Oh ok, so even if the laws were necessary they would derive their necesitty from God. But would'nt some argue if these mathematical laws of physics are necessary we don't need to further explain them in God?

Would that render the argumenr from contingency false?

A skeptics version of their argument goes like this: ''=12.1599998474121pxIf the universe is consequence of the laws and the laws exist platonically, then the universe is necessary, according to this theory it can happen and anything that can happen will happen. ''

Hi AKG,

AKG wrote:

A skeptics version of their argument goes like this: ''If the universe is consequence of the laws and the laws exist platonically, then the universe is necessary, according to this theory it can happen and anything that can happen will happen.''

As far as I can tell, the latter part of your statement is based on a kind of gambler's fallacy[1]. If I roll a six-sided die a hundred times, it is not the case that every time I roll a 1 it becomes more likely I will later roll a 6. Rather, it is equally probable that I will roll a 1 or a 6 every time I pick up the die for a new toss. Similarly, it does not necessarily follow that if there is indefinite time, everything that can occur must occur (even in a necessitarian universe, all that follows is that what does and will occur must occur).  

For more detailed argumentation and analysis, it would help to have a more specific argument or ontology (which might make an interesting thread in its own right). I don't want to go off the rails arguing about something you're not saying. Though, it looks like you may be going for a mathematical universe ontology. 


[1]As Scott writes, normally one would deal with these types of arguments individually as they're written out in full.
[2]The Third Way defender would probably just reply by arguing for a real distinction between essence and existence in the mathematical entities, and then proceeding with the argument as normal; Aquinas thought there are necessary beings besides God.

Last edited by John West (7/11/2015 7:11 pm)

AKG wrote:

If Aquinas did how is God ultimately the ultimate necessary being and all derive necessity from Him?

This question is a little hard to parse, but if I'm understanding it correctly the answer is that Aquinas didn't mean quite the same thing by "necessary" that you and many others do. The relevant meaning here is something like "having no inherent tendency toward corruption." An angel, for example, is a "necesssary" being for Aquinas because it doesn't have any inherent tendency to degrade and die. But it's not "necessary" in a Leibnizian sense; reality can get along perfectly well without angels, and God can annihilate even an existing angel if He so chooses.* Their necessity in this sense is a part of their nature, which is itself conferred on them by God.

God's own necessity is different, in that it's not conferred on Him by some external source and it can't be taken away. It's "possible" for angels not to exist (although when they do exist, they're "necessary beings"), but it's not "possible" for God not to exist.

(John West may also want to weigh in here with some references to absolute and relative necessity. That's a slightly different but closely related point. Basically, the idea there is that angels exist with "relative necessity" because God has decided that there will be angels, but they don't exist with "absolute necessity" as God does because God could have decided not to make any angels. The stock example, from Aristotle, is that Socrates isn't necessarily sitting, but "Socrates sitting" is necessarily sitting; the former would be absolute necessity, the latter relative or conditional necessity, in the sense that the necessity is conditional on its being assumed or given that Socrates is in fact sitting. Beyond that I'll leave it aside unless you or John would like to follow up on it; its relevance to your present question is only indirect.)

----

* Incidentally, something similar is true of the human soul: it's immortal, which means it has no inherent tendency to die (and is therefore a "necessary being" in the above sense), but God can still annihilate it if He wants to. One objection I've seen people raise against the "annihilationist" view of hell is that the human soul is immortal and therefore can't be destroyed. However, although the Church does teach that annihilation (at least in certain specific versions) is false, this isn't why. God can annihilate even an inherently immortal soul merely by ceasing to maintain it in being.

Last edited by Scott (7/11/2015 3:13 pm)