- Miguel
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
UGADawg wrote:
1 - Generally, because it's hard to see how you could have a complete explanation obtain without the explanandum obtaining as well.
2 - But that's the whole point, and in fact it's exactly what many philosophers have said: no matter how strong our intuitions are that things that exist must have explanations, our intuitions that things could be otherwise are stronger. Therefore, ~PSR.
3 - But this is because you're conflating two different perspectives on modality, i.e. the possible worlds one with the more classical one.
4 - Because possible worlds necessitarianism is completely consistent with classical theism, unless you insist classical theism must take a libertarian view on free will (which, to be clear, I find borderline incoherent as well).
6 - Well, it's how I've seen it described in several of the articles I've read. And I'm not sure what's so frightfully difficult about understanding how a finite good could entail our choice: if you have a well-behaved preference function, then, given the constraints you face, there's only going to be one option that any instrumentally rational agent would take. Re: libertarian free will, the problem is just that there's no adequate explanation for why one alternative is taken rather than another. Saying it's self-explanatory is, in my view, just a complete non-explanation.
Edit: In fact, I'd probably say if finite goods couldn't determine our choices, I'd be very worried about whether I have free will: if I prefer a given choice to all others in a given context, and that choice is indeed within my capabilities to bring about, yet it's still possible I don't take the action, something seems to have gone amiss.
1- That's simply dubious. As I said, without that specific understanding of PSR, most objections to libertarianism seem to just fall apart. It is plainly possible for a genuine explanation to not entail its explanandum, as is possible for a contingent free action to be self-explanatory.
2- True, but that's (again!) presupposing that an explanans must entail its explanandum or that there are no contingent self-explained facts. And how is this to be of any help to someone who affirms necessitarianism? The fact philosophers are generally willing to sacrifice PSR (even though they understand it wrong) just to preserve contingency in the universe just shows how necessitarianism is unacceptable given our most basic modal intuitions.
3- Am I? How can it even be possible for a being whose essence is distinct from existence to exist in all possible worlds? How is it possible for a composite being to exist in all possible worlds? If a being's essence is distinct from its existence, at least in principle the the being can possibly fail to exist; in other words, there will be possible worlds in which it does not exist. And if a being is composite, it is in principle possible for its parts to be separated, in which case there are possible worlds in which such composite being does not exist. Or it would be meaningless to take it as a composite being.
4- I'd rather not speak for "classical theism". I think classical theists should affirm libertarian free will, but from that point I don't necessarily argue that there can be no compatibilist classical theists. But it does seem terribly bizarre to me. And I think there is a very serious problem for the anti-libertarian when we consider that God created contingent beings. (1) How could God in any way possible be determined to create anything at all? That God did not have to create the world, and that he could instead have chosen to not create anything at all, is a very common position among classical theists. And how can we even make sense of the idea that God, who is perfectly unconditioned, who is sufficient to Himself, could ever be determined in any way to create the world? (2) That being said, I think there are also problems with the idea that God necessarily creates the world, and yet the world is contingent (so the thesis would be parasitic upon necessitarianism, which to me is false because of other reasons such as 2 and 3).
6- The problem is that a finite good, precisely because it is finite, can never be sufficient to determinately move a rational will. The rational will is repelled by any finite good inasmuch as it is finite, and even an analysis such that "X is a bigger finite good than Y so John was DETERMINED to choose X" seems unintelligible, as X would on,y be *finitely* better than Y, so its "being better than" cannot determinately move a rational will (who is repelled by finiteness). It can attract it, but it can never sufficiently necessitate the will to choose it, since there will always be something repelling about it; and it is completely unintelligible to say that a rational will is necessarily attracted by something which repels it. To put it differently, the deterministic attraction implies something like a limitless or an irresistible force, but the finiteness to the rational will can only be an immovable object. It would be like saying that a perfect thing has such and such flaws but is still perfect anyway. It makes no sense, and blurs the distinction between finite and infinite goods. A rational will *cannot* be determinately moved by a finite and imperfect good. It would be an unintelligible brute fact.
Meanwhile, the whole criticism against libertarianism rests on a dubious (and I would say clearly false) assumption that an explanans must entail its explanandum.
Last edited by Miguel (3/03/2018 9:40 pm)
- RomanJoe
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
Renki's leg?
- Jeremy Taylor
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
Sorry, a typo. I meant Runki's leg. Runki was a famous example of a drop-in communicator in cases of mediumship. That is, a communicator who is unknown to any present at a séance, and whose need to communicate seems stronger than the medium's desire to provide a message from that particular person. Stevenson investigated the case, and here is his original case study:
I would say, absent any a priori metaphysical commitments, a case like this does seem like plausible evidence for some kind of supernatural or paranormal phenomena. But beyond that it is notoriously hard to go based just on empirical evidence. In the case of Runki's leg, a paranormal explanation seems the most plausible but whether that should be interpreted as evidence of the existence of a disemobdied soul (or perhaps parts of it) or some kind of super-psi or even demons is very hard to say. The same goes for cases like Stevenson's reincarnation case studies. This is why I think miraculous and paranormal phenomena (taken as a whole) are good, but not cast-iron, arguments against materialism, but they are far less clearly arguments against atheism.
- Callum
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
No but I don't think the atheist has to discredit the *direct* evidence of a hypothesis (miracle, psychical whatever) in order to reject it if the prior probability is so overwhelmingly low. The direct evidence will need to be very strong to overcome the priors.
I'm not aware of the work of Braude etc so can't comment but with these issues it has to come down to the specifics. There may well be extremely strong evidence which *by itself* is enough to show materialism/naturalism/atheism Or whatever the case may be.
In most cases, some kind of hypothesis can be provided to account for the data even if another hypothesis is much more expected on the data. But if the prior probability is extremely low for the leading hypothesis, it won't be clear which one to prefer.This is obviously a popular sceptical position, going back at least to Hume. But it usually means little more than dogmatically asserting materialism. It is hard to see why someone without an a priori commitment to materialism would accept this position. It is rightly considered the hall-mark of pseudo-scepticism.
If one tries to leave aside, as far as possible, all background metaphysical positions, I think there are clear cases where paranormal explanations seem the most plausible - the famous case of Runki's leg, for example. We cannot be certain, of course, but what have been called the normal explanations (fraud, coincidence, etc) can be ruled out, as can the abnormal ones (multiple personalities, cryptomnesia, etc).
No it's Bayes theorem. Hume's understanding of probability was far weaker than even that of his contemporaries. As long as the prior probability isn't zero, the direct evidence can in fact overcome it and give a high posterior probability of the hypothesis being true. However, I do question if there ever are such cases in practice. What should happen in conjunction is an attack on the prohibitively low priors (materialism isn't justified). Of course, in theory I agree with you. In practice though, I think it's rare to have strong evidence that cannot be interpretated to some degree in other schools of philosophy (and remember, if the evidence in question is the *only* reason the materialist is being given to question his position, his prior for the psychical event will be so low that some half assed hypothesis which explains half the data may still have a posterior probability equal to the psychical hypothesis(
- Jeremy Taylor
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
I see what you mean, but in that case it would depend upon the reasons the materialist has for their own position. In general, the materialist doesn't have conclusive arguments for his position, rather he appeals to considerations like parsimony, etc.
I think the actual way careful investigation and consideration of these cases would tend to pursue them is in a way relatively unhindered by metaphysical presuppositions. The investigator would form some sort of intuition of where the complex and multifarious evidence points. This is the approach of people like William James, C. D. Broad, and Braude, who tried to look at these issues empirically. Because To overrule this intuition you'd need strong metaphysical arguments to the contrary. As noted, I don't think materialists generally put forward such arguments. I don't think banging on about Occam's Razor or the threat to science or the importance of methodological naturalism would be anywhere near strong enough, especially if we are talking about the entirety of strong miracle/paranormal cases. Indeed, most Western materialists and naturalists are in a peculiarly weak position, because they tend to ground their position mostly on a rejection of the alternatives, and because they are so keen to take an empiricist approach.
- Callum
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
I see what you mean, but in that case it would depend upon the reasons the materialist has for their own position. In general, the materialist doesn't have conclusive arguments for his position, rather he appeals to considerations like parsimony, etc.
I think the actual way careful investigation and consideration of these cases would tend to pursue them is in a way relatively unhindered by metaphysical presuppositions. The investigator would form some sort of intuition of where the complex and multifarious evidence points. This is the approach of people like William James, C. D. Broad, and Stephen, who tried to look at these issues empirically. Because To overrule this intuition you'd need strong metaphysical arguments to the contrary. As noted, I don't think materialists generally put forward such arguments. I don't think banging on about Occam's Razor or the threat to science or the importance of methodological naturalism would be anywhere near strong enough, especially if we are talking about the entirety of strong miracle/paranormal cases. Indeed, most Western materialists and naturalists are in a peculiarly weak position, because they tend to ground their position mostly on a rejection of the alternatives, and because they are so keen to take an empiricist approach.
Large agreement here Jeremy. The Mcgrews have a good paper on the resurrection and Bayes theorem but their use is applicable here. If the data but forward by Broad (for example) is so easily accounted for by a paranormal hypothesis and so difficult to account for by the best materialist/naturalist hypothesis, then, at the least, it puts the burden of proof on the materialist to justify the prohibitively low prior probability he has for paranormal activity. A burden I think we can agree he can't meet.
Notice, also, that this still separates the bare bones, empirical data from the interpretive, background philosophy to a large degree.
- DanielCC
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
Also, I agree atheists (and materialists) can be rational. But I struggle to see how atheism itself, as a philosophical position (and materialism) could be rational. It faces way too many problems. I mean, ffs, some atheist philosophers of religion have built their entire cases upon the acceptance of BRUTE FACTS. It doesn't get much worse than that. If this isn't a telling sign, I don't know what is.
I agree that the brute fact universe variant of atheism is a non-starter. I am surprised more philosophers interested in the knowledge question haven't laid into the notion of a brute fact as incoherent.
Is there any *really* good defense of atheism that can account for all its difficulties?
.
Really good defenses? No, there are good or at least interesting defenses but they require one to bite some pretty counter-intuitive bullets. It's also questionable whether all of them count as atheistic as opposed to pantheistic.
Is there any *really* good defense of atheism that can account for all its difficulties?
1- Cosmological arguments
Basically, when it comes to the existence of the universe or conditioned beings, atheists have to hold either to (a) brute facts, which are literally worse than magic; or (b) that the necessary/unconditioned being responsible for the existence of the universe is itself physical/material and impersonal. But this faces severe problems, such as I) the universe, and every material being, appears to be contingent and in fact scientists often assume it is, II) the explanation for conditioned beings in terms of an unconditioned one can't be merely conceptual, but can't be scientific either (science seems to explain things in terms of conditioned beings and laws), so what could it be if not personal?, III) can't explain the order in the existence of contingent beings, as the theist can appeal to all teleological considerations here which strongly suggest purposeful creation, IV) metaphysical problems, such as material beings having parts which need to be conjoined, etc, V) the possession of all perfections by a necessary, unconditioned being, VI) avoiding necessitarianism/Spinozistic pantheism, etc etc.
I agree about brute fact atheism being dead. The atheist either has to argue that the universe is the result of a non-God necessary being (if non-agential then modal collapse worries become more pressing) or as a result of cylical causation, which might be ruled out by the PSR anyway and requires some pretty hefty metaphysical and scientific presumptions re the nature of time. Neither are very plausible.
What do you mean by point II, the claim about conditioned and unconditioned beings (sounds Kantian)?
I think arguments from a necessary being to a necessary being possessing perfect attributes are far weaker than the basic cosmological argument reasoning and arguments about metaphysical parts weaker still. It seems hard to avoid attributing omnipotence to the necessary being though for PSR reasons (if the atheist wants to dodge that they should posit more necessary beings to ground different explanatory chains)
2- General teleological arguments
They have to (a) deny final causes or (b) accept final causes. If they accept final causes, they probably have to hold some form of platonism to explain how final causes can be operative before they even exist. Then all objections against platonism would apply. If they deny final causes, they have to accept brute facts about the regularity of the laws of nature and even the mere existence/persistence in existence of things.
Why would they have to accept Platonism? The question of whether there are dispostional properties is a different debate to what a property is i.e. is it a universal, trope or resembling relation. The Thomist teleological argument does not far very well unfortunately as philosophers convinced by dispositional properties and physical intentionality won't buy the thesis about relations to a mind (in fact if they be physicalists and want to avails themselves of intentionality in nature they can't).
Three other options here would be neutral monism (the weakest I think), panpsychism or atheistic idealism
3- Fine-tuning
In sum, they have to (a) deny the fine-tuning, or (b) explain it by means of a multiverse or (c) explain it by some kind of necessity.
Don't know enough about this to comment. Of course if they bite the modal collapse bullet or accept modal concretism (which also entails biting the modal collapse bullet) then that would be one way around it. Likewise for other non-materialist accounts.
4- Arguments from eternal truths (Saint Augustine, Leibniz, etc)
Atheists have to (a) reject realism about universals, possibilia, propositions, mathematical objects and truths etc. or (b) accept realism but somehow ground it in either platonism, aristotelian realism, or something evwn more eccentric such as lewisian possible worlds. There are serious problems with all of these.
Again sadly I don't think the Argument from Eternal Truths will convince many who are not already theists. Yes, there are problems with Platonism but most of those are physicalist naturalist strawmen anyway.
I5- Qualia/consciousness
Presumably, most atheists will want to be materialists, but then they'll have to either accept some kind of eliminativism or reductionism. But then they'll have serious problems with the knowledge argument, the zombie argument, and so on. Otherwise, they'll have to settle for something like property dualism and will have to find a way to avoid epiphenomenalism and to explain how property dualism would be possible (some kind of emergentism). Or they'll have to be something even more eccentric, such as panpsychists. If they accept something like Nagel's view it becomes hard to resist certain teleological arguments, or certain arguments from reason.
Agreed that normal materialism is dead. Good riddance, atheists would have had an easier time if the gave up their determination to die on that hill. They will just accept immanent teleology, neutral monism, panphysicism or idealism though. I think *consciousness* is something that would cause problems for naturalist proponents of the first position though. Again I don't think the Thomist teleological argument is going to be much use against them.
7- Libertarian free will
Granted, many atheists are compatibilists. But if they're incompatibilist libertarians, they'd have to somehow square it with materialism (which presumably most atheists accept). From what I've heard there have been some defenses of materialistic libertarian free will (Rescher), but it could be an additional worry.
True, not just Libertarian free will but agent causation as well. Of course this is incompatible with old materialism but I'm assuming the new breed of atheists will have dropped that anyway after devouring their weaker offspring. Agent Causation still presents an issue, the best way round it would be for them to flood the world with agents. The atheism in question will certainly be very different from what we popularly associate with that position.
8- Objective morality and axiology
If the atheist wants to maintain mechanistic naturalism (as most of them do), it becomes notoriously difficult to hold any sort of objective morality or axiology.
Those atheists will be a thing of the past. Morally it seems a choice between Platonic intuitionism or some kind of perfectionist ethics a la Smith.
Last edited by DanielCC (3/04/2018 7:30 pm)
- UGADawg
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
I mean, I don't think the notion that someone could prefer A to B, yet pick B, is even coherent, unless the relevant budget constraint allows for B and not A.
We are in agreement on that point, unless I misunderstand you.
And to your latter question, insofar as something isn't subsumed into the preference function, it just isn't relevant to the choice.
What is the 'something' here which you are thinking isn't subsumed into the preference function?
I don't think that. Rather, I'm saying it seems the libertarian would have to hold there is something beyond preferences and constraints relevant to the choice. And it's not clear to me what that would look like, or how it would be cashed out in a way that doesn't leave the choice seeming arbitrary. On the other hand, if there's nothing beyond the set of preferences / constraints relevant to the decision, how is it not determined? There's a fairly straightforward mathematical interpretation of this where the choice outcome cannot be otherwise given the set of preferences / constraints, Miguel's protestations to the contrary regarding a finite good being unable to determine a choice notwithstanding.
Last edited by UGADawg (3/04/2018 5:19 pm)
- Miguel
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
DanielCC,
Cosmological arguments:
As you said, these alternatives require the atheist to bite very counter-intuitive bullets. What I meant with conditioned beings is just a neutral term signifying some kind of dependence, however one understands it (act/potency, parts/wholes, essence/existence, whatever). In principle, a conditioned being can be necessary but still require conditions for its existence (eg numbers). Funny you think arguments about metaphysical parts to not be strong, as I personally find them very plausible and one of the biggest problems for atheism, as they imply the immateriality of the necessary/unconditioned being and from there it seems pretty easy to derive intelligence and agency. That and how to avoid modal collapse without the necessary being being an agent. I also agree with Samuel Clarke, Pruss and others that teleological aspects also make it very plausible that the first cause is intelligent; in principle one could try to avoid it by necessitarianism, but that's not a good option: if we come across a message written in the sand "REMINDER THAT EXISTENCE ACTUALLY IS A PREDICATE", it would be preposterous to explain it by invoking necessity without any kind of intelligence behind it (also, Hume can bite me). Also if there is rationality in the universe, by PPC the first cause would also have it wouldn't it?
From what I said about teleology I think modal collapse would not be an adequate answer to fine-tuning, should've made that clear. The main way out from FT would be a multiverse without Boltzmann brains, but there are some issues with the multiverse hypothesis as an explanation, I think.
I mentioned platonism because to me it seemed like the only alternative to explain operative final causes which do not actually exist in nature. And I think platonism is very problematic.
When it comes to reason, I don't think immanent teleology, neutral monism and panpsychism could be enough for taking care of all arguments from reason. Idealism, well, is it really plausible (or at least possible, even) to have a coherent idealism without theism, or at least pantheism? It seems to me that atheistic idealism would be a really strange position.
Last edited by Miguel (3/04/2018 9:12 pm)
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Thread Starter- Miguel
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Re: Is there any hope for atheism as a philosophical position?
Also, this might sound a bit strange, but couldn't some kind of hylemorphism be compatible with idealism? Unless idealism is to become meaningless, wouldn't we still hold that there is a basic difference between what we call "material beings" and what we could try to differentiate as "mental beings"? Idealists have to admit that there is a strong correlation between, for instance, brain states and what we'd call mental states. If both were taken as mental by the idealist, wouldn't it still be the case that they are different or have different properties, and arguments from reason could conclude that there is what we'd call a soul different from and above the "idea of the brain" (and thus the argument from the soul goes through again)?
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