For beings whose essence is distinct from existence: no, because since existence is not part of the essence, there is nothing in them which could keep them in existence; no tendency to continue existing.

For composite things in general: no, because as you said, nothing in the intrinsic principles of a composite being can explain why it continues to exist as that specific whole, precisely because it is composite and the parts themselves can only operate if they themselves are actual/unified. But then a regress ensues. If the parts are not further composites, for instance form and matter: these isolated by themselves are mere abstractions and cannot cause themselves to come together as parts. Same for essence and existence.

When we leave the realm of material beings, which are all composites (of form and matter, or of essence and existence, of act and potenct, or what have you), we'd need parts which are both immaterial *and* capable, by themselves, of causing or explaining the actual conjunction of parts. Abstract objects (such as isolated forms, essences, existences, numbers, etc) can't do this. Whatever accounts for their existence as conjoined wholes must therefore be a mind. But a simple mind, independent of any parts, can only conjoin the abstract parts we were just discussing; it cannot give abstract parts a power to act and cause wholes while remaining abstract. Nothing can do that. That would make no sense. How can you make an abstract, isolated platonic form (or an essence, or an esse) able to somehow operate and call a prime matter (or an act of existence) for itself, which it doesn't even have? Makes no sense. So whenever it exists as a whole, it must be kept in unity like that by something external to itself.

So no, I don't thing anything can give an "impetus for existence" to things which by themselves have nothing to do with existence.

Last edited by Miguel (2/25/2018 4:53 pm)

RomanJoe wrote:

Yes, but also keep in mind that the advocate of existential inertia would agree that the intrinsic principles of a thing are incapable of explaining why something persists in existence--this is precisely why they posit some impetus for existence transferred from a temporally prior cause.

 
Yeah, but my point is that precisely because the intrinsic principles of this thing is incapable of explaining why it persists in existence, so is it not possible for it to receife an "impetus for existence" sufficient to keep what is naturally not-existing in existence. It's an absurd notion.

RomanJoe wrote:

Yes, I understand, something composed of just form and matter has no tendency to exist with regards to the principles of form and matter. Matter is not a positively existing substance without the actualizing form. But form is only an abstraction and not a substance without matter. So we can't look towards form or matter in a substance to explain its tendency to stay in existence--rather, we have to look outside of it, towards something which bestows it existence. But the proponent of existential inertia would just say this outside thing is just an imparted impetus to exist that stays with the substance for some time. Therefore, we don't need look for a concurrent cause. Rather, we just need to know that at some point in the past matter and form became composed into this specific substance by a bestowal of existence via an existential impetus.

So the proponent of existential inertia agrees that matter and form are totally causally impoverished with regards to persistence through existence, and that we have to look to something outside of them to find some thing to explain their persistence. This thing, they would say, is not a concurrent cause (say, another substance composed of form and matter) rather it's the impetus that it received some time ago from a prior substance. 

 
But it makes no sense. Something whose essence is not existence (or a composite of matter and form, or potency and act, etc) cannot be altered in such a way so as to continue existing by itself (existential inertia) since by its very nature it cannot remain in existence without being kept in existence by something else. In other words, they don't even have the potency to have "enduring existence" by themselves even if this "enduring existence" is first given to them by something else. It just doesn't make any sense. It's in their nature to not remain in existence; nothing can change their nature. They are what they are.

If what you're saying is that the proponent agrees, but only says that this composite being is kept in existence by an "existential impetus", then that existential impetus itself is just what we'll call the external cause that keeps them in existence. But then it must be something concrete in order to keep them existing -- we're back at God x regress --, it can't be "enduring existence" as an abstraction. What you're saying is simply unintelligible to me.