So far as location is concerned, that clearly doesn't work. Why delineate particles at one location from adjacent ones?

Otherwise, although your actual position is unclear, but so far as you are arguing for reductionism (i.e., the macroscopic qualities are nothing but the microscopic particles arranged in a certain way), claims about dependence aren't enough. This is why I brought up property dualism. Property dualist functionalism is probably the most popular position today in philosophy of mind, even (or especially) amongst materialist inclined philosophers. Property dualism claims mental qualities supervene on physical ones. That is, the former are entirely causally dependent on the latter. In this case, although my qualitative experience are not reducible to anything physical, they are entirely caused by physical processes, and have no causal power themselves, even between each other. Property dualists acknowledge this doesn't make mental qualities reducible to physical ones. That's why they are dualists, even if often reluctantly so (it is about as close to materialism as you can get whilst admitting that there seem to be irreducibly mental properties). Even if all that you have said about the dependence of macroscopic entities on microscopic ones is true, it doesn't show that the former is reducible to the latter. The pixel example doesn't show reduction. It doesn't show that the other colours are nothing but arrangements of the three primary ones. This is what you have to show, not just causal dependence but identity - that the macroscopic is nothing but the microscopic.

Are you saying that subatomic particles have forms?

It would be misleading, as well, to suggest science has concluded all macroscopic entities are reducible to microscopic ones. This is a metaphysical claim, not a scientific one. It is the result of reading the science a particular way, and generalising from that. It isn't something science has or could conclude.

No offence you're not really taking on board and responding to criticisms. 
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For a start, you continue to ​equate causal dependence and origination with reduction, without taking on board what has been said against doing that. None of your examples are, without addition, of reduction as opposed to causal dependence. They show lower level entities give rise to higher level properties. But that isn't all reduction means. Reduction means that, in some sense, those higher level properties just are the lower level entities. Are you familiar with contemporary philosophy of mind? As I said above, property dualism is probably the most popular position on the mind amongst philosophers, especially amongst materialist leaning philosophers, and at its heart is the distinction between causal dependence and reduction. Property dualists are dualists because they recognise, often reluctantly, there are irreducibly mental properties, but they don't allow these to have any causal power. As is the case with any materialist worth his salt, they only allow the physical to have causal power. This is dependence (supervenience is the technical term) but not reduction. You need to explain how your examples establish reduction or identity, rather than just dependence or supervenience.

Not that you have necessarily shown that macoscopic entities are entirely dependent on microscopic ones. I wonder how, apart from qualia, such a position of yours would, for example, deal with the unity demanded of the human mind if we are to explain things like reason (the argument from reason), intentionality, and unity of consciousness, not to mention that the causal role of mental properties (pace epiphenomenalism - which property dualists are committed to when they deny the mental causal power), including psycho-physical causation, seems to belie complete dependence. Indeed, to note this latter, if what you said were true then it would presumably lead to epiphenomenalism, which is incoherent - if mental properties or substances, like qualia, have no causal power, then we shouldn't even be able to talk about them, yet we can. Similarly, how you'd explain psycho-physical causation, from the relatively well-known but still mysterious placebo effect to the most extraordinary feats of hysterics and hypnotics, if there were entire causal dependence of the mental on the physical, is hard to see.  Science most certainly hasn't shown that all things are at base level reducible to subatomic particles. That is a metaphysical claim that generalises certain aspects of science. It is not a claim natural science does or can make.

​Anyway, you know seem to be agreeing with A-T on forms, in general terms at least, except you deny substantial forms to anything but subatomic particles. As has been said above, such a position, whist implausible, is not necessarily be a denial of A-T forms. Although you were ambiguous earlier, you now seem to have repudiated nominalism.