Classical Theism, Philosophy, and Religion Forum / What are the best responses to Kant's transcendental idealism?

**Posted by John West** 7/03/2018 11:41 am

But guys we probably shouldn't spend too much time on indiscernible worlds objections. I don't want to get too far from the thread's Kantian theme.

**Posted by Miguel** 7/03/2018 12:21 pm

John West wrote:
I'm not making the modal collapse objection. I'm making the indiscernible worlds objection. Dan makes the latter a follow-up to the former in his Five Proofs review, but they're distinct objections.

I don't see how God's reason for choosing w or v could be statistical or indeterministic. (I'm not even clear on what that means.) The libertarian free choice reply is a good one (though, as I mentioned, leads to problems of its own).

Other potential replies include necessitarianism and extreme modal realism.

Statistical/indeterministic in case we're not talking about God, but only of some necessary ground of existence. I reject that as I don't think it makes much sense and I think theism follows, but hey, the discussion is about PSR, so maybe a defender could appeal to statistical processes if they think it works.

It isn't the modal collapse objection, but presumably the issue is that there can be no reason why w rather than v. Roughly the same answers could be given here in the context of a free choice (or a statistical explanation); "no entailment", or self-explanatory contingent facts.

Maybe a theist can appeal to aesthetic considerations here, too.

Last edited by Miguel (7/03/2018 12:33 pm)

**Posted by Calhoun** 7/03/2018 1:05 pm

John West wrote:
But guys we probably shouldn't spend too much time on indiscernible worlds objections. I don't want to get too far from the thread's Kantian theme.

Ok, just want to say that this objection doesn't seem threatening at all, with or without libertarianism. An epistemic brute fact is not relevant to cosmological argument. its just something we can't explain given our knowledge not an actual brute fact.

**Posted by John West** 7/03/2018 1:12 pm

Calhoun wrote:
Ok, just want to say that this objection doesn't seem threatening at all, with or without libertarianism. An epistemic brute fact is not relevant to cosmological argument. its just something we can't explain given our knowledge not an actual brute fact.

I don't think it merely implies an epistemic brute fact: there is no reason for God to choose w over v because (except for their sheer numerical non-identity) they're the exact same world.

Pruss raises a similar objection in his The Principle of Sufficient Reason, and considers it threatening. (He ends up trying to reply to it with a modified version of the identity of indiscernibles.)

**Posted by John West** 7/03/2018 1:22 pm

Miguel wrote:
Statistical/indeterministic in case we're not talking about God, but only of some necessary ground of existence. I reject that as I don't think it makes much sense and I think theism follows, but hey, the discussion is about PSR, so maybe a defender could appeal to statistical processes if they think it works.

It isn't the modal collapse objection, but presumably the issue is that there can be no reason why w rather than v. Roughly the same answers could be given here in the context of a free choice (or a statistical explanation); "no entailment", or self-explanatory contingent facts.

Maybe a theist can appeal to aesthetic considerations here, too.

Honestly, your reply suggests that you misunderstand what I mean when I say that the worlds are indiscernible, i.e. qualitatively identical and only numerically distinct. (I'm thinking especially of your comment about aesthetic considerations.)

**Posted by John West** 7/03/2018 1:23 pm

Anyway, I don't think I have enough time to continue this conversation (cf. Vallicella “Philosophia longa, vita brevis”).

Thanks for everything so far.

**Posted by Miguel** 7/03/2018 1:47 pm

John West wrote:
Miguel wrote:
Statistical/indeterministic in case we're not talking about God, but only of some necessary ground of existence. I reject that as I don't think it makes much sense and I think theism follows, but hey, the discussion is about PSR, so maybe a defender could appeal to statistical processes if they think it works.

It isn't the modal collapse objection, but presumably the issue is that there can be no reason why w rather than v. Roughly the same answers could be given here in the context of a free choice (or a statistical explanation); "no entailment", or self-explanatory contingent facts.

Maybe a theist can appeal to aesthetic considerations here, too.
Honestly, your reply suggests that you misunderstand what I mean when I say that the worlds are indiscernible, i.e. qualitatively identical and only numerically distinct. (I'm thinking especially of your comment about aesthetic considerations.)

Oh. I reread it, I think you're right. I didn't catch that; I take that back then. but there's still the free will response. But also, I am not sure I agree we can have such a situation of "qualitatively identical and only numerically distinct". I find it somewhat suspect.

Last edited by Miguel (7/03/2018 1:51 pm)