Related to the topic under discussion and my previous post, I've just learned of the last book by the late philosopher of religion William L. Rowe: "Can God Be Free?" Oxford University Press, 2004. Quoting from the Amazon page:

This book focuses on God's freedom and praiseworthiness in relation to his perfect goodness. Given his necessary perfections, if there is a best world for God to create he would have no choice other than to create it. For, as Leibniz tells us, 'to do less good than one could is to be lacking in wisdom or in goodness'. But if God could not do otherwise than create the best world, he created the world of necessity, not freely. And, if that is so, it may be argued that we have no reason to be thankful to God for creating us, since, as parts of the best possible world, God was simply unable to do anything other than create us―-he created us of necessity, not freely. Moreover, we are confronted with the difficulty of having to believe that this world, with its Holocaust, and innumerable other evils, is the best that an infinitely powerful, infinitely good being could do in creating a world. Neither of these conclusions, taken by itself, seems at all plausible. Yet each conclusion appears to follow from the conception of God now dominant in the great religions of the West.

William Rowe presents a detailed study of this important problem, both historically in the writings of Gottfried Leibniz, Samuel Clarke, Thomas Aquinas, and Jonathan Edwards, and in the contemporary philosophical literature devoted to the issue. Rowe argues that this problem is more serious than is commonly thought and may require some significant revision in contemporary thinking about the nature of God.

I argue that the issue raised by Rowe is solved fully and simply by Christian trinitarian doctrine, according to which:

A. God the Father indeed produced the best possible world that He could: the infinitely perfect divine "world" ad-intra of the Holy Trinity, though He did it not by creation but by eternal emanation or procession, and

B. God the Father eternally generates the Son and spirates with Him the Holy Spirit by necessity of nature (*), not by a libertarian free decision.

So, God the Father indeed cannot do otherwise than produce the best world, which is the divine "world" ad-intra, and He eternally does it by necessity of nature (*).

(*) as opposed to necessity from want or necessity from external imposition.
 

Last edited by Johannes (2/27/2018 3:59 pm)

@Daniel: joewaked referred to the same position of Davies in joe's post above, #85. 

Miguel, you’re saying Fr. Davies’ argument is implausible, not Daniel’s comment (#92), correct?

Yes, I was talking about "Davies's argument", although I'd rather not speak explicitly about fr. Davies because I haven't actually read him. So I was just talking of what has been mentioned here.

If what is being said is that God is not a moral agent in the same way we are, then this is correct: God is Being itself, so He is not good in the same univocal sense that a man is good. But this doesn't mean God is not good, of course; since He is goodness itself, He is good. But when we speak of God, we use analogy, not univocal language.

I do, however, think it is wrong to say God is not morally good full stop. As I said, "moral goodness" cannot be predicated of God in the same univocal sense that we predicate it of people. But it is also not equivocal. I would argue that God *is* morally good, only in a way infinitely greater than any man is morally good.

First, we know that God is goodness itself, because He is Being itself. So God is good. But what is moral goodness? The way I understand it, "moral goodness" is goodness relevant and applied to rational agents. Rational agents can apprehend different goods and choose which to pursue. A morally good man is a man who correctly apprehends what is truly good and in accordance with his being, and chooses what is a true (or higher) good instead of a false (or a lower) good. Thus a (morally) good man seeks and tells the truth instead of spreading lies; helps people and follows his social nature instead of hurting others; etc. Moral goodness is goodness considered in relation to the actions of free, rational agents. But God is a free and rational agent. And God is also good. Therefore God is morally good. And in fact, God will never act against His nature. I don't see how we can avoid this, unless we change the understanding of moral goodness in this context.

Secondly, I mentioned that I find it implausible to suggest God can have *absolutely no* moral duties whatsoever, because, as I said, it seems pretty clear to me that if God promises something to a person, He will be obliged to keep His promise. Won't He? But of course this doesn't mean God has moral duties in the same exact sense we do. I believe God has no natural obligations towards us whatsoever. He keeps us in existence at every instant, we depend on God in an absolute manner not comparable to any natural relationship, so if God wants to take our lives, anihilate us or something else like that, He could do that without failing any obligation. In this sense, I agree that God's mercies are entirely gratuitous (which may be sufficient for Davies's response for the problem of evil, if that's the context). But it doesn't mean that God is not morally good, or, I think, that he can have no moral obligations He chooses to take upon Himself (if He makes a promise, for example). God is morally good, just not in the same exact manner people are morally good; and God can have moral obligations, though very different ones, no natural obligations towards any being other than Himself.

Last edited by Miguel (2/25/2018 9:33 pm)

ficino wrote:

Thank you for your thoughtful answer, Miguel. If Feser and Davies are right to reject Theistic Personalism, can an adequate account of promises be given, if the maker of the promise is personal but not "a person"? I would guess you would say, yes, and construe a denial of "God is a person" differently from, say, a denial that a non-rational being is a person.

 
I second the Thank You to Miguel!

@miguel, when you get a chance, please check your inbox.   Could use your feedback on my last msg to you.