As far as I remember, Feser simply states that the fact we come to know PSR from experience (if we do that) there is really no reason to limit such a principle to the world of experience as such, as if it would not be valid in the numenon. Kant argues that our principles of thought do not apply to the numenon, only to our experience of things. Unless one were to accept Kant's highly controversial conception of nature and human knowledge; for Kant, we just cannot know the noumenon, we can't say anything about it, only our experience. It's not a strawman, just a simple retort. Especially in analytic philosophy, it is highly unlikely that Kant's conception will be accepted.

To me, Kant's objection that our principles (including psr) only apply to our experience and we can never know anything about the noumenon, is ultimately incoherent:

1) Consider a typical empirical argument for PSR: PSR is the best explanation for why things do not pop into existence with no cause or explanation whatsoever.
2) Kant's insistence that we must limit such a principle to our experience comes off as ad hoc against the simplest explanation, but suppose we buy Kant's thinking in order to accept the objection, and we only take it that it's impossible for things to pop into existence in our experience, but that it is possible in the noumenon (PSR holds for our experience but not for the noumenon)
3) Now we can entertain the following possibility: if PSR does not apply to the noumenon, then mysterious beings could be popping up into existence in the noumenon all the time, and such beings could also be causing things to pop up into existence unexplained *in our experience*
4) But this clearly does not happen, so the same argument we limited to a conclusion about "our experience" would also lead us to conclude that PSR is indeed true in the noumenon, beyond our experience, and thus we avoid the scenario in 3.
5) Alternatively, one could try to hold that, like 3, there could indeed be a multitude of beings coming into existence all the time in the noumenon with no explanation whatsoever. But such beings cannot make things pop into existence *in our experience*, because order is how we experience things. However, the problem is that this option is not really available for the Kantian, since it entails that we can know sure objective facts about the noumenon: whatever beings there are in the noumenon, they CANNOT make things pop into existence wih no apparent explanations whatsoever in our experience. They also cannot change the way we experience things (which could also be happening all the time if PSR is false). But then Kant's whole division of the noumenon and the world of experience becomes blurred, and we contradict his view that we cannot come to know objective facts about the noumenon. Then we have no reason to accept Kant's objection in 2, and indeed we have reasons to reject it.

Moreover, the overall bizarreness of the kantian PSR in such a case speaks against it. Why wouldn't any noumenon beings be able to cause effects in our experience that would only seem to be unexplained? It wouldn't even technically violate our "experience PSR" since ultimately the effects would have causes (in the noumenon), just would seem unexplained to us. Can't things seem unexplained to us? Etc.

UGADawg wrote:

Well, my point was that Kant isn't reasoning like: we know PSR from experience, therefore it's only valid for experience. In fact, Kant thinks the opposite is true, i.e. we know PSR prior to experience. And in fact, for Kant, the kinds of facts that result in us coming to know PSR have nothing to do, of themselves, with the question of which domains PSR can be validly applied to. So while it's true to say the inference from "we learn PSR from experience" to "therefore PSR can only be applied to experience" is a bad one, it's decidedly not Kant's inference, so it's neither here nor there.

My worry regarding your objection (5) is just that the Kantian would presumably say however the noumena act on us causally, we'll interpret those causes as being consistent with PSR, since interpreting our experience in light of PSR is a condition required for the possibility of experience in the first place.

 
Sure enough but my point is that if we do not accept Kant's controversial views about nature and knowledge, we have no reason to limit PSR to experience. Even if we come to know it a priori. Which I believe is also one of Feser's points -- more often than not people say "Kant refuted this or that" without realizing that Kant's arguments depend on his controversial system which is not very popular today. A critic can't have its cake and eat it too.

About your reply to 5, that is precisely my point. That is an open possibility, but not for the Kantian, because what it implies is that through the argument I just made we ended up arriving at a conclusion that holds not only for our experience but for the noumenon also. The noumenon *cannot* cause anything that could appear to us to be unexplained. But this is incoherent withh Kant's view that we cannot really come to know anything objective about the noumenon, and takes away all the force of kantian objections. In a sense we can even say that we have reached principles that apply all across the board, beyond our experience binding also anything in the noumenon: the principles that condition our experience. So 5 is not at all an open possibility for the Kantian. We therefore have no reason to limit PSR to our experience, and in fact have good grounds for rejecting such a limitation.

Moreover, it seems to me that there is also an additional problem here: our experience does not structure the world in a way that every phenomenon we see has an apparent explanation. More often than not we come in contact with phenomena for which we have no explanation whatsoever; in such cases, we don't actually conclude that there is no explanation whatsoever and these are just brute facts, rather we believe there are explanations to be found, but we just weren't able to find them. The explanations are beyond our ken. If that is the case, however, then the situation gets even worse for the Kantian: an infinity of unexplained beings could pop into existence in thhe noumenon with no explanation and for no reason whatsoever, and then cause bowling balls to be appearing in our experience ex nihilo. Why would this be a violation of our "experience PSR"? The bowling balls would not really be brute facts at all: they would all have causes in the noumena. They would, just like certain phenomena we come across in ordinary experience, just *appear* to not have explanations; we wouldn't find any explanation for them just like we don't for many things. So how exactly should our experience even preclude these bizarre scenarios from occurring -- which we know do not occur, as all kinds of thigs could just be popping up into existence at random if it were possible, but which by themselves would not be categorically different from known cases of unexplained phenomena? Why should our experience preclude such occurrences only "to that certain extent"? So it seems that, additional to the problems in option 5, our experience really should not be able to preclude these bizarre things from happening if PSR were not true in the noumenon.

Last edited by Miguel (2/13/2018 9:12 pm)

Miguel wrote:

As far as I remember, Feser simply states that the fact we come to know PSR from experience (if we do that) there is really no reason to limit such a principle to the world of experience as such, as if it would not be valid in the numenon. Kant argues that our principles of thought do not apply to the numenon, only to our experience of things. Unless one were to accept Kant's highly controversial conception of nature and human knowledge; for Kant, we just cannot know the noumenon, we can't say anything about it, only our experience. It's not a strawman, just a simple retort. Especially in analytic philosophy, it is highly unlikely that Kant's conception will be accepted.

To me, Kant's objection that our principles (including psr) only apply to our experience and we can never know anything about the noumenon, is ultimately incoherent:

1) Consider a typical empirical argument for PSR: PSR is the best explanation for why things do not pop into existence with no cause or explanation whatsoever.
2) Kant's insistence that we must limit such a principle to our experience comes off as ad hoc against the simplest explanation, but suppose we buy Kant's thinking in order to accept the objection, and we only take it that it's impossible for things to pop into existence in our experience, but that it is possible in the noumenon (PSR holds for our experience but not for the noumenon)
3) Now we can entertain the following possibility: if PSR does not apply to the noumenon, then mysterious beings could be popping up into existence in the noumenon all the time, and such beings could also be causing things to pop up into existence unexplained *in our experience*
4) But this clearly does not happen, so the same argument we limited to a conclusion about "our experience" would also lead us to conclude that PSR is indeed true in the noumenon, beyond our experience, and thus we avoid the scenario in 3.
5) Alternatively, one could try to hold that, like 3, there could indeed be a multitude of beings coming into existence all the time in the noumenon with no explanation whatsoever. But such beings cannot make things pop into existence *in our experience*, because order is how we experience things. However, the problem is that this option is not really available for the Kantian, since it entails that we can know sure objective facts about the noumenon: whatever beings there are in the noumenon, they CANNOT make things pop into existence wih no apparent explanations whatsoever in our experience. They also cannot change the way we experience things (which could also be happening all the time if PSR is false). But then Kant's whole division of the noumenon and the world of experience becomes blurred, and we contradict his view that we cannot come to know objective facts about the noumenon. Then we have no reason to accept Kant's objection in 2, and indeed we have reasons to reject it.

Moreover, the overall bizarreness of the kantian PSR in such a case speaks against it. Why wouldn't any noumenon beings be able to cause effects in our experience that would only seem to be unexplained? It wouldn't even technically violate our "experience PSR" since ultimately the effects would have causes (in the noumenon), just would seem unexplained to us. Can't things seem unexplained to us? Etc.

1-2 Things do not pop in or out of existence for no reason for Kant. Straightforwardly, the PSR applies to phenomenon. As for things w.r.t noumenon, then its just a misapplication of the pure concepts of understanding.
3. There is no fact of the matter of what is occurring in the noumenon. To say there is is precisely exiting the system of transcendental idealism, and entering into transcendental realism.

Because Kant has no need for the use of "causation" to be applied to how transcendental objects affect us. Affection isn't used in the way that causation is used. There is a logical relationship (epistemic) with objects and phenomenon, not a causal one. 



 

Last edited by Marty (3/04/2018 9:54 pm)

If you want to have an argument for why Kant's system is true/false, that's another argument. But if you begin with Kant's premises (which you have at least tentatively accepted for the sake of argument), you end with his conclusions. You begin with the system of transcendental idealism, and there will be no fact of the matter whether what occurs in the noumenon. Yet you're insisting as holding to knoweldge of it, and then begin applying concepts to which you have no capacity of doing. So again, PSR is merely a regulative function produced by the pure concepts of understanding, and a categorical misapplication used anywhere else. 

Also the noumenon isn't question-begging. All it's positing are certain epistemic limitations in the negative sense of the term. Merely, we have certain types of concepts of understanding the world, and that's where our understanding ends. That in order to understand the world at all, as qua the discursivity thesis, you must employ concepts that are sythensized with intuitions. When you begin speculation on how things really are outside of experience, you have to give an explanation for how this is possible. Does this involve somehow going outside of concepts? Then the question would be what does that even look like?

Last edited by Marty (3/04/2018 10:45 pm)

Marty wrote:

If you want to have an argument for why Kant's system is true/false, that's another argument. But if you begin with Kant's premises (which you have at least tentatively accepted for the sake of argument), you end with his conclusions. You begin with the system of transcendental idealism, and there will be no fact of the matter whether what occurs in the noumenon. Yet you're insisting as holding to knoweldge of it, and then begin applying concepts to which you have no capacity of doing. So again, PSR is merely a regulative function produced by the pure concepts of understanding, and a categorical misapplication used anywhere else. 

Also the noumenon isn't question-begging. All it's positing are certain epistemic limitations in the negative sense of the term. Merely, we have certain types of concepts of understanding the world, and that's where our understanding ends. That in order to understand the world at all, as qua the discursivity thesis, you must employ concepts that are sythensized with intuitions. When you begin speculation on how things really are outside of experience, you have to give an explanation for how this is possible. Does this involve somehow going outside of concepts? Then the question would be what does that even look like?

 
But that's the whole point. By assuming Kant's premises *arguendo*, it can be shown that they ultimately (1) are false, if we are led to affirm true facts about the noumenon, or (2) that they don't cohere with our own experience, as limited-PSR would not be enough.

By rejecting 1, we are forced to conclude that ceteris paribus our experience and inference to best explanation would lead us to reject Kant's transcendental idealism. This is a valid argument and can't be denied by insisting on "transcendental idealism", because that is precisely what has been found to be lacking by the best explanation argument. So the empirical argument gives us reason to reject transcendental idealism, all things being equal. He can't reject it because it is inconsistent with TI because that would beg the question.

Of course, the Kantian may accept that and think he still has stronger reasons for holding TI, this wouldn't beg the question, but his position would still be weakened (to me, severely weakened) by the best explanation argument. That's all.