StardustyPsyche wrote:

@Calhoun
SP 1.All change requires locomotion.
"and like I said 1. is false anyway. "
--Can you provide an example of a change that does not require locomotion?

I already did, and I also told you that its the locomotion that requires change, not the other way around, and your conflation of the two claims still didn't go away.
 

Last edited by Calhoun (11/26/2017 12:18 pm)

StardustyPsyche wrote:

@ficino
"But how do we know that the First Way is supposed to require that all the events in the chain occur instantaneously?"
--Because Aquinas allowed for a past eternal universe.  If causation is temporal then a causal regress analysis is temporal.  On a past eternal universe there is no need for a first mover, since in that case the universe has always existed and everything in it has always been moving.

But then, why did Aristotle think he needed a first mover, since he posited an eternal universe? In fact, Aristotle argues the eternity of the universe from the need, he thinks, to posit eternity of motion - in turn, moved by an unmoved mover.

Aquinas cannot have intended to make instantaneous causation a necessary attribute of an entire per se causal series, since as I cited, he gives an example in which causation is not instantaneous: the wood does not become actualized as hot instantly. 

I have no beef with what you say are findings of modern physics, SDP. I continue to think that your arguments will benefit from closer attention to how Aquinas, Ari and also Feser have phrased what they say. I'm an ancient languages guy, not a physics guy, so what I've tried to offer may be irrelevant to your project. Anyway, I look forward to how this thread develops.
 


 

@Calhoun
"I already did"
"duration"
--That's it?  That's your only example of "change" that does not require locomotion?  In what sense does an object change due to "duration"?  How does this supposed example of a non-locomotion change support the First Way, or Second Way, or in any way indicate a flaw in my refutations of Aquinas in #7 and #8 respectively?

@ficino
"But how do we know that the First Way is supposed to require that all the events in the chain occur instantaneously?"
--Because Aquinas allowed for a past eternal universe.  If causation is temporal then a causal regress analysis is temporal.  On a past eternal universe there is no need for a first mover, since in that case the universe has always existed and everything in it has always been moving.


"But then, why did Aristotle think he needed a first mover, since he posited an eternal universe?"
--Because, among his somewhat complicated schemes of sublunary and supralunary motions, Aristotle had the idea that objects would naturally come to rest if not continually acted upon.  I cover in #7 why the First Way makes sense and would be a powerful argument for a first mover if that were the case.

"In fact, Aristotle argues the eternity of the universe from the need, he thinks, to posit eternity of motion - in turn, moved by an unmoved mover."
--Right, on the A-T view the universe and motion are past eternal because a first mover has always acted in the present moment to sustain motion and absent that first mover motion would cease.  Also absent that first mover material would cease to exist.

Feser describes this as material could just "blink out":
12:10 "Regress...existence at any moment...water could blink out, it could be annihilated. It could go from existence to non existence.
There must be something actualizing that water, keeping it in being."

46: Can You Prove God Exists? —Dr. Edward Feser
PatrickCoffin.media
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1hi9cQHHyjg

"Aquinas cannot have intended to make instantaneous causation a necessary attribute of an entire per se causal series, since as I cited, he gives an example in which causation is not instantaneous: the wood does not become actualized as hot instantly"
--It could be thought of as instantaneous by degrees.  Simultaneity of cause and effect does not extend beyond the limit as delta time goes to zero.  In a rough manner of speaking, each small bit of heating does happen in the present moment. 

Heating the wood as a fire grows is somewhat analogous to acceleration.  Maintaining a particular temperature would be somewhat analogous to uniform linear motion.

Acceleration is clearly a temporal process.  To consider a causal series of accelerations one clearly employs a temporal regress analysis.

The question of the hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment is most clearly brought to light by considering uniform linear motion.  Does an object in motion tend to come to rest if not acted upon, or does an object in motion tend to stay in motion if not acted upon?  In the former case a strong argument can be made for the necessity of a hierarchical first mover acting in the present moment.  In the second case there is no such necessity, and the First Way becomes superfluous and needlessly complicated idle speculation.

"I continue to think that your arguments will benefit from closer attention to how Aquinas, Ari and also Feser have phrased what they say."
--I have studied the first way in detail and written many thousands of words on the subject, including careful parsing of sentence structure, counting the number and form of occurrences of words, analyzing the argument using logical notation, analyzing the difference between the because structure and the therefore structure, read what several modern writers have said, and engaged a significant number of people claiming to have various levels of A-T expertise.

Feser had ample opportunity to correct his errors but he chooses not to, so I doubt he will provide any sound analysis of the supposed proofs offered by Aquinas.  But, if you find any such thing please do send me a link.


 

Re: per se series and simultanteity, Feser in his Aquinas pp. 69-71 writes as though a causal series ordered per se will manifest its causal events all at the same time. E.g. p. 71: ". “Causal series ordered per se are paradigmatically hierarchical with their members acting simultaneously.” But he goes on to say that the instrumental nature of the secondary causes is key to the notion of a per se series. Simultaneity is of secondary importance, p. 72. Now that Feser distinguishes between "simultaneous" and "instantaneous" in his Five Proofs, it's not clear to me whether he has refined his position since 2009 or has just gone into more detail.

I have not, however, seen Feser discuss Aquinas' exposition of per se hierarchies as defined by the intentio of the supreme member. Aquinas goes into that aspect of a per se hierarchy in his Comm on the Liber de Causis 1. 

So, in Lib Caus, not only are the operations of subordinate members of a per se causal series determined by the supreme member; they are determined so as to achieve the "intentio" of the supreme member. The general principle that what is caused per se aims at the intention of the agent, and what is accidental is apart from the intention of the agent, is found often, e.g. ST 2a 2ae q. 109 a. 2 ad 2; SCG II.41.8.

Does the picture of per se orders given in Lib Caus cohere with what Aquinas says about such orders elsewhere? Or does Aquinas allow that a causal series ordered per se might be defined by some feature other than the intentio of the supreme member and not by its intention? E.g. defined by simultaneity and not intention?

I have not found such a passage.

What I do find is stuff like this:

De substantiis separatis 15: in causes ordered per se, the closer to the first we find any cause, the greater it is, since it makes other causes to be causes. God therefore is more the cause of all the motions than even the several motive causes themselves are the causes. 
In Arist. Meta. V l. 2: the principal agent acts for its own end, and all secondary causes ordered per se operate for the first cause's end. [This amounts to the "intentio" requirement though does not use the word.]

[ETA: in the Second Way, intention of the supreme cause is contained in the premises when Aquinas introduces efficient causes "ordinatae", in an ordo.  In the First Way, I don't see intention of the first mover contained in the premises. Some sort of simultaneity seems implied in the constant use of present tense verbs, but as I said, the example of heating wood, an instance of alteration, shows that Aquinas thinks a causal event can have a duration.]

Like Aristotle, Aquinas will talk about the "intention of nature" and avoid saying that nature has mind. He says this fairly often so I won't provide citations. Of course, Aquinas also drives nature's intentionality back to God's mind, as in the Fifth Way and elsewhere. I don't try to tackle the question, whether he can elude the accusation that he's smuggling in "mind" already when he invokes "intention." I will just say that I've seen some modern philosophers of science talk about "natural final causality," behind which they refuse to locate a divine mind. 

Last edited by ficino (11/26/2017 3:10 pm)