Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum » Specified geographical location as a requisite of causation?

surroundx · 1/19/2018 8:26 am

bmiller wrote:
It meant to establish that if it is said that "nothing" separates A from B, then A and B are at least touching with no space between them. If space separates A from B then there is more than just their own boudaries that separate them. That's all. That *nothing* is different from empty space which is different from material objects.

Well I'd say that empty space is a qualified negation, the lack of something specific, namely material objects. So although no thing separates them, nevertheless they really are separate; there is discontinuity of extension, in virtue of the unactualised potential for more material objects to exist. (continued below)

bmiller wrote:
Please tell me why you think the extent of space is infinite.

To be honest I'd prefer not to use the term 'extent', as it might appear that I'm trying to piggyback on the legitimate notion of extension to make my case. Something colloquial like "goes on forever" would be more fitting.

Space, and here I'm not just talking about "empty space" (which is a qualified negation), is a universal negation: nothingness. And thus has no extension and no limits. There is nothing to stop you from actual locomotion in a fixed direction forever. There is no finite upper limit to the quantity of extension that may be instantiated at a given instant. For any finite number of existing objects, another object could always begin to exist and thus take up more previously empty space.

Do you think that an actual infinite is metaphysically possible?

bmiller · 1/19/2018 10:48 pm

surroundx wrote:
Space, and here I'm not just talking about "empty space" (which is a qualified negation), is a universal negation: nothingness. And thus has no extension and no limits. There is nothing to stop you from actual locomotion in a fixed direction forever. There is no finite upper limit to the quantity of extension that may be instantiated at a given instant. For any finite number of existing objects, another object could always begin to exist and thus take up more previously empty space.

Are you saying that *space* = nothingness? And there are different version on nothingness? Some versions qualified and some unqualified?

Sorry, having a hard time following your theory. Is there something I should read to get a background?

surroundx wrote:
Do you think that an actual infinite is metaphysically possible?

I can't answer you unless I understand what what you think *nothing* and *infinite* mean.

surroundx · 1/19/2018 11:04 pm

bmiller wrote:
Are you saying that *space* = nothingness? And there are different version on nothingness? Some versions qualified and some unqualified?

Space=nothingness. In a possible world in which only a single quark exists, then only a single quark exists. There are no necessary prior conditions for it's existence (viz. no ontic need for space).

Take the sentence "space is empty". Space is the subject and empty is the predicate. Thus I have made a qualification. And the same goes for occupied space. Nothingness is a universal negation and hence unqualified. But if you bring material objects into the picture then you begin to talk about empty and occupied space, and hence qualify space in virtue of the things predicated of it.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic · 1/20/2018 9:41 am

surroundx wrote:
In a possible world in which only a single quark exists, then only a single quark exists. There are no necessary prior conditions for it's existence (viz. no ontic need for space).

Hmm, is it correct thus to say "in which"? And not "composed by"? Because in a world with only one single quark, said quark can't move; unless we allow space to be in too.

Secondly, I'm not sure if we can go on "in a world in which only a single quark exist". It's not rightly conceivable (per Anscombe).

bmiller · 1/20/2018 10:56 pm

surroundx wrote:
Space=nothingness.

surroundx wrote:
Take the sentence "space is empty". Space is the subject and empty is the predicate. Thus I have made a qualification.

But then the first quote qualifies space just as much as the second since space is the subject and nothingness is the predicate.
"Space is nothingness"
"Space is empty"
Are grammatically the same.

And as Frenchy points out, in a world in which there is only a quark and nothing else, how could it be said to move?

surroundx · 1/20/2018 11:27 pm

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Hmm, is it correct thus to say "in which"? And not "composed by"? Because in a world with only one single quark, said quark can't move; unless we allow space to be in too.

Technically you can't say "composed by/of" because the world wouldn't be composed, it would be simple (viz. a single existent "in" it).

Space simply is the absence of material objects. So said quark can move if it is the efficient cause of it's own locomotion.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Secondly, I'm not sure if we can go on "in a world in which only a single quark exist". It's not rightly conceivable (per Anscombe).

I haven't read anything by Anscombe on Hume's conceivability argument, I've only heard second-hand remarks, so you'll have to elaborate.

surroundx · 1/20/2018 11:47 pm

bmiller wrote:
But then the first quote qualifies space just as much as the second since space is the subject and nothingness is the predicate.
"Space is nothingness"
"Space is empty"
Are grammatically the same.

No, they are different. In the sentence "space is nothingness", the predicate "is nothingness" establishes co-reference. In the sentence "space is empty", the predicate "is empty" modifies the subject by informing us that (the) space is not currently occupied by a material object.

bmiller wrote:
And as Frenchy points out, in a world in which there is only a quark and nothing else, how could it be said to move?

In which sense? You doubt that it can be the efficient cause of its own locomotion? There is nothing for it to move through? There is no other material object to detect its relative locomotion? If the latter, that is an epistemic point, not an ontic one.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic · 1/21/2018 8:57 am

surroundx wrote:
Technically you can't say "composed by/of" because the world wouldn't be composed, it would be simple (viz. a single existent "in" it).

Correct.

surroundx wrote:
FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Secondly, I'm not sure if we can go on "in a world in which only a single quark exist". It's not rightly conceivable (per Anscombe).
I haven't read anything by Anscombe on Hume's conceivability argument, I've only heard second-hand remarks, so you'll have to elaborate.

Basically, Anscombe attacked Hume on "we can imagine a ball popping into reality". Anscombe said that this is not possible, as we can't find a difference from this scenario and "a ball popping into reality from another universe" and all, because we can't conceive it at all. I suspect your scenario to be the same, and I'm going to expand why.

surroundx wrote:
Space simply is the absence of material objects. So said quark can move if it is the efficient cause of it's own locomotion.

No, they are different. In the sentence "space is nothingness", the predicate "is nothingness" establishes co-reference. In the sentence "space is empty", the predicate "is empty" modifies the subject by informing us that (the) space is not currently occupied by a material object.

In which sense? You doubt that it can be the efficient cause of its own locomotion? There is nothing for it to move through? There is no other material object to detect its relative locomotion? If the latter, that is an epistemic point, not an ontic one.

Well, in said universe, it's not just a quark. You're saying that there is a quark, plus the possibility of having other objects, or, in a different saying, such a quark being in a different position than what it is (since you're allowing motion); meaning that this universe actually contains a quark... and something else, perhaps a potentiality, space, whatever you mean it, but it's that something we're all interested about in this discussion.

Speaking about motion, this is where I start having other problems : since that universe is simple, then motion there is impossible. Indeed, even if I speak about what you call locomotion (... that terms make me suspicious about your identity, though...) then it's locomotion in regards of something. If there is only a quark, then to what this quark is moving? From what? Do we need to posit absolute space or absolute references in order to allow motion? If that's the case, the example backs to showing that space is something positive in addition to be the negation of things.

And the last hint from Anscombe would be that, even if what could be called motion in that universe is coherent, it doesn't show anything about what we can experience here and now, unless we posit that there is something in common with our universe.

Last edited by FrenchySkepticalCatholic (1/21/2018 8:59 am)

surroundx · 1/22/2018 9:04 am

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Basically, Anscombe attacked Hume on "we can imagine a ball popping into reality". Anscombe said that this is not possible, as we can't find a difference from this scenario and "a ball popping into reality from another universe" and all, because we can't conceive it at all. I suspect your scenario to be the same, and I'm going to expand why.

This came up in the Unbelievable debate between Feser and Arif Ahmed. Did Anscombe really say "from another universe", or something more like "from another part of the universe"? The notion of multiple universes is in conflict with the traditional definition of a "universe" as all of physical/material reality.

I can conceive of a ball popping into reality, as that "popping" is conceivably without prior cause. I certainly wouldn't put that forward as an argument that something can come from nothing, contra Arif Ahmed. But by the same token I don't think Anscombe's critique really hits home.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Well, in said universe, it's not just a quark. You're saying that there is a quark, plus the possibility of having other objects, or, in a different saying, such a quark being in a different position than what it is (since you're allowing motion); meaning that this universe actually contains a quark... and something else, perhaps a potentiality, space, whatever you mean it, but it's that something we're all interested about in this discussion.

I disagree. The actual quark is potentially in another location in virtue of its very nature. Namely, as a locomotive. Assuming of course that it really is a material simple, and that it is one of the types of material simples that innately possess locomotiveness.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
Speaking about motion, this is where I start having other problems : since that universe is simple, then motion there is impossible. Indeed, even if I speak about what you call locomotion (... that terms make me suspicious about your identity, though...) then it's locomotion in regards of something. If there is only a quark, then to what this quark is moving? From what? Do we need to posit absolute space or absolute references in order to allow motion? If that's the case, the example backs to showing that space is something positive in addition to be the negation of things.

Why are you suspicious of my identity? Locomotion is a neutral philosophical, nay colloquial, term.

It seems like you're confusing epistemic objections with ontic ones. We don't need to be able to tell that the quark is moving, as long as it is actually doing so. Anyway the locomotion is accidental. It is the efficient cause of that locomotion that is essential. If we imagine the quark shares the world with some immovable object, then if the quark tries to move through the immovable object any efficient cause that would "normally" result in locomotion will fail to do so.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic wrote:
And the last hint from Anscombe would be that, even if what could be called motion in that universe is coherent, it doesn't show anything about what we can experience here and now, unless we posit that there is something in common with our universe.

I don't see the grounds for the restriction of philosophical import. But at any rate, the commonality is that quarks also exist in this world, and through science we are aware of their essence.

FrenchySkepticalCatholic · 1/22/2018 1:51 pm

surroundx wrote:
Why are you suspicious of my identity? Locomotion is a neutral philosophical, nay colloquial, term.

I know. But the last time someone spoke about locomotion here, it turns out to be one of the worthleast disputes I've ever had - and it's kind of a trigger. Don't let this suspect I hold you in bad regard. ^^'

surroundx wrote:
This came up in the Unbelievable debate between Feser and Arif Ahmed. Did Anscombe really say "from another universe", or something more like "from another part of the universe"? The notion of multiple universes is in conflict with the traditional definition of a "universe" as all of physical/material reality.

I can conceive of a ball popping into reality, as that "popping" is conceivably without prior cause. I certainly wouldn't put that forward as an argument that something can come from nothing, contra Arif Ahmed. But by the same token I don't think Anscombe's critique really hits home.

MBA (my bad argument) : my language being French, I missed the spot. Anscombe meant that sure, we can conceive a ball springing into existence. But can we imagine a ball springing into existence without a cause, as different to springing into existence thanks to magic, or springing into existence thanks to quantum teleportation or anything? We can't. Sure, we can form a picture and give that picture the title; that doesn't mean that it's possible it happens without contradiction or absurdity as holding in reality. Let us not confuse imagination and conceiveability.

You'll see what I mean. I gathered my best drawing skills to give you what I mean here.

surroundx wrote:
I disagree. The actual quark is potentially in another location in virtue of its very nature. Namely, as a locomotive. Assuming of course that it really is a material simple, and that it is one of the types of material simples that innately possess locomotiveness.

It seems like you're confusing epistemic objections with ontic ones. We don't need to be able to tell that the quark is moving, as long as it is actually doing so. Anyway the locomotion is accidental. It is the efficient cause of that locomotion that is essential. If we imagine the quark shares the world with some immovable object, then if the quark tries to move through the immovable object any efficient cause that would "normally" result in locomotion will fail to do so.

Here is the picture. I think our disagreement is the following :

For me, when we say that the universe is only one quark, I'm seeing the left one. Only one quark, with no possibility of motion (no other possible or potential - the only existant is the quark, everything in red doesn't exist, even as potential).
You seem to be arguing the right one.

Correct?

It's to show you that in my view, it's impossible - not as epistemic, but ontologically speaking - to move the quark. If you disagree, I'm curious to what is your point.