I think that ironically consciousness is the main problem for materialism if one endorses a teleologically 'rich' view of matter a la C.B. Martin and other naturalistic Aristotelians. On hindsight I wonder if Feser's claim in his Philosophy of Mind that the problems of consciousness reduce to the problems of intentionality were not some what tactical (because if he admitted they were a problem it would cause problems for the Thomistic tripartite theory of soul). 

I don't think the A-T- account of mind really provides a convincing or even fully fleshed out account of how phenomenal consciousness can be built up out of non-conscious processes. I'd need to re-read books on the subject but two immediate persisting problems would be the unity of conscious and the endurance of the ego over time.

The Thomistic theory of cognition is riddled with problems or at least inadequacies (that is points which may be right but need a hell of a lot more fleshing out). For instance what does it mean to say a form exists in the mind? Or, even worse, the Imagist elements in their account of singular cognition.

surroundx wrote:

Whatever the epistemic difficulties in trying to give a materialistic account of consciousness, I don't at all see how positing immateriality offers any explanatory benefits whatsoever. That's my two cent(ence)s.

 
They’re not just epistemic problems; they’re metaphysical problems, The idea is that matter *on the materialistic* conception can’t account for consciousness even in principle. Asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a metaphysical argument are is kind of like asking what the “explanatory benefits” of a mathematical theorem are. The argument either works or it doesn’t.

But that’s not what the OP is talking about. I think the OP pretty much presupposes a non-materialistic conception of matter, but then asks if those aspects of minds that are material on the Aristotelian really are so.

RomanJoe wrote:

I really want to better understand the mind from an A-T view. My initial reactions when I first came across A-T accounts of mental experience, and how it supposedly doesn't fall victim to the hard problem of consciousness, is that it really is just a form of epiphenomenalism, no? Certain material forms can generate a rush of mental experience (qualia, intentionality, privacy) and these mental experiences can't be assessed empirically like  the third-person motions of material processes.

 
I’m no expert, but I doubt Thomists would consider it epiphenomenalism, not with the four causes system and all. I could be wrong, but under epiphenomenalism it would then basically be a part of the material cause or at least subordinate to it.

The material cause of consciousness would be the neurons involved in it, the efficient cause whatever happened to bring the neurons into existence...So we still have the formal and final causes, which are not somehow less important (which they would be if epiphenomenalism were true).

Dry and Uninspired wrote:

RomanJoe wrote:

I really want to better understand the mind from an A-T view. My initial reactions when I first came across A-T accounts of mental experience, and how it supposedly doesn't fall victim to the hard problem of consciousness, is that it really is just a form of epiphenomenalism, no? Certain material forms can generate a rush of mental experience (qualia, intentionality, privacy) and these mental experiences can't be assessed empirically like  the third-person motions of material processes.

 
I’m no expert, but I doubt Thomists would consider it epiphenomenalism, not with the four causes system and all. I could be wrong, but under epiphenomenalism it would then basically be a part of the material cause or at least subordinate to it.

The material cause of consciousness would be the neurons involved in it, the efficient cause whatever happened to bring the neurons into existence...So we still have the formal and final causes, which are not somehow less important (which they would be if epiphenomenalism were true).

 
From what I remember, according to a standard A-T view, or at least Feser's interpretation, what we perceive as qualia would be real accidental features of substances, so it would be part of the formal cause I presume. I think it makes sense, and at least it is, to my mind, the best "natural" explanation one could give to qualia.

It's interesting to see different perspectives on the subject. While I am a committed hylemorphist, I recognize that "Cartesian" dualism still has very able defenders; Karl Popper, Swinburne, Goetz, Collins, etc. Fr. Robert Spitzer in particular defends what he calls "trialist interactionist hylomorphism", in which he complements John Eccles's later model of interactionism with a hylomorphism inspired by Bernard Lonergan and Polanyi. Although I don't know many details.

A small problem I have with hylemorphic dualism -- or at least Feser's view -- is that its view of the afterlife seems a little too limited without miraculous interference. Basically, I agree with this assessment: https://thomism.wordpress.com/2016/03/27/the-survivalism-debate/ It could be that Aquinas's own development leaves more room for a more robust view of the afterlife that does not depend on divine intervention. This may seem like a minor detail for some people, like I'm trying to square the immortality that follows from our rational nature with traditional Christian accounts of immortality, which seem a little more robust. But I think we have independent reason for accepting this kind of afterlife, apart from Christian revelation: I think St Anselm's argument for immortality is a plausible one. There's also the data of veridical NDEs. Although these are compatible with Feser's account of the afterlife, they seem more easily suited for a *naturally conscious* afterlife. I don't think it's a big problem, but I think it's a way Feser's view can be criticized.

A related problem for a Cartesian view which would treat consciousness as transphysical would be the possible implication that animals have natural immortality, too, which seems weird. That's one of the reasons that made Descartes take the (obviously nuts) position that animals are like "machines". Not to mention the interaction problem, among others.

And about materialism and consciousness, I agree with Dry's assessment of the qualia issues as metaphysical problems. I think it's irrelevant whether or not "immateriality" gives a particularly satisfactory explanation or not; the problem is rather that we know materialism cannot even in principle explain or accomodate for consciousness (contra McGinn's mysterianism too); knowledge arguments, zombie arguments, Nagel's arguments, they all show that there is no logical supervenience between qualia facts and physical facts.

Last edited by Miguel (1/11/2018 9:08 pm)