You never responded to my objections tho.

Anyway, do you have the Metaphysics of Sabzavari? Please share his argument for the distinction between Essence and Existence; there are never enough arguments for contingency, in my view

Another good read. Was pleased to read the capabilities of Aristotelianism to uphold disjunctive effects. What do you think of Feser's reply to Oerter regarding the substantial form/nature of the helium (or Hydrogen, i forget) to decay with the probability it does as a good example?

Also (for all us PSR junkies) Pruss has a new book on neccessary existence coming out in March. Hopefully original work has been done.

A quick response:

A;though I didn't go into it any further in the essay Scotus also gave interesting arguments for restricting the principle of motion to substances coming into existence. There's an essay by Peter King on Scotus and self-motion, which is worth reading though migraine inducingly dense. The way Thomist present it too often implies that the theory of act and potency or powers properties stands or falls with it.

Incidentally I would recommend those interested in natural theology check out Emanuel Rutten's A Critical Assessment of Contemporary Cosmological Arguments: His contention that the Gale-Pruss PSR and by extent all stronger variants commit one to Molinism is the most interesting critique of PSR arguments I have yet seen from a modern philosopher.

Nice article. Reading your own posts I'm coming to think I'm more and more willing to affirm necessitarianism, as it seems to allow for an A-T approach more consistent with my own views and I've never found anything objectionable about determinism in any event. And it seems to me if determinism is unobjectionable, then so is necessitarianism. One interesting thing is that your view of Aquinas's thoughts on free will seem very similar to mine; I was reading him an an economist versed in rational choice theory, and when one reads Aquinas saying the will is ordered to the good based on what the intellect affirms as good, it starts sounding very much like rational choice theory because (on that view) there's little sense to be made of an individual choosing something that wouldn't maximize their happiness (or utility, etc.) given their preferences, the information presently available to them, etc. Ed himself says something broadly similar to this in his article "Being, the Good, and the Guise of the Good" I think, when he specifically says Aquinas has a 'thin' conception of the good w.r.t. the will being ordered to the good.

Last edited by UGADawg (1/21/2018 10:58 pm)

Freakazoid wrote:

Just out of curiosity, what is your specific take on powers and dispositions?

I endorse 1B and have reservations about 1C (more specifically I reject the concept of prime matter both as individator and principle of 'physicality').

Freakazoid wrote:

Didn't you say before that a broadly Aristotelian view on change and causality on would support the First Way?

I think a generic First Cause cosmological argument a la the Second Way follows from most Aristotelian accounts which don't permit cyclical causation. What such an account - the powers account - gives us is a theory of causation on which that phenomena is both objective and necessary.

Note though that if one has a powers theory of modality and is willing to accept a couple of additional fairly modest premises (the worst would be axiom S5 but that might be avoidable too) then one already has a strong argument for an omnipotent necessary being.