This is an argument I came up with a few days ago. I am not completely sure if it's valid or sound, but it seems interesting to me, and very different from standard attempts to derive PSR from PNC.

As it stands, it works better if we use a basic distinction between essence and existence, though it may not be necessary. I use it for convenience. I'll just present it informally in different steps.

1) There is a sense in which everything that exists *must* exist, in order to allow for the tautology that "the existent being exists". This means that any being, as long as it exists at t, *must* exist at t and therefore cannot fail to exist at t.

2) For a contingent being X, this means that X could in principle fail to exist and need not exist, so we may say that X has a "potential to not exist" (although, more appropriately, it would just be that X's potency to exist needs to be constantly actualized). But as long as X exists at t, its potency to not exist cannot be actualized at t. If it could be actualized at t, it means X could both exist and fail to exist at t, which is a contradiction. So X's non-existence must be precluded.

3) For a contingent being X that doesn't have existence as part of its essence (and therefore no inherent tendency to exist), it is only possible for its non-existence to be precluded if there is a cause, an explanation, that effectively is responsible for X's existence at t and therefore precludes X's non-existence at t.

NOTE: None of this implies any sort of necessitarianism; the contingent being "needs" to exist only at t when it is already an existent being, as a result of a cause; it needn't exist before t and neither does it need to exist after t; we could also say that God could have chosen to create a different universe and that different universe would only need to exist posterior (ontologically) to God's creation, at t, so there is no real necessitarianism.

4) So, to recap, a contingent being that exists at t, and therefore cannot not-exist at t, is able to instantiate this state of affairs/have this tautology being really true of itself, only because there is a cause of X at t which therefore precludes X from not-existint at t.

5)A brute thing or fact, however, by definition cannot have a cause. A brute thing Y that exists at t also *must* exist at t, logically, however, how is it able to ensure that it cannot not-exist at t? A contingent being is able to have its non-existence precluded at t because of a cause/explanation of its existence at t. But a brute thing cannot have a cause or any explanation for its existence at t.

6) If there is nothing to preclude the non-existence of a being at t, then it is possible for that being to not-exist at t. Notice how this does not presuppose PSR or PC in any way; I am not treating "nothing" as some sort of strange cause or explanation, or depending strictly on intelligibility instead of non-contradiction; I am just stating the fact that if there isn't anything at all to preclude the non-existence of a being at t, then it is possible for that being to not-exist at t. It cannot be said that, as a matter of brute fact, that being could still have its non-existence precluded if there isn't anything that precludes its non-existence. That would be a real contradiction. So if there isn't anything at all that precludes the non-existence of something at t, that something can fail to exist at t.

7) But recall how the brute thing existing at t doesn't have any cause or explanation for why it exists instead of not existing. It doesn't have anything (like a cause) to preclude its non-existence at t. So, by 6, this would mean that a brute thing existing at t could fail to exist at t. But that's a contradiction!

8) Is there any other option available? Well, one could say that the brute thing Y existing at t has its non-existence precluded by the mere predication of its existence at t. So, Y's existence at t, combined with PNC, ensures that Y cannot exist, retaining coherence.

9) However, what would that even mean of Y? The mere fact that it exists at t would be sufficient to ensure that it doesn't possibly fail to exist at t, without the aid of any external cause whatsoever. That could only be possible, however, if Y were a necessary being. A necessary being existing at t cannot not-exist at t simply because it exists -- it has an inherent tendency to exist, its own essence is existence, all by itself it is able to keep existing.

10) But a brute fact/thing cannot be a necessary being, or that would mean that this brute fact/thing exists because of what it is; there would be an explanation for the existence of the brute thing, to be found in its nature and its inherent tendency to exist. So a brute fact/thing can't be necessary and must be contingent.

11) The brute thing cannot have its non-existence at t precluded simply by the fact that it exists, for that would mean that it has an inherent tendency to remain in existence, that its own nature tends to exist -- which would make it a necessary being, not a brute thing/fact.

12) It also cannot be said that the brute thing has its non-existence precluded at t simply because of PNC, because what has its non-existence precluded because of PNC would be a necessary being, which a brute fact can't be.

13) So a brute fact/thing doesn't have anything at t that precludes its non-existence at t, when it exists.

14) So it is possible for the brute thing to both exist and not-exist at t, which is a contradiction.

15) Therefore brute facts/things are impossible. QED.


What do you guys think? The latter steps would be the most controversial ones, I assume. As of now, I think it works. But I'm not completely sure either; I may be a little biased since it's my argument.

Any comments?

Last edited by Miguel (1/25/2018 12:29 pm)