1 of 1- RomanJoe
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Reductionism and qualitative features
Admittedly I'm not well-versed in current atomic theory, but I have always thought that a seeming proof against reductionism (particularly the atomist brand) is the existence of qualitative features. How can loosely connected swarms of featureless particles ever give rise to the qualitative simplicity of reality? If subatomic particles cannot exhibit redness, then how can one, two, three, four, seven trillion, seven trillion to the tenth power, ever exhibit redness? Now, of course, one can relegate qualitative data to the mind--hence qualia. But is such a move justified? In an attempt to solve the puzzle of qualitative features within a materialist reductionist worldview, the reductionist has to sacrifice the mind--making it the elusive phantom, the immaterial. Any thoughts on my thoughts?
- FrenchySkepticalCatholic
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Re: Reductionism and qualitative features
Part II is interesting.
- seigneur
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Re: Reductionism and qualitative features
FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Part II is interesting.
It may be interesting, but is it true?
The tradition of Scholasticism, following the intuitions of Aristotelian philosophy, saw quality as founded on quantity.
Really? I read the exact opposite in e.g. Grosseteste's On Light.
I want to say in effect that in material things, to a surprisingly large extent, form IS structure.
Maybe read instead Oderberg's article Is Form Structure?
- Timocrates
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Re: Reductionism and qualitative features
Part II is interesting.It may be interesting, but is it true?
The tradition of Scholasticism, following the intuitions of Aristotelian philosophy, saw quality as founded on quantity.
Really? I read the exact opposite in e.g. Grosseteste's On Light.
I want to say in effect that in material things, to a surprisingly large extent, form IS structure.
Maybe read instead Oderberg's article Is Form Structure?
A structure will always be formal. Every configuration of an atom involves a formal part: indeed, whenever we even attempt to define things we include a formal element in the definition.
@RomanJoe
One of the things I love about Scholastic philosophy is its retention of what I believe is the first desire of philosophy: to rest the mind on things that are certain or most certain. Atomism and materialism are hardly certain because we hardly have any insight into these things. Indeed, for epistemology, materialism at least is dangerous: we still don't know the nature of matter and if all of our knowledge actually rests on understanding matter as such then we are basically doomed to radical skepticism. Notions such as form and actuality can give a basis for our knowledge and understanding, which agrees with common sense: it explains how we can actually know things, however limited or partial this understanding might be. Aristotle I believe rightly uses artifacts as an obvious example and instance of material forms: without it language, e.g., would be impossible and meaningless.
There is a reason, in my opinion, why Boethius took consolation in philosophy. We are rational animals and we desire to know.
It always astonishes me how alike we are today to the early Greek thinkers: we constantly regurgitate their ideas and their thinking. But there is a difference: back then they had the excuse of just learning and ignorance. Today we are closer to senility when we entertain some of those ideas seriously: we are positively childish. The fact we are told to think of the whole universe as a product of random chance and accident borders on madness: it is the same as taking seriously typhoons crashing into Chinese junkyards and producing fully operational jumbo jets.
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- SteveK
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Re: Reductionism and qualitative features
Now, of course, one can relegate qualitative data to the mind--hence qualia. But is such a move justified?
This doesn't do anything to resolve your fundamental question. All you've done is moved 'redness' to the mind. If 'redness' exists, then it exists no matter where or how it exists.
- RomanJoe
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Re: Reductionism and qualitative features
Now, of course, one can relegate qualitative data to the mind--hence qualia. But is such a move justified?
This doesn't do anything to resolve your fundamental question. All you've done is moved 'redness' to the mind. If 'redness' exists, then it exists no matter where or how it exists.
I agree. I'm concerned with whether or not fundamental particles can give rise to the simplicity of redness. It seems impossible. Though perhaps some may argue that qualia like redness is epiphenomenal and can somehow rise out of a specific structure of fundamental particles.
Last edited by RomanJoe (12/30/2017 6:20 pm)
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