You would have to say more, as I simply don't see enough matter for a more elaborate response. 
What a silly joke. 

I do apologise for all the crimes against English commited above, and I am prepared to beg forgiveness for any insult of philosophy that we discover in my reply. 
In my defense, however, I'd note that I'm somewhat ill, and hence in a rather diminished mental state. 
I submit that the comment above is not to be fully explained by my temerity, but rather hope and the necessity of exercise. 

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/26/2017 5:13 am)

I apologise if what I wrote is not optimally intelligible, but I've done that in advance already, so..

If by "metaphysical part' you mean some truth that is descriptive of a thing, and it seems to me that you're doing just that, it is necessary to inquire how many distinct realities do you believe to be behind these truths. For your question to make sense, I think, you need to posit more than one, as your difficulty is immediately resolved if you don't posit more than one: whatever a pure act is, it excludes any passive potency, and if you 'locate' both per se existence and actualisation of the series in the same pure act, it cannot have any passive potency at all.

The only way of maintaining that there are two pure acts (actualisation of the movers in a per se series and existing) in the prime mover (conceded to be a 'substance' rather than a merely accidental unity) that I can see is granting composition in Him. If the 'causal' pure act is different from that of existence, but is at the same time dependent on it, it would seem that it has to be an accident of sorts. But it can't be that: any 'real' dependence in this case reduces to being actualised: accidents are really distinct from substances, have their own essences etc., and (a) pure act is not an actualised potentiality. In other words, no accident can be purely actual, hence pure act has to be substantial. That leaves us with the possibility mentioned first: different truths are predicated of the prime mover, they are notionally different, are not synonyms, but there's only one reality to which these correspond.

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/27/2017 8:48 am)

Perhaps you can argue that, but I wonder how you would go about something like that.

I really think that at this point in our discussion I have to ask what you mean by "metaphysical part". The reason is this: what I believe Dr. Feser to be referring to as "part" in his latest book is something belonging to a substance and being essentially relevant for "actualising" (activity), as the final cause is the cause of all causes, and all others are there for the sake of teleological activity. 

For example, my heart is one, and so is my soul, in a different order. The crucial thing about these parts is that their being is caused by the substance: were my heart to be surgically removed, it would cease to be my part. After my death, my soul will no longer be actually informing my body; I am - as a substance - rid of actuality, even if not all of it, and my soul is bereft of actually informing my body. The actuality of these parts is in some way dependent on them being parts of the whole, and hence it is said that parts are in potency to the whole. 

So suppose a candidate for primemovery is moved. Clearly, if it is moved by another, then the regress proceeds. If it is moved by itself, then the only intelligible way that can happen is by having one part move the other. This moving part, if it is not moved itself, is pure act. But if it is, and parts are in potency to the whole, and it is actually a part, then it has to be moved in order to be an actual part of the whole. 
But, then again, if we apply the name of "part" to something that derives no new determination in being joined to the whole, what reason do we have for calling it a part? It is rather a substance with no potentiality. And if you have to further ask if it is possible for there to be some potentiality, to accommodate this, I think, you'll have to posit parts again. But, as I have, I hope, shown, we can't posit any in the real prime mover.

I suspect that I may be missing something, though. Hopefully the intelligility of my writing will improve.

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/28/2017 11:37 am)

I believe that in order to locate these potencies (that have to be potencies, as the 2nd thesis you refer to says) you would have to introduce composition into the prime mover. However, I don't think sense can be made out of the suggestion that pure act is a part of some whole, since in that case it has to have some potency that is actualised with the 'existence' part being in composition with the whole. Neither can I see any sense in a suggestion that a real part of something has no determination of its being in virtue of being a real part, as I said above.

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/28/2017 2:04 pm)

I don't think I'm talking about a anything of peculiar importance to the 'Neo-platonic' argument, as noted  before. What is of importance here, is that parts are -in potency- to the whole.

But let's try something else. We have a candidate for primemovership. In your scenario, it's existence is pure act. In other words, it doesn't have a potential for existence, rather, it's purely actual in this respect to begin with. You then suppose that its actualisation of per se causal series is an accident, a potency actualised, and ask whether this - an other potentials of it - is at all possible.

Let's consider a potential that is irrelevant for the actualisation of potentials in a per se causal series. Suppose a potential of "considering whether or not to specially assist GeorgiusMancz in explaining the argument to RomanJoe" (replace it with whatever you like). Suppose it then actualises this potential.

What you're missing here, perhaps, is that upon this actualisation the prime mover candidate now actually considers the question. But wouldn't it then be true that it now actually -exists- as considering whether or not to give this special assistance?

When I decided to reply to you, I began actualising "GeorgiusMancz replying to RomanJoe". I had the active power to do so, the actualisation of which requires a certain potency in me, and now it is in act. But now I do -exist- as "GeorgiusMancz replying to RomanJoe". I moved, a real potential that -I- had had before was actualised. If this is what you posit in the prime mover, the latter is no more a prime mover than I am. 

You may reply that, unlike myself, the prime mover's existence is pure act. The reason I talk about parts is because I see no way to even begin such an argument without distinguishing parts in the prime mover. One is moved to do that because act and potency are really distinct. But to suggest that one simple pure act (inc. that of existence) is also potency for something else (for some 'futher specified" existence or whatever) is, I believe, to beget a clear absurdity.

But if you introduce parts, you can at least afford one more step. You can say that in the prime mover there's a part that corresponds to its pure act of (mere?) existence, and other parts that correspond to its many (or few) potencies. But this doesn't get you very far, because, again, parts are in potency to the whole. If you insist that the purely actual part doesn't have any actuality in virtue of it being a part, immediately the question arises: why, precisely, do you call this pure act a part?

Last edited by GeorgiusThomas (11/30/2017 4:19 am)