Huh? The misunderstanding seems to be coming from one poster, SP, and he seems to misunderstand both elementary physics and Thomistic metaphysics. Indeed, he seems to have some real problems with basic reasoning, as well. Take this gem:

​

Do you realize that Feser brings to you the idea that to account for no change in the existence of mass/energy there is an invisible being that is continuously changing everything in the universe in just the right way so as to provide us all with the illusion that nothing in the universe changes in the respect of material existence?

​This is transparently fallacious, moving illicitly as it does from there being no change in one respect (the overall conservation of mass/energy - allowing for now SP is correct about the relevance and meaning of this) to there being no change at all.

SP has changed his argument many times - like Don Jindra and some other gnu trolls he seems to be able to drop, subtly or not so subtly, his points and take up others without acknowledgement this is what he is doing, always maintaining the same conclusion though. But his current argument is so idiotic you'd think even he would be embarrased about it. He is claiming that the fact the law of the conservation of energy/mass means there is no change in the overall amount of energy/mass in the universe, this means there is no change simpliciter. This is absurd. How would the conservation of energy/mass rule out changes in place, quality, substance, etc.? And that is without getting into the discussions about the exact status of the aw of conservation of energy/mass. 

nojoum wrote:

I think I have enough knowledge to more or less have a feeling for Aquinas' metaphysics and I can assuredly say that I have a very good grasp of physics due to my university education. The point is that the picture that classical physics draw is so radically different than Thomistic metaphysics.I cannot believe that anyone with an understanding of classical physics would not face serious problems with Thomistic metaphysics. On othe other hand, the people here who have studied Aquinas' metaphysics seem to have no or little grasp of classical physics. So you have this constant clash because none of the sides really understand the framework of each others' point of view. I think its better for physicsts to go do academic philosophy or philosopher to go and do academic physics.

How familiar are you with contemporary Aristotelian philosophy?
 

DanielCC wrote:

nojoum wrote:

I think I have enough knowledge to more or less have a feeling for Aquinas' metaphysics and I can assuredly say that I have a very good grasp of physics due to my university education. The point is that the picture that classical physics draw is so radically different than Thomistic metaphysics.I cannot believe that anyone with an understanding of classical physics would not face serious problems with Thomistic metaphysics. On othe other hand, the people here who have studied Aquinas' metaphysics seem to have no or little grasp of classical physics. So you have this constant clash because none of the sides really understand the framework of each others' point of view. I think its better for physicsts to go do academic philosophy or philosopher to go and do academic physics.

How familiar are you with contemporary Aristotelian philosophy?
 

I dont know about contemporary Aristotelian philosophy. I was exposed to the Aristotelian philosophy in Feser's TLS. The problem was that due to my background in physics even the notion of actuality and potentiality seems so strange. I am even tempted to say that it is irrelevant. So if such a basic notion can be so problematic, then I guess the rest would not be any better. I;m not claiming that modern physics got it right and thomistic metaphysics is wrong. I don't have a slight authority to make such claim. It is just that at least on the surface they seem so incompatible.

Just to be clear, I have studied engineering and currently swamped in quantum mechanical simulations using which you basically can predict the behvaiour of any given arrangement of material if it is within the computational power.( offcourse there are cases where simulations are wrong, even simulations of water has problems but there are groups of materials for which certain properties can be calculated accurately)

Last edited by nojoum (12/21/2017 5:47 pm)

Nojoum,

I think Lloyd Gerson, in his Plotinus, succinctly states why some notion of potency seems essential:

​Surely, though, the Stoics could reject the legitimacy of the concept of potency all together. But this entails a rejection of a real distinction between potency and actuality. Then, in referring to the present in relation to the future, there is no way to distinguish non-arbitrarily what something has the potency for being what something does not have the potency for being. Every moment should be a total surprise, because nothing that was a moment ago has any relevance to what is going to be.

​Physics and metaphysis are distinct levels of analysis. The physicist qua physicist doesn't worry about things like basic accounts of causation. He assumes them. If you pick up any introductory textbook on metaphysics, you'll see that, though it might refer to scientific issues and evidence, it deals with metaphysical questions, not scientific ones, and often in language and concepts that would mean little to a physicist. If the mere difference in levels of analysis and language were enough to signify a fundamental clash in approaches, this would apply to all metaphysics, not just A-T. That the physicist has no interest or knowledge of the distinction between act and potency means little, at least until you can show the conflict is a real one between the the substance of modern physics and A-T metaphysics.
 

nojoum wrote:

Its a bit more complicated than that Jeremy. For example on the issue of change, the whole point was that you could not have something coming out of nothing and so Aristotle came up with potentiality. A physicist would simply say that quantum mechanics dictate how matter interacts and thus what you see is just the working of qunatum mechanics. It's just how this matter behaves if certain conditions are provided. In a simple case a physicist would say that matter exists, there is no experiment showing matter going out of existence, so why should one give an account why matter exists? Of course, I agree that there should be a starting point,(there should be self-sufficient thing). However, a physicist would simply say that matter is self-sufficient. It maybe the atom or quarks or what have you, we might not even be able to know that there is actually something smaller than quarks but a physicist would say then that thing is the self-sufficient being and thus all we see is just the interaction of these smallest beings. 
 

I'm not quite sure what you're getting at. Your physicist here seems largely not to be operating as a physicist but as a metaphysician, and a bad one. Statements like matter is self-sufficient (I'm not sure what this means) are metaphysical ones, not scientific. I'm also not sure how this would explain (metaphysical, not scientific) issues like explaining causation and change. Besides, A-T gives arguments precisely why matter is not self-sufficient (if the meaning is that matter alone can explain change or its own existence). This metaphysical physicist would have to respond to them, not dismiss them. How has this physicst refuted Gerson's point?

By the way , I added to that post you quoted:

If you pick up any introductory textbook on metaphysics, you'll see that, though it might refer to scientific issues and evidence, it deals with metaphysical questions, not scientific ones, and often in language and concepts that would mean little to a physicist. If the mere difference in levels of analysis and language were enough to signify a fundamental clash in approaches, this would apply to all metaphysics, not just A-T. That the physicist has no interest or knowledge of the distinction between act and potency means little, at least until you can show the conflict is a real one between the the substance of modern physics and A-T metaphysics.