Posted by aftermathemat  2/13/2018 8:52 am | #11 |
RomanJoe wrote:
Can one even reliably deploy an argument for God (or anything) without PSR? Assuming PSR is false, there's no reason why a specific conclusion follows from certain premises. Assuming PSR is false, we could have no guarantee in any "rational" argumentation.
Correct.
Heck, if PSR is false, then epistemic nihilism could in fact be true, and we cannot even say that it's unlikely. Epistemic nihilism, for those who don't know, is the position that there literally are no epistemic merits or demerits, no epistemic obligations of being rational or providing reasons and evidence, and no proposition is such that it entails anything beyond itself, destroying the possibility of deduction.
Of course, the problem with epistemic nihilism is that it is self-defeating and incoherent, because we literally don't have any reason to believe it if it were true, because we don't have any reason to believe ANYTHING if epistemic nihilism were true. Another problem with epistemic nihilism is that, since it denies any epistemic normativity, it is literally meaningless as a position because, at least according to some analytic philosophers, meaning is normative in nature because it may imply other meanings and exclude certain other ones from consideration. This also implies that epistemic nihilism is basically like eliminativist materialism and denies all semantic meaning as well.
I don't know if the above thesis, namely that meaning is normative in nature because a certain idea may imply other ideas and the rejection of yet other ones, is compatible with Aristotelianism-Thomism and/or classical theism and classical philosophy but if it is, it gives us further reasons to accept PSR.
I think we may even be able to make an argument for PSR on the basis that, if ~PSR were true, the possibility that meaning does not exist and epistemic nihilism is true would be wide open, which cannot be because they are self-defeating and incoherent, which by implication means that ~PSR is self-defeating and incoherent.
But I'm not exactly sure of that, since the atheist may say that ~PSR applies only to coherent possibilities, thus preserving some of the rationality of ~PSR (that is, if that position ever even had any "rationality" to begin with).
Last edited by aftermathemat (2/13/2018 8:58 am)
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Posted by Miguel 2/21/2018 1:44 am | #12 |
Just reaffirming what I said in a previous post here, one can defend inductive cosmological arguments for God without having to even necessarily conclude PSR. And I just feel like saying it, but I think Richard Swinburne's overall inductive case for God is a strong one.
My main reasons for believing in God come from classical deductive arguments (Leibnizian cosmological arguments, thomistic arguments, classical teleological ones, the existence of the soul, eternal truths/augustinian, and so on) which are therefore my favorites, but I think the inductive arguments are strong. If for whatever reason I came to reject classical deductive arguments, I'd still accept an inductive case which I think is very plausible. Though disagree with some of his specific views on God's nature, I think Swinburne is correct when he says that a being like God is probable given the existence of the universe, the order in it, the fine tuning, the existence of conscious (we could add rational) agents, and religious experience. We could also say that the existence of a being like God is the best and simplest explanation to these facts, especially taken together. Sometimes we overlook the fact that there are good cases for the existence of God beyond Aquinas, Aristotle, Leibniz Augustine Al-Gazhali etc.
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Posted by Johannes 2/21/2018 11:10 am | #13 |
Then so much the worse for the PSR denier, and he has to come up with a non-question-begging way to reject PSR.
The rejection of PSR is always question-begging. What the atheist would say is that your acceptance of PSR is just as question-begging as his rejection thereof, both of them being bets.
The only way we can make the argument absolutely succeed is to prove that there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence and that there cannot be any grounds whatsoever to say existence is not explicable.
Until we do that, the PSR denier can still stubbornly hold on to his denial.
Of course "there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence". No atheist would deny that. Rather, he would say that there is NO compelling (for him) reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
So, proving that "there is NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence" is not enough to convince a PSR denier. Rather, you need to prove that there is a principled, or compelling, reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
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Posted by Johannes 2/21/2018 12:13 pm | #14 |
Atheists often deny PSR on the basis that it's denial doesn't entail a contradiction and that brute facts are logically possible.
I think it's pretty much incontroversial that brute facts should be a last resort. Who even accepts brute facts outside the context of cosmological arguments anyway? Certainly they should at least not be preferred when there is a potential explanation available. Regardless of whether or not we accept PSR, should we really accept that there is an unexplained infinite regress of conditioned beings causing each other where there is nothing guaranteeing the conditions necessary for any of those conditioned beings to exist? Should we just accept that the universe exists for no reason whatsoever, no explanation needed, nothing? It's clearly bullshit to me.
IMV it is important to distinguish between physical brute facts and metaphysical brute facts, or equivalently between physical explanations and metaphysical explanations.
Most scientifically-minded atheists do not accept physical brute facts. They hold that all entities and events within the universe can be explained by previous entities and events through the physical laws. What they deny is that the existence of the universe itself with its laws needs to be explained, not that it can be explained. So, they accept the possibility, necessity and (at least provisional, as was the case of classical mechanics,) "correspondence with reality" of physical explanations of entities and events within the universe, but they do not accept the necessity and "correspondence with reality" of metaphysical explanations.
Again, the atheist's rejection of the necessity and "correspondence with reality" of metaphysical explanations is not on principled grounds, but just a bet. He would say, "You theists bet that metaphysical explanations are necessary and correspond with reality and I bet that they don't, because I can clearly see where (or rather to Whom) your bet leads."
The weak point of the atheist's position is that current physical observations and established physical laws (not fancy hypotheses) lead to infer that the universe started to exist at some initial time in some initial state which cannot be the result of a previous state, according to those established physical laws. So, the atheist has to either face up to the fact that there is no physical explanation for the beginning of the universe or seek refuge in the fairyland of eternal inflation, the multiverse, and/or the landscape of string theory, hoping that some day a truly scientific model will emerge from there, and moreover that it will be validated by observations.
Alternatively, the atheist can seek refuge in cyclical cosmology, but then he is confronted by the conclusively established finding that the expansion of the universe has been accelerating during the second half of its history, which forces him to postulate:
- either that some presently unknown mechanism will change the currently accelerating expansion into decelerating expansion, stop, and then contraction,
- or that something changed between all previous instances of the universe and the current instance, whereby all previous instances decelerated their expansion and reversed into contraction whereas the current instance will expand for ever.
Either postulate is clearly just fanciful thinking.
So, we theists are comfortably at home not only in metaphysics, but also in current established physics, while atheists must seek refuge in scientifically-sounding fairyland.
Last edited by Johannes (2/21/2018 12:23 pm)
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Posted by aftermathemat 2/21/2018 12:16 pm | #15 |
The rejection of PSR is always question-begging...
Of course "there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence". No atheist would deny that. Rather, he would say that there is NO compelling (for him) reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
So, proving that "there is NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence" is not enough to convince a PSR denier. Rather, you need to prove that there is a principled, or compelling, reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
1) Wouldn't that make the Della Rocca argument work then, and thus force him to hold the position that no explicability arguments are valid / we have no reason to think anything is explicable?
2) How exactly is it that there is no principled reason why explicability shouldn't apply to existence? Della Rocca in his paper refutes certain suggestions as to how such a principled reason would look like, and himself admits that the atheist needs to provide such a principled reason in order to avoid the argument, and says that he isn't optimistic that any such principled reason can even exist, which still implies that the atheist could in the future find a principled reason to deny explicability to existence. Unless we have a decisive argument as to why there is no principled reason and/or can give very strong reason to think that there can be no principled reason to deny explicability to existence, the atheist could just stubbornly deny the argument and hope that some day in the future we may find a principled reason.
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Posted by Miguel 2/21/2018 12:23 pm | #16 |
Then so much the worse for the PSR denier, and he has to come up with a non-question-begging way to reject PSR.
The rejection of PSR is always question-begging. What the atheist would say is that your acceptance of PSR is just as question-begging as his rejection thereof, both of them being bets.
The only way we can make the argument absolutely succeed is to prove that there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence and that there cannot be any grounds whatsoever to say existence is not explicable.
Until we do that, the PSR denier can still stubbornly hold on to his denial.Of course "there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence". No atheist would deny that. Rather, he would say that there is NO compelling (for him) reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
So, proving that "there is NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence" is not enough to convince a PSR denier. Rather, you need to prove that there is a principled, or compelling, reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
But such a reason is already given in the argument. Begging the question is not an option for any rational person; if we accept explicability arguments, then it is only natural for us to accept an explicability argument for why things exist - which therefore leads to PSR. Since this is not open for the PSR denier, he must provide a non-question-begging reason to limit explicability arguments and not allow them to be applied to the existence of things. If he has no such a reason, he simply cannot - on pain of begging the question, which is irrational and invalid - reject the PSR. His only coherent alternative would be to deny all and any explicability arguments, but this is also not an option since it's extremely problematic and also self-defeating. So the PSR denier is stuck between begging the question and accepting PSR.
By contrast, one who accepts PSR does not beg the question in this context, since he simply accepts all explicability arguments, including the one which leads to PSR.
You could maybe ask why he accepts any explicability arguments then, but that goes beyond the dialectical context of Della Rocca's argument. However even in this case the PSR proponent does not beg the question: he can say he accepts explicability because there is a reductio against rejecting it: not only would it stop science and common sense, but it would also be self-defeating as explicability is necessary for us to conclude many thoughts on the basis of arguments and reasons, including any reason for doubting explicability.
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Posted by aftermathemat 2/21/2018 12:25 pm | #17 |
IMV it is important to distinguish between physical brute facts and metaphysical brute facts, or equivalently between physical explanations and metaphysical explanations.
Most scientifically-minded atheists do not accept physical brute facts. They hold that all entities and events within the universe can be explained by previous entities and events through the physical laws. What they deny is that the existence of the universe itself with its laws needs to be explained, not that it can be explained.
I would disagree here.The question of why things exist is a concrete question, since it applies to the actual existence of the universe (and the rest of reality if multiverses and such are somehow confirmed). But the question also easily applies to the existence of any one contingent object, as well as the whole universe collectively, right now, which means that the existence of any one contingent thing is also a "physical fact" in a sense, since it's existence is concrete and actual right now.
The atheist would of course deny that there is any explanation as to why any contingent thing (and the universe collectively) exists right now. But to do so would result in affirming the existence of physical brute facts, since the continued concrete existence of any object is a physical fact. And this opens the atheist up to all sorts of objections such as the possibility of things popping into existence in the future, Hume-style skepticism of induction, the ceasing to exist of anything at all, and a whole bunch of other such arguments that act as strong reasons to accept PSR.
Last edited by aftermathemat (2/21/2018 12:27 pm)
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Posted by Johannes 2/21/2018 12:34 pm | #18 |
Begging the question is not an option for any rational person; if we accept explicability arguments, then it is only natural for us to accept an explicability argument for why things exist - which therefore leads to PSR.
The atheist could base his position on distinguishing between physical and metaphysical explanations, and then accepting the necessity and correspondence with reality of the former while rejecting those of the latter.
That would clearly be question-begging, but the atheist could say that the theist's putting in the same bag both physical and metaphysical explanations is also question-begging, or more elegantly, a postulate.
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Posted by Johannes 2/21/2018 12:48 pm | #19 |
I would disagree here.The question of why things exist is a concrete question, since it applies to the actual existence of the universe (and the rest of reality if multiverses and such are somehow confirmed). But the question also easily applies to the existence of any one contingent object, as well as the whole universe collectively, right now, which means that the existence of any one contingent thing is also a "physical fact" in a sense, since it's existence is concrete and actual right now.
This is a good example of the distinction between physical and metaphysical explanations.
The immediate physical explanation of why a notebook is on your desk right now is that it was there a moment before. From then we can go back to your purchasing it, some factory assembling it, a supernova explosion producing the heavy elements that went into it, and so on till Big Bang.
The metaphysical explanation of why the notebook, as well as the whole universe, exists, is that the Necessary Being, He whose essence is unbounded existence itself, sustains it into existence.
An atheist will accept the necessity and correspondence with reality of the physical explanation and reject the necessity and correspondence with reality of the metaphysical explanation. That rejection is not on any principled reason but just a bet, as is, from his viewpoint, your holding that metaphysical explanations are necessary and correspond with reality.
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Posted by Miguel 2/21/2018 12:51 pm | #20 |
The rejection of PSR is always question-begging...
Of course "there is literally NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence". No atheist would deny that. Rather, he would say that there is NO compelling (for him) reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
So, proving that "there is NO principled reason why explicability does not apply to existence" is not enough to convince a PSR denier. Rather, you need to prove that there is a principled, or compelling, reason why explicability MUST apply to existence.
1) Wouldn't that make the Della Rocca argument work then, and thus force him to hold the position that no explicability arguments are valid / we have no reason to think anything is explicable?
2) How exactly is it that there is no principled reason why explicability shouldn't apply to existence? Della Rocca in his paper refutes certain suggestions as to how such a principled reason would look like, and himself admits that the atheist needs to provide such a principled reason in order to avoid the argument, and says that he isn't optimistic that any such principled reason can even exist, which still implies that the atheist could in the future find a principled reason to deny explicability to existence. Unless we have a decisive argument as to why there is no principled reason and/or can give very strong reason to think that there can be no principled reason to deny explicability to existence, the atheist could just stubbornly deny the argument and hope that some day in the future we may find a principled reason.
If by "stubbornly deny the argument" you mean irrationally deny the argument, then perhaps the atheist can do that. If you believe in X and X entails Y, and you haven't got the slightest idea how to reject Y without simultaneously rejecting X, then you have to accept Y. This same pattern could be defended in a matter similar to Della Rocca's own argument, I belive, and on its face this epistemological pattern seems fundamental to valid and coherent reasoning. Think about it: if you accept X, and X->Y but you reject Y, and you have no idea whatsoever how the entailment can be avoided without begging the question, what would the rejection of Y imply for the coherence of your beliefs and belief-formation?
Perhaps (though I'm not sure) one could still insist that if Y is so implausible so as to never warrant acceptance, then the entailment from X to Y can be resisted. But only if the entailment itself is not extremely plausible, and the fact we have no idea whatsoever how it can even be coherently resisted speaks in favor of the entailment being very probable. And prima facie this would put the burden of proof on the PSR denier to come up with an extremely strong reason to reject Y and that cannot be defused (if it can, then prima facie the entailment X->Y will be more plausible than the improbability of Y, given the background.).
