all, necessarily, an omniscient and morally perfect God is impressed by all and only the good reasons.  What the reasons on the basis of which God created this world are is something largely beyond my ken, though we can say a few standard things about the value of beings that participate in God’s life.

            As a modification of my hypothesis, I should note that it might be that what matters explanatorily is not only the fact of the agent’s being impressed by the reasons, but also the degree to which the agent is impressed by them.  It is easy to modify the account to take this into account, by explaining not just in terms of a set of reasons but in terms of a set of reason-weight pairs.

            There is, still, something uncomfortable about the proposed explanation of libertarian action.  I think a reader is likely to have the sense that while it is correct to say that the choice of graduate school might be explained by what is better for a spouse, even though this factor would have equally been present had a different choice been made, this kind of explanation is explanatorily inferior to, say, deterministic causal explanation or explanation in terms of a necessitating metaphysical principle.  That may be.  But there is no need to take the PSR to say that there is always the best kind of explanation—the PSR I am defending merely says that there is an explanation of every contingent proposition.  And that is all I need for the cosmological argument."

This is more or less my thoughts. It isn’t like God is strictly ordered to a particular good, just like the man who is wise isn’t strictly ordered to the formation of the triangle.

Could you expand that a bit more, Camoden? I guess where I am confused is how we explain a God that is impressed with one set of reasons (as Pruss puts it) for creating world A exists over a God that is impressed by the set if reasons to create world B?

It's a necessary truth that God is impressed by 'set A'? But then that seems to mean that he couldn't have been impressed by 'set B'?

It very well could be in a consequent fashion. It does not follow a world is necessary strictly considered in itself, but it might be given other factors, like God's Wisdom. This at the very least provides possible grounding. And what ground's it would be God's Holiness/Wisdom. 
 

Camoden wrote:

Callum wrote:

Also, stressing the intellect as prior to will only seems to push the question back a stage.

God wills the creation of world A -----> explained by God grasping the good of world A -----> explained by?

God grasping the good of world A being a neccessary truth seems to be the only way to terminate the series. Which seems to entail God is not free to will the creation of world B supposing PSR?

Probably God's Essence, which serves as the ultimate standard for gradation. Secondly, there very well could be a regress of reasons here, which is fine because of God's actual infinitude (obviously these reasons would be coextensive with aspects of His being and not quantitative, but in order to avoid the accidental property objection I will refrain).  Leibniz actually addressed this point funnily enough (he was quite good at anticipating objections, I honestly think he was aware of every objection raised against the argument). 

It is on page 2:

http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/leibniz1686b.pdf

So something along the lines of;

God wills the creation of world A ---> explained by God grasping the good of World A ---> explained by God's Essence as Supreme Intellect itself, which is omniscient and a neccessary being?

This works in terminating the explanatory regress without appealing to a brute fact, thus maintaining the PSR.

However, I have trouble seeing why God grasping the good of world A actually explains anything!? Lets start the explanatory chain from the bottom and move up this time;

God is a neccessarily existing Supreme Intellect ---> this means that God is omniscient (he grasps all that is good) ---> God grasps the good of world A ---> God wills the existence of world A.

The problem is that God is omniscient. He also grasps the good of world B, C and D. Supposing God has free will in that nothing external to him or his internal nature compels him to act one way over another, then that second to last link in the chain (God grasps the good of world A) doesn't explain God's willing world A.

God essentially grasps the good of world A, B, C and D but only wills the creation of world A. God grasping the good of world A does not explain His choice to will it over other worlds.

It seems the difficulty is balancing on one hand, the free will of God in that whatever explains his choices don't strictly entail his choices  (which rule out free will) and actually explaining his choice to create the world he has. To actually make it intelligible otherwise you appeal to brute facts.

Dilemma; is the PSR false or is God not free?

Pruss seems to tackle my concerns, but i'm struggling to see what his argument is. Does anyone have any thoughts?

"Granted, it is necessary that God freely chose what to create while he was impressed by R.  Let q be this necessary proposition.  Let p be the BCCF.  Then even though q is necessary, it is contingent that q explains p (or even that q explains anything—for if God created something else, that likely wouldn’t be explained by his being impressed by R, but by his being impressed by some other reason).  And so we can ask why q explains p.

But at least one possible answer here is not particularly difficult.  The question comes down to the question of why God acted on R to make p hold.  But God acted on R to make p hold because he was impressed by R.  And God’s acting on R to make p hold is explained by his making a decision while impressed by R, with its being a necessary truth that God is explained by R and by every other good reason.  So, ultimately, q not only explains p, but also explains why q explains p.  Had God acted on some other reason S that he is also impressed by to make not-p hold, then we could say that this was because he was impressed by S. "

Problem I see is that God is omniscient. He grasps all of the good reasons for anything possible world.

He grasps the good reasons R for creating this world and the good reasons S for not making this world. Pruss seems to be saying God's action to make this world is explained by (i) God impressed by the reasons for creating this world and (ii) God makes a decision when impressed by these reasons.

But, being omniscient, God would also know and be impressed by the reasons not to create this world. I don't see how (i) explains the specific reasons for *this* world being created and (ii) seems to beg the question. We want to know why *this* decision was made over another.